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  This study looks at the welfare implications of the minimum wage in China, and covers 
three topics: the minimum wage and wage inequality, the minimum wage and employment, 
and the minimum wage and the gender wage gap. The main finding is that the welfare 
implications of the minimum wage in China are mixed, with both positive and negative 
welfare effects. Four main conclusions are reached. Firstly, minimum wages can effectively 
reduce overall wage inequality at the municipal level (despite non-compliance) through 
raising individual wages at the lower end of the wage distribution. Secondly, minimum 
wages generally have significantly negative effects on urban employment with some 
indication of more marked effects for traditionally disadvantaged groups such as youth, 
older workers, and women. Thirdly, minimum wages significantly raise women’s wages 
relative to men’s at the lower quantiles of wage distribution, thus reducing the gender wage 
gap. Together with the second result, this means that the minimum raises women’s relative 
wages, while lowering their employment. Fourthly, these three results are especially robust 
during 2004-2007, when the minimum wage system was reinforced.  
  Specific point estimates found in this study are as follows. As regards minimum wage 
impacts on wages, we find that a 10% increase in the minimum wage raises the wage at the 
10th percentile by up to 6%, and also reduces the 10-60 wage gap by almost 10%. Given 
such significant wage effects, we expect employment effects, and find that elasticity of 
employment with respect to the minimum wage for compliant workers is about -0.2 pre-
2004 and -0.3 post-2004. The figure for compliant youth is higher, approximately -0.4 pre-
2004 and -0.8 post-2004. However, we also find that the negative employment effects for 
compliant workers are counterbalanced to some extent by significant positive effects for the 
non-compliant. Overall employment effects therefore appear small for most groups, though 
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The minimum wage is one of the most studied topics in labour economics. However, the majority 
of the literature concentrates on developed countries. As is to be expected given the limited 
literature on less-developed countries (LDCs hereafter), relevant research on China is in its 
infancy. The theory and empirical experience of the minimum wage in developed countries needs 
to be fitted into the framework of development economics, remembering that China is an LDC 
(albeit one of the most important). Moreover, studies on China and other LDCs can in turn afford 
varied and rich findings for minimum wage studies in general. In summary, it is necessary and 
interesting to study China’s distinctive experience of the minimum wage. 
  This study will investigate the welfare implications of the minimum wage in China, which is 
important since the minimum wage potentially provides a wage floor for many millions of 
low-wage labourers. Generally speaking, the minimum wage is a policy confronting equity and 
efficiency issues. On the one hand, it redistributes earnings between employers and employees, 
helping workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. This equity effect is especially 
important in a monopsonistic labour market to avoid exploitation (payment of wages less than the 
marginal revenue product). On the other hand, the minimum wage forces employers to change 
their employment decisions, which may or may not (given monopsony power) reduce unskilled 
employment. Thus, when the welfare implications of the minimum wage in China are explored 
both redistributive and employment effects need to be considered. In addition, the minimum 
wage effect on the gender wage gap is examined as a special case of the above two effects since 
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women make up a larger proportion of the low wage workforce than men (see Table 4.1). Overall 
then, this study includes three components: minimum wage effects on the wage distribution, on 
employment, and on the gender wage gap. 
  The data used in this study are a sub-sample of the Urban Household Survey (UHS hereafter) 
in China, combined with municipal minimum wage data collected personally. In particular, the 
UHS sample data in this study include individual annual data over the period 1988-2003 and 
individual monthly data over 2004-2007. This UHS sample covers nearly half of the mainland 
provinces (14 out of a total of 31 provinces), with important economic zones included. Total 
observations amount to more than 160,000. In sum, this study is based on representative 
individual urban survey data for 1988 to 2007. 
  The remaining sections in this chapter are arranged as follows: first, a brief introduction on the 
institutional background is given; then research advantages, contributions and findings are 
illustrated; and lastly, the thesis structure is presented. 
1.1. Institutional background 
This section first summarises China’s basic administrative divisions and regional characteristics. 
Then the second part takes up the labour market, describing characteristics of LDCs and 
transition economies relevant to China. Specifically, we discuss such concepts as the 
dual-economy, formal and informal sectors, state-owned enterprises (SOEs hereafter), state trade 
unions and rural migrants. Lastly, the minimum wage system as it has developed in China is 
illustrated and discussed. 
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Administrative and regional characteristics 
First, is must be remembered that China country has four levels of administrative divisions. 
These divisions are sheng (province), shi (city), xian (town) and xiang (village). The fourth level 
(village) is usually only used in rural areas. As noted, our study is based on urban survey data; 
therefore, it only includes the three levels of province, city and town. However, for each 
administrative level there are in fact several terms with different political implications. For 
example, at the province level, there are 4 zhixiashi (municipalities directly under central 
government, such as Beijing), 5 zizhiqu (autonomous regions, such as Xinjiang) and 22 sheng 
(proper provinces, such as Shanxi) on the mainland. In order to simplify statements, normally 
these terms at the province level are uniformly called sheng (province). Thus, in total there can be 
said to be 31 mainland provinces.  
Analogous simplifications are required for the terms shi (city) and xian (town). Two terms 
need to be clarified regarding xian (town) and municipality. First, in a large part of the literature 
on China (for example, see Fang and Lin, 2013) xian is translated as county following the 
corresponding term in the administrative division system of the United States. However, 
following usage in the United Kingdom, xian is better translated as town. Thus town in this study 
has the same administrative and political meaning as county in some literature on China (for 
example, see Fang and Lin, 2013), both representing the level of xian. Second, since towns are 
only smaller cities, and are often mentioned together with cities as towns and cities, we will use 





central government (zhixiashi), such as Beijing and Shanghai, are taken to represent the province 
level. Overall, then, our study uses two administrative levels, the province and the municipality.    
The second point of the basic background is that China exhibits obvious regional differences. 
The eastern region includes all coastal provinces, with the most developed economy in the whole 
country (The summed provincial GDP of the east has always been more than half of the national 
GDP, since economic reform began in 1978). This area attracts enterprise, as well as skilled and 
low-skilled workers from all over the country, exhibiting a tight labour market. By contrast, the 
western region is waterless and the poorest. Its GDP is less than 20% of the national GDP. 
Generally, people are reluctant to work for firms or government departments in the western 
region. The situation of the central region is somewhere between the east and west. Thus, 
regional factors require consideration in this study.     
The labour market 
There are several characteristics of the labour market in China. First, China is a transition 
economy, containing features of both a market economy and a planned economy. A free labour 
market gradually started to appear in the 1980s. Before that, from the early 1950s to the late 
1980s, there was only a system of wage administration and labour allocation (Knight and Song, 
2006, p.3). Even nowadays, the government has an important influence on the labour market, for 
example through state-owned enterprises (SOEs). There are a large number of SOEs in our 
survey’s urban areas. They not only influence markets as employers, but also take on “social 
responsibilities” as representatives of government in the market, for example, maintaining low 
product prices, and improving employment and worker welfare to keep society “stable”. In fact, it 
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is widely accepted that SOEs are more policy-led than profit-led2. Thus, the behaviour of 
government and its SOEs also needs consideration in this study. 
  Second, like all LDCs, China has a dual-economy with a rural and urban sector. As a 
traditional agricultural country, a large part of the population lives in rural areas. In 1990, the 
fourth national census classified more than 70% of people as rural. By 2000, this ratio had fallen 
but still remained as high as 64%3. Given that part of the rural population aims to move into the 
relatively small urban labour markets, there is an almost unlimited labour supply to the urban 
labour market, as depicted by the Lewis model on the dual-economy in development economics 
(for example, see Cai and Wang, 2010). This elastic rural labour supply rests on the internal 
passport system or hukou (see the next paragraph), and gives rise to a dual labour market in the 
urban areas. 
  The administrative passport system restricting mobility from rural to urban areas is the 
household registration system called hukou. Each person has a hukou to relate his/her identity to 
the local police system. If a person’s hukou corresponds to his/her administrative district, such as 
a province or municipality, he/she is defined as a local resident and is eligible for municipal 
facilities such as subsidized housing and schools, and also employer-provided benefits such as 













outside options and be prepared to supply their services for lower wages.      
  Restriction of rural-urban mobility gives China a dual labour market in urban areas with formal 
and informal sectors. Usually, informal sectors are characterised by avoidance of the law, small 
firms, and casual or self-employment. Workers in informal sectors typically have low skills and 
low earnings with little or no prospect of internal promotion (Shen, 2000; Zhu, 2002). It is true 
that there exist informal jobs in formal sectors, in part because of the high cost of hukou transfer. 
In other words, formal jobs in China should be accompanied by an official record in personnel 
files and a location transfer of hukou; that is, a transfer from a migrant to a resident identity. 
However, such hukou transfer is especially difficult for SOEs and government departments. 
Unlike other LDCs, therefore, even though a person is employed by a SOE or public department, 
he/she may still be regarded as belonging to the informal sector since he/she has had no hukou 
transfer. The dualism caused by the hukou system can be used to explain firms’ widespread 
non-compliance with minimum wages (that is, payment of sub-minimum wages) as discussed 
below. 
  Workers in formal and informal sectors are also likely to be treated differently even within the 
same firm. Workers in formal employment obtain written labour contracts, which include wage 
rates that follow government rules, some kinds of in-work welfare (such as housing and medical 
allowances) and strict disemployment compensation, while workers in informal sectors may only 
make verbal agreements (Knight and Song, 2006, pp.86-99). This difference complicates our 
analysis of minimum wages. When the minimum wage rises, wages in formal sectors increase 
accordingly. This indicates a higher labour cost for the formal workers, and may lead to a fall in 
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employment in formal sectors relative to informal sectors. On the other hand, it must be 
remembered that a formal labour contract conveys job security, so that the burden of adjustment 
could fall on informal workers, leading to a fall in informal employment relative to formal 
employment. Those two opposite responses need empirical analysis.  
In summary, China is a special LDC. It contains all the characteristics of LDCs, i.e. a 
dual-economy of rural and urban sectors, an “unlimited” labour supply to urban labour markets, 
and a dual labour market of informal and formal sectors in urban areas. However, it also contains 
its own features, with its rural migrants having hukou restrictions, a strong government, large 
numbers of SOEs, weak trade unions and low levels of social welfare. All these factors are 
directly or indirectly related to this study on the minimum wage, and are now considered. 
The minimum wage system 
China first established its minimum wage system in 1993 and reinforced it in 2004 as shown 
below. Its minimum wage is intended to be applicable to all employed people, including the 
young and the disabled. On 24th November 1993, the Enterprises Minimum Wages Regulations 
were issued by the Ministry of Labour. In the following July, the Labour Law of China was 
issued (implemented on 1st January 1995). Ten years later, in January 2004, further Minimum 
Wages Regulations were issued, and implemented in March of the same year, reinforcing the 
original 1993 regulation. Finally, in 2007 the Announcement about Further Perfecting Minimum 
Wages Regulations was issued, highlighting several problems in minimum wage regulation and 
pressing for better implementation, given problems of non-compliance (see below). 
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  Though based on a national law, the specific level and fixing date of the minimum wage is 
decided by provincial governments. The minimum wage in each province, therefore, began 
gradually, province by province. Taking the sample data as an example, the earliest minimum 
wage was in Guangdong province in 1992, a test province for minimum wages before the 
national law. The latest one in this period was in Sichuan in 1995. Relevant details can be found 
in the appendix of Chapter 3 (Appendix 3a-d). Furthermore, recognising the different stages of 
economic development within each province, there are several levels of municipal minimum 
wage for the each province. This feature is similar to Canada (Wang and Gunderson, 2011), and 
different from the single national minimum wage level in the UK, for example. This means that 
China contains around 100 separate minimum wages each year, providing good variation for 
empirical analysis.  
  The procedure of minimum wage fixing is similar to other provincial policies in China – set by 
provinces and agreed by the central government. First, the provincial Department of Labour and 
Social Security, cooperating with the provincial trade union and the provincial business 
association, proposes provisional minimum wages (MLSS, Minimum Wages Regulations, 2004). 
Then the provincial department sends its plan to the national leading department – the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security. The Ministry is then meant to consult with the National Trade Union 
and the National Business Association. After consultation, the Ministry may put forward some 
amendments, and returns the plan to the provinces. However, if there is not any response from the 
ministry within 14 days, it means that the plan has been approved completely (MLSS, Minimum 
Wages Regulations, 2004). Once approved, the provincial Department of Labour and Social 
Security reports to the local provincial government, and the new minimum wage is formally 
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published in the regional gazette.  
Businesses are meant to respond quickly to the newly adjusted minimum wage. The regulation 
states (MLSS, Minimum Wages Regulations, 2004) that within seven days of acceptance, new 
minimum wages are to be announced in the regional gazette and in at least one newspaper, the 
circulation of which must cover the whole administrative district (either province or 
municipality). After the new minimum wage is announced, enterprises are meant to apply it to all 
employees within ten days. Thus there appear to be ten days for enterprises to adjust their wages. 
However, in practice the minimum wage regulations have to be revised, in recognition of which, 
Guandong province, for example, set a grace period of three months for enterprises to adjust their 
minimum wages in 20134. Nevertheless, minimum wage changes are likely to have quicker 
effects in China than in developed countries such as the UK and US which give much more 
adjustment time (several months normally, see Neumark and Wascher, 2008, p.63).  
  As an LDC, two features regarding the implementation of the minimum wage in China can 
offset its disemployment effect. One is the fact that it is a monthly rate, and the other is 
non-compliance. Although an hourly minimum wage does exist, customarily monthly wages are 
popular in China and hourly wages are seldom adopted because of limited part-time work 
availability. Accordingly, firms can increase the minimum wage while raising working hours at 
the same time. In this way, any disemployment effects may be reduced. Non-compliance for its 
part is caused by the conflict between wage equity and employment (Cooke, 2005, pp.134-138). 





export enterprises and may cause unemployment. Thus, the government would rather acquiesce 
with some non-compliance, which can work as a buffer against any adverse employment effects 
of the minimum wage policy (Empirical analysis of non-compliance is given in section 4.2 in 
Chapter 4). Overall, these two features make the analysis of China’s minimum wage somewhat 
different from developed countries.  
Finally, the reinforcement of the minimum wage system in 2004 is important to this study. 
When minimum wages were first established in the 1990s, China was transforming its planned 
economy to a market economy, and priority was given to efficiency (economic development) 
without much consideration of fairness (equal wages and income)5. However, when entering the 
2000s, China was becoming one of the most important economic powers, and economic 
development was not so pressing an issue. Moreover, social problems caused by income 
inequality became increasingly severe. Therefore, the central government turned its policies from 
efficiency to fairness. A slogan, “set up a harmonious society”6, was put forward in 2004. In 2005, 
the government further emphasised its aim “to pay more attention to social fairness”7. 
Against this backdrop, the new version of the minimum wage regulation in 2004 was designed 
to have stronger impacts than before. The most important revisions were: first, that hourly 
minimum wages had to be specified by local governments, not just monthly rates; second, that 
                                                              
5  “Xiaolv youxian,  jiangu gongping”  ‐  see The Resolution  from  the Central Committee of  the Communist Party of 
China  on  Perfecting  theSocialist  Market  Economic  System  (Zhonggong  Zhongyang  guanyu  Jianli  Shehuizhuyi 
Shichang Jingji Tizhi Ruogan Wenti de Jueyi), 1993. 







governments had to adjust their minimum wages at least every two years; and third, that the 
determination of the minimum wage level should be changed. As regards this final revision, in 
the 1993 regulation, local governments were meant to consider labourers’ productivity when 
deciding the minimum wage, while in the 2004 regulation, this productivity factor was dropped, 
and new factors added, including inflation, and the workers’ share of social security taxes. In sum, 
the regulation of 2004 was intended to be more favourable to workers.  
  In summary, the minimum wage in China has its own particular characteristics. It exhibits 
good provincial and municipal variation, an advantage for data analysis. It is normally set as a 
monthly rate, which may reduce employment effects (since hours can increase to offset wage 
increases). Enterprises need to respond to increases in minimum wages within two or three 
months, suggesting the role of lagged minimum wages is relatively unimportant. Non-compliance 
is quite widespread. Lastly, there appears to be an increase in minimum wage pressure in 2004 
and afterwards. 
1.2. Research advantages, contributions and findings 
  This study has several advantages:  
  (1) A unique municipal minimum wages dataset has been collected personally, offering more 
detail than the provincial minimum wage data usually used. It must be remembered that there is 
no uniform source to collect municipal minimum wages in China (see Wang and Gunderson, 
2011, 2012; Fang and Lin, 2013), and hundreds of municipal minimum wages have been set over 
the whole country since 1995. These municipal minimum wages were collected personally, 
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together with their specific implementation dates, giving more accuracy than in the current 
literature on China (Wang and Gunderson, 2011 and 2012).   
  (2) Individual monthly panel data are used, with individuals followed for 12-48 months, which 
permits individual fixed effects and thus alleviates endogeneity problems caused by omitted 
variables. The estimates, therefore, are more accurate than using the data at the municipal level 
alone. 
  (3)  The data series cover a long period, 1988 to 2007, 20 years in all. This permits a contrast 
of the pre-2004 period with the post-2004 period, when the minimum wage system was 
reinforced. It also allows use of within-municipality variation.  
  This study contributes to the literature in the following ways:  
  (1) It is the first study to look at the direct relationship between the wage inequality index and 
the minimum wage in China. It is also the first study to make preliminary investigations into the 
spillover effects of the minimum wage in China. 
  (2) It is one of the few studies to focus on minimum wages at the municipal level. Almost all 
relevant studies on China (surveyed later) are at the more aggregate provincial level. 
  (3) To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study to directly examine the role 
of the minimum wage in the gender wage gap at various points of the wage distribution, and in 
particular at the bottom deciles. 
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  This study finds that the welfare implications of the minimum wage in China are mixed, with 
both positive and negative welfare effects. The main conclusions include:  
  First, despite non-compliance, minimum wages can effectively reduce overall wage inequality 
at the municipal level. The channel of this “equity” effect (without considering unemployment) is 
through raising individual wages at the lower end of the wage distribution. 
  Second, minimum wages generally appear to have significant negative effects on urban 
employment. Three disadvantaged groups include young workers, women workers and older 
workers. 
  Third, the minimum wage appears to strongly reduce gender wage gap among the low-paid. 
Low-paid women’s pay is increased more than low-paid men’s. Also, more women than men 
become covered by the minimum. These beneficial changes occurred at a time when wage 
inequality, and the gender wage gap itself was generally rising. 
  Finally, the above conclusions are especially robust during 2004-2007, when the minimum 
wage institution was reinforced. 
1.3. Thesis structure 
This thesis has six further chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature. It includes three 
main sections, i.e. the minimum wage and wage inequality; the minimum wage and employment; 
and the minimum wage and the gender wage gap. Chapter 3 describes the data used in the thesis, 
as well as giving a statistical description of the main variables. In particular, the two datasets are 
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described. One concerns the Urban Household Survey (UHS), and the other the municipal 
minimum wage data collected personally. Then Chapter 4 examines the minimum wage and wage 
inequality, including three main sections: the compliance issue, the minimum wage and overall 
wage inequality, and the minimum wage and wage distribution. Chapter 5 looks at the minimum 
wage and employment, including theory, empirical results and robustness checks. Chapter 6 
focuses on the minimum wage and the gender wage gap. Lastly, Chapter 7 draws some 
conclusions.        
  Figures, tables and appendices are attached at the end of each corresponding chapter. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
There is considerable literature pertaining to the minimum wage which is relevant to this inquiry 
in China. Extensive literature reviews can be found in Brown et al. (1982), Card and Krueger 
(1995) and Brown (1999). Two more recent surveys from Neumark and Wascher (2006 and 2008) 
conclude that the minimum wage compresses wage distribution but depresses employment, while 
the very recent survey (Belman and Wolfson, 2014) mainly of US research is less conclusive. For 
specific countries, Metcalf’s review (2008) on the employment effects of minimum wages in the 
United Kingdom is notable, as is Gunderson’s (2005) for Canada. Recent surveys on employment 
effects can be found in Schmitt (2013) and Mărginean and Chenic (2013). Minimum wages in 
developing countries are surveyed in Freeman (2009). Overall, most literature concentrates on 
minimum wages in industrial countries, and is limited in relevance for LDCs, leaving a literature 
gap for China. 
  The literature on the study of minimum wages in China is small. Empirical studies in Chinese 
journals only appear from 2005, one year after the reinforcement of the minimum wage system 
mentioned in Chapter 1 (Han and Wei, 2005). The first relevant English paper (Du and Pan, 2009) 
was published in 2009. To date, in English there are merely six published papers (Du and Pan, 
2009; Ding, 2010; Han et al., 2011; Ni et al., 2011; Wang and Gunderson, 2011 and 2012), one 
conference paper (Xiao and Xiang, 2009) and two working papers (Du et al., 2008; Fang and Lin, 
2013). It seems that China’s minimum wage only attracted attention from academic economists 
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after 2004 when this system was reinforced and had “bite”. 
  The plan here is to consider research findings for minimum wage effects on wage inequality, 
employment and the gender wage gap in turn. In the first section, the focus is on the experience 
of industrial countries and LDCs as there is a gap in the literature on wage inequalities for China. 
Notice here the features of LDCs include a dual-economy, formal and informal sectors in urban 
areas, and non-compliance of minimum wages, as noted in the introductory chapter. As for the 
second section, the minimum wage and employment, China’s experience will be illustrated in 
detail since some relevant literature on China already exists. The final section on the minimum 
wage and gender wage gap is the shortest, since the international research effort here is just 
beginning.  
2.2. The minimum wage and wage inequality 
The fundamental target of a minimum wage policy is surely anti-poverty and redistribution (as 
institutional labour economists and politicians claim – see Levin-Waldman, 2009). However, 
limited studies investigate the wage distribution aspect of minimum wages compared with the 
extensive literature on the employment effect of minimum wages (Brown, 1999; Dickens et al., 
2012). The emphasis on employment effects is based on the view that welfare and employment 
effects go together (assuming, as is reasonable, that the unskilled face the highest risk of being 
laid off when minimum wages rise), and employment is easier to measure.  
  Normally, two ways of thinking about wage redistribution are employed. One is to establish 
the direct relationship between inequality and minimum wages (Lee, 1999); the other is to 
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compare a counterfactual wage distribution adjusted from the minimum wage with the observed 
distribution (DiNardo et al., 1996; Firpo et al., 2009). In developed countries, the wage 
counterfactual method is more often used while in LDCs, the direct relationship is more usually 
measured. As for China, no literature exactly follows either of these two approaches, though there 
are some relevant studies of inequality. Let us now consider in turn the literature on developed 
countries, then developing countries and finally China. 
It is important to distinguish wage and income inequality. A person’s total income, besides 
wages from a full-time job, includes welfare payments, income from property, remittances and 
transfer income, wages from a second job, etc. As Brown (1999, p.2152) says, income inequality 
is more complicated than wage inequality. Neumark and Wascher (2008) separate wage 
inequality from income inequality in their studies as well. This is not only because wage 
inequality is at an individual level while income inequality is related to households, but also 
because workers on the minimum wage are usually not in households at the bottom of the income 
distribution (Brown, 1999; see also Macurdy 2015). That said, there is a literature relating 
minimum wages to both wage and income inequality, and we will consider both below.  
The minimum wage and inequality in developed countries 
Even for developed countries like the UK or US, the literature on the effects of minimum wages 
on inequality or wage compression is limited. One method is to relate wage dispersion over time 
or by region to the corresponding minimum wage (Lee (1999) makes the classic study for the 
US). The alternative is the counterfactual distribution method (see Aeberhardt et al., 2012). Both 
methods generally find large impacts of the minimum wage compressing the wage distribution. 
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However, this large redistributive effect appears contradictory to the mixed (and generally small) 
employment effects of the minimum wage, as will be reviewed in a later section. This result is 
called the minimum wage paradox (Teulings, 2000). One approach is to establish theoretical 
frameworks to incorporate this paradox, and the other is to probe the redistributive effect of the 
minimum wage more deeply. We now consider Lee’s (1999) and the counterfactual distribution 
methods and the minimum wage paradox in more detail. 
  Both methods appear to agree on the substantial effects of falling minimum wages on rising 
inequality, though they have limitations. Lee’s (1999) approach of establishing a direct 
relationship between inequality and minimum wages is limited by the endogeneity problem 
(inequality might cause rising minimum wages and vice versa). The other approach is to compare 
the observed wage distribution with a counterfactual one (DiNardo et al., 1996; Fortin and 
Lemieux, 1997; Aeberhardt et al., 2012). Autor et al. (2010, p.1) describe its limitation as follows: 
“…the estimated counterfactual wage distributions derive exclusively from reweighting of 
observed wage densities rather than controlled comparisons. Thus, they are closer in spirit to 
simulation than to inference.” 
  Lee’s exhaustive study (1999) looks at the rising inequality and concurrent decline of real 
minimum wages during the 1980s in the US, the methodology of which will be adopted later in 
Chapter 4. Specifically, Lee (1999) regresses the tenth and fiftieth percentile wage gap on the 
minimum wage as in the following model (simplified by Neumark and Wascher, 2008, p.128): 
ln (W10jt) - ln (W
med
jt) = αt + β·{ln (W
min
jt) – ln (W
med
jt)} + λ·{ln (W
min
jt) – ln (W
med
jt)}
2 + εjt, 
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where W10 refers to wages at the tenth percentile, Wmin is the minimum wage, Wmed is the median 
wage (the 50th percentile), and j and t denote states and years, respectively. Lee (1999) shows 
theoretically that the two effective minimum wage terms, i.e. the minimum wage relative to the 
median (ln (Wminjt) – ln (W
med
jt)) and its square ({ln (W
min
jt) – ln (W
med
jt)}
2), in the above model 
capture the redistributive effect of minimum wages in a simple way. Moreover, his model permits 
spillover effects by using an increasing function to establish the relationship between the 
effective minimum wage and wage inequality, which are not included in the counterfactual 
distribution method of DiNardo et al. (1996) and their successors. Lee’s results (1999) indicate 
that the falling US minimum wage can account for much of the rise in US inequality, which is 
supported by Leigh’s (2007) similar finding from his study using Australian data, and detailed 
discussions in Card and DiNardo’s (2002) and Lemieux’s (2006) US studies. Though some 
doubts result from the endogeneity problem – and the fact that the median wage appears on both 
sides of the equation (the division problem), the method is simple and intuitive. Therefore we 
take it further in a later chapter, and consider ways to eliminate the endogeneity and division 
problems.   
As for the other method used to investigate the redistributive effect of the minimum wage, the 
core thinking here is to find a counterfactual wage distribution that would otherwise have been 
under another minimum wage, higher or lower than the one observed. This counterfactual 
distribution is compared with the factual distribution, thus the difference between the two is the 
impact of the minimum wage institution, ceteris paribus. The literature above differs in how to 
define this counterfactual distribution. DiNardo et al. (1996) initially adopted a semi-parametric 
procedure to investigate the effect of the minimum wage on US wage inequality. The 
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characteristics of workers in 1979 are estimated under Kernel density estimation. This result is 
used to reweight the 1988 sample to achieve the counterfactual distribution with the aim of 
showing “how much a worker, with the characteristics of the 1979 workforce, would have been 
paid in 1988” (DiNardo et al., 1996). This is basically the idea of Oaxaca (1973). However, 
instead of using the means of covariates as in Oaxaca’s method (1973), this method takes into 
account the whole distribution, which makes it possible to see where the minimum wage has its 
largest effects. They find that the decline in the real value of minimum wages is responsible for a 
third of rising residual wage inequality. 
One problem in DiNardo et al.’s early study (1996) is that spillover effects are not allowed, 
because the change in the minimum wage is assumed to have no effect on the wage distribution 
to the right of the minimum. That is why Fortin and Lemieux (1997) call their method, which is 
much simpler but with the same idea as DiNardo et al.’s (1996), “cut and paste”. As they say, 
they only “replace the mean and the variance of log wages among affected workers in 1988 by 
the mean and variance of log wages” of the corresponding group in 1979 (Fortin and Lemieux, 
1997). Not surprisingly, as the co-authors of the above 1996 paper, they find similar large effects 
of the decreasing minimum wage on the increasing wage inequality. However, obviously this 
assumption is unrealistic, especially considering the fact that although the minimum wage 
influences less than 10% of workers in the US, it dramatically reduces the 50/10 log wage 
differentials by around 66%. 
Aeberhardt et al. (2012) follow Firpo et al.’s unconditional quantile regression method (2009) 
to construct a counterfactual distribution for France. The difference between this study and 
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DiNardo et al.’s semi-parametric method (1996) is that unconditional quantile regressions are 
used to set up the corresponding weights in DiNardo et al.’s method (1996). Thus there is no 
specific regression form to restrict the wage distribution reconstruction. Combining 
difference-in-difference (DID) indicators to overcome the endogeneity problem, Aeberhardt et al. 
(2012) find small but significant impacts of minimum wages on the lower-tail of the French wage 
distribution between 2003 and 2005. The small magnitude of impacts is where their study differs 
from DiNardo et al. (1996) and Fortin and Lemieux’s (1997). However, there is a significant 
effect, and it extends up to the 7th decile. Thus DiNardo et al.’s (1996) conclusion regarding the 
distributional compression effects of minimum wages is reinforced. 
In the UK, Dickens and Manning (2004a) and Dickens et al. (2012) also show discernible 
impacts of the minimum wage on inequality. Dickens and Manning (2004a) use an approach that 
takes advantage of propensity score matching, as well as a more complicated method developed 
by Stuttard and Jenkins (2001) as a supplement. Their results are consistent, showing moderate 
(but significant) effects of minimum wages on inequality. However, Dickens et al. (2012) use a 
different method from the reweighting approach. They first examine the observed evolution of 
the log 50/5 and 50/10 wage gap, and then estimate the trends controlling for the National 
Minimum Wage (NMW hereafter). The difference between the two is the contribution of the 
NMW to wage inequality. Dickens et al. (2012) and Dickens and Manning’s (2004a) results are 
consistent in finding the redistributive effects of the NMW, and are supported by Holmes and 




In a word, conclusions from the reweighting distribution method have achieved a consensus. 
The consensus concludes that in the US the impact of the minimum wage is consistently large, 
and in the UK and France it is smaller but still discernible. However, the reweighting method 
requires a strong assumption with regard to functional form, which has typically been settled 
using semi- and non-parametric approaches, such as unconditional quantile regression (Firpo et 
al., 2009). Another problem in this method is that, as Autor et al. (2010) point out, analysis based 
on reweighting distribution is to simulate an assumed wage distribution, instead of using 
inferences and deduction based on facts. The direct estimation of the impact of the minimum 
wage on inequality using Lee’s (1999) method overcomes this problem, as we see in Chapter 4 
below.  
Approaches to solving the endogeneity and division problems inherent in Lee’s (1999) method 
are as follows. The division bias problem in OLS estimates relates to the fact that both sides of 
the regressions include the same variable of centrality (the boundary of spillovers, see Lee, 1999). 
Thus, when the measurement error is an important part of variation in the centrality, a spurious 
correlation between dependent and independent variables will be produced. This is partly settled 
by using a trimmed mean instead of the median, where the mean is calculated excluding the 
bottom 30% and top 30% of the sample for each state year (Lee, 1999, p.998). For example, 
Bosch and Manacorda (2010) use another centrality calculated from a dataset different from their 
regression dataset to establish an instrument variable. Since the measurement errors of the two 
datasets are not correlated, the division bias problem can be eliminated.  
As for endogeneity, there are two sources. One is omitted-variable bias. Lee (1999) excludes 
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state fixed effects, yet Autor et al. (2010) suggest there is a strong correlation between the median 
state wage (a deflator for both dependent and independent variables) and the relative wage level 
(dependent variable). Moreover, not only median state wages, but many other factors existing in 
the minimum wage setting procedure from state governments exacerbate this omitted-variable 
problem (Boeri, 2012; Butcher, 2012). That is why Dolton et al. (2012b, p.14) state that their 
results, with a similar specification to Lee’s (1999), are “indicative only of correlations in the 
data”. The other source leading endogeneity is reverse causality; that is, inequality might cause 
minimum wages as well as vice versa (Dolton and Bondibene, 2012a). Dolton and Bondibene 
(2012a) in fact use a political instrumental variable, based on the argument that a left-wing 
government is more likely to increase the minimum wage.  
One final point in this part is the minimum wage paradox, i.e. the estimated large effects of 
minimum wages on inequality contradict the inconsistent or small employment effects (Teulings, 
2000). If sometimes the employment effect of the minimum wage is small, as reviewed in a later 
section, through which channel can the minimum wage compress wage distributions so obviously? 
Two strands are developed. One is to establish a new theoretical framework to incorporate the 
two effects. For example, Teulings (2000) develops a distance-dependent elasticity of substitution 
(DIDES) production function, from which a large aggregation bias can be found and used to 
explain the concurrent effects with distinct magnitudes. Dickens et al. (2012) suppose aggregate 
labour supply is inelastic but labour supply to an individual employer is not, so that employers 
are competing with each other under a fixed availability of employment. The second strand is to 
re-estimate the redistributive effect of minimum wages considering the endogeneity problem 
during estimation. Both Autor et al. (2008) and Aeberhardt et al. (2012) find much smaller 
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magnitudes of equality effects than previously estimated under more careful consideration and 
more advanced methods. In conclusion, this paradox, combined with the related endogeneity 
problem in Lee’s method (1999), needs further study. 
The minimum wage and inequality in developing countries 
In contrast to the literature on developed countries, most literature on LDCs depends on direct 
regressions of inequality indicators on minimum wages as in Lee (1999), rather than the 
redistributive approaches (DiNardo et al., 1996; Firpo et al., 2009) mentioned above. Dependent 
variables used under Lee’s method are decile gaps (for China, see Bosch and Manacorda, 2010; 
for South Africa, see Dinkelman and Ranchhod, 2012), along with the Gini index, Theil index, 
Atkinson index and the coefficient of variation (Costa Rica, see El-Hamidi and Terrell, 2001; 
Brazil, see Jales, 2012). This kind of study, of course, is at the country (El-Hamidi and Terrell, 
2001; Dinkelman and Ranchhod, 2012) or province/municipal level (Bosch and Manacorda, 2010; 
Jales, 2012), though the inequality indicators are constructed from individual data. As for the 
redistributive approach, few cases are found, though Maloney and Mendez (2003) present a study 
for Latin America. Furthermore, some other methods distinguished from the above two are 
considered. For example, Foguel et al. (2001) use nominal mean wages as dependent variables in 
their study of Brazil. Neumark et al. (2006) present elasticity of real decile wages (10th, 20th, 30th 
and 50th) with respect to the minimum wage using the GLS method with an AR1 error process. 
Lemos (2009) shows Kernel log real wage distributions and spikes of the minimum wage using 
monthly panel data. Jales (2012) follows Lee’s idea (1999), but adopts a new density 
discontinuity design approach. Obviously, inequality attracts more attention for LDCs, with the 
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simpler approach based on Lee (1999) predominating, and this will form the basis for this study 
of China. 
  Results for the economy as a whole generally point to the minimum wage causing both 
wage/income inequality reduction (El-Hamidi and Terrell, 2001; Leigh, 2007; Gindling and 
Terrell, 2009; Bosch and Manacorda, 2010; Dinkelman and Ranchhod, 2012; Jales, 2012) and 
wage distribution compression (Maloney and Mendez, 2003; Lemos, 2009). However, 
distinguishing between formal and informal sectors are concerned, results are mixed. El-Hamidi 
and Terrell (2001) and Gindling and Terrell (2009) suggest large positive effects in formal sectors 
and no effect in informal sectors. However, Foguel et al. (2001) and Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) present large positive impacts in informal sectors instead. Strong positive effects for both 
sectors are found as well (Maloney and Mendez, 2003; Lemos, 2009; Jales, 2012). In summary, 
minimum wages appear to significantly decrease inequality in LDCs, both for formal and 
informal sectors. 
  Three further points should be noted. Firstly, most studies concentrate on countries in Latin 
America, with a few on Africa. One of the characteristics of minimum wages in these LDCs is 
their high levels. For example, Ham (2013, p.6) indicates that minimum wages in Latin America 
are about 20-60% of average wages and 30-90% of medians, larger than those in Europe and the 
US. Such high minimum wages may partly explain the large redistributive effects – and also 
spillover effects up to high percentiles. Furthermore, informal sectors benefit from the minimum 
wage as well though with non-compliance, which is still a puzzle according to Neumark and 
Wascher (2008, pp.115-116) and needs further exploration. Lastly, poverty reduction is often 
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related to inequality and minimum wages in LDCs as well. However, this topic regularly uses 
poverty lines or household income as dependent variables and is beyond this thesis. Now let us 
turn to the research on minimum wages and inequality in China. 
The minimum wage and inequality in China 
The effects of the minimum wage on inequality and the wage distribution in China have attracted 
even less attention than Brazil or other typical developing countries. Neither the direct 
relationship between inequality and minimum wages nor its redistributive effects have been 
investigated.  
  As regards wage levels, relevant studies so far indicate little impact of the minimum wage. One 
careful study is by Wang and Gunderson (2012). They use the DID method to estimate the effects 
of the change in minimum wages between 2002 and 2004 on wages in rural and urban 
households in eastern China. No discernible impact is found in their whole sample or the industry 
or ownership sub-samples. Consistent with these findings, Luo and Cong (2009) look at the 
impact of changes in minimum wages on changes in the average industry wage from 1994 to 
2006 at the provincial level. They also find a weak mixed relationship. Lastly, Ma et al. (2012) 
footnote finding an insignificant result of the minimum wage on the Gini index. However, they 
explain this finding as possibly due to inaccurate construction of the Gini from firm-based 
average wages. Generally speaking, the negligible impact on wages from the minimum wage may 
be caused by using aggregate rather than individual wages.  
If the literature is extended to the impact of minimum wages on poverty or the income gap, 
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four empirical papers written in Chinese are relevant (Luo, 2007c and 2011; Yang, 2008; He, 
2011). Luo (2011) finds significantly negative effects of the minimum wage on the poverty ratio 
in rural areas in 18 provinces between 1995 and 2008. However, the coefficients of the minimum 
wage are abnormally large. For example, in her result with pooled data, when the minimum wage 
rises by 1%, the rural poverty ratio will fall by 226.5%. Though unit root tests and co-integration 
tests are performed, her conclusions are implausible. The remaining three studies look at the 
effect of minimum wages on the rural-urban income gap, obtaining significantly negative results 
using cross-sectional data at the provincial level in 2005 (Luo, 2007c; Yang, 2008) or in 2009 (He, 
2011). That is, a higher minimum wage lowers the gap since rural migrants always send their 
income (wages) back to their rural home to support family there. They encounter the same 
problem as Luo (2011): with a dependent variable – ratios of urban-relative to rural-income per 
capita – averaged around three, they get coefficients for log minimum wages as large as -52 (He, 
2011) to -99 (Luo, 2007c; Yang, 2008) and get even larger constants of more than 240. This may 
be caused by their underspecified model with only covariates of the minimum wage and its 
square, GDP and its squares, and regional dummies of east, west and central areas. That said, the 
above four papers are interesting exploratory studies on the effects of minimum wages on poverty 
and income gaps. 
Conclusions on inequality 
In summary, the existing literature indicates that the minimum wage has a discernible impact on 
wages, whether it be in developed or developing countries, or in formal or informal sectors. This 
sometimes large wage impact, combined with the inconsistent employment effects of the 
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minimum wage, is still puzzling, and awaits further exploration. As for China, the relevant 
literature is scarce. What evidence there is indicates that minimum wages have small positive 
impacts on aggregate wages but possibly strong impacts on poverty and income inequality 
reduction though more research is needed here. Thus, based on the literature and methodology on 
developed countries, as well as that from developing countries, further study of the minimum 
wage and inequality in China is of interest. 
2.3. The minimum wage and employment 
The employment effect of minimum wages is one of the most studied fields in economics. As 
Dolado et al. (1996) say in their summary: “it is as easy to make a theoretical case against 
minimum wages as for them. Evidence, not theory, is what is needed now.” Basically, 
corresponding empirical studies can be divided into four generations (Dube, 2011, p.763):  
The older time series literature, the first wave of the new minimum wage research that 
featured both case study and state-panel approaches, a third generation of follow-up work 
largely based on these two methodologies, and a fourth generation of recent work that tries to 
make sense of the sometimes contradictory evidence. 
This survey will concentrate on the third and fourth generation, combined with some literature in 
the second generation. 
  This survey focuses in turn on industrial countries, developing countries and China. For 
industrial countries, preference is given to a general picture and examining the trend for future 
studies. As for LDCs, emphasis is placed on the contrasting results found for formal and informal 
sectors, which offers valuable experience to China. Literature on employment effects in China is 
much more common than on wage distribution effects. Below, empirical literature for developed 
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countries will be reviewed first, then developing countries and China. 
The minimum wage and employment in developed countries 
The theoretical forecasts for employment effects of minimum wages are as straightforward as 
“textbook models”. In neoclassic theory, in a perfect competition market, raising minimum wages 
will decrease labour demand, for example reduction in employment or working hours. Details 
about the behaviour of supply and demand can be found in Neumark and Wascher’s study (2008, 
p.39 and pp.50-53). At the same time, monopsony models assume that individual firms have 
some market power over wages, so that an upward-sloping labour supply curve will lead to rising 
employment as wages increase. Employment will keep moving up the supply curve until 
minimum wages exceed the equilibrium level obtained in a perfect competitive market. This 
process can be seen as profit redistribution between employers and employees (Flinn, 2010, p.28). 
Some extensions of the models are based on a similar theory of monopsony behaviour (Metcalf, 
2008; Neumark and Wascher, 2008, pp.54-56). The other strand of studies focuses on search 
models (Neumark and Wascher, 2008, p.56) or develops a new production function (Teulings, 
2000). Generally, the main conclusion from the theory is mixed, depending on whether one 
believes in a competitive or monopsony labour market.  
  Comparing with the relatively simple picture of theory studies, the empirical studies of 
employment effects are more complicated. Among the four generations of empirical studies noted 
above, the first wave concentrates on time series data. Brown et al. (1982) found a negative 
elasticity of youth employment with respect to the minimum wage from -0.1 to -0.3 based on 
earlier literature in the US. Then in the early 1990s the second wave, the new minimum wage 
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research, begins (Neumark and Wascher, 2008, pp.37-38; Flinn, 2010, pp.96-97; Dube, 2011, 
p.763). During this period, two strands of studies are representative. One is the case study 
approach using the DID method; the most famous being a study of a ‘quasi-natural experiment’ 
comparing employment between New Jersey with a rising minimum wage and Pennsylvania with 
a constant minimum wage in the fast-food industry in the US from Card and Krueger (1994). The 
other strand is the panel data approach given the availability of data under changing policies. 
Studies from Card (1992) and Neumark and Wascher (1992) can be seen as the beginning here. 
The new minimum wage research extends the scope of elasticity of employment with respect to 
the minimum wage from near -1 to around zero (Neumark and Wascher, 2008, p.104; Belman and 
Wolfson 2014, p.108), which is clearly far from reaching an agreement.   
  The third and fourth wave of empirical studies, has tried to reconcile the sometimes conflicting 
evidence. Neumark and Wascher (2008, pp.71-72) pointed out that there are three difficulties in 
case studies using DID: adequacy of the control groups, dealing with lagged effects, and 
reliability of the survey data. However, a famous study from Dube et al. (2010) overcomes the 
above shortcomings and affords convincing results using the case study method. They not only 
construct a data set of restaurant employment by repeating Card and Krueger’s experiment (1994) 
thousands of times, but use contiguous US county pairs to set up all comparisons over a 16-year 
period. This study succeeds in “generalising” Card and Krueger’s research (1994) and finds no 
employment effects (Schmitt, 2013). Still, this is not the end of the story. A recent study from 
Neumark et al. (2013) continues to argue that counties with geographic proximity do not 
compose the best control group. They adopt a “synthetic” control matching estimator to prove 
their perspective and find that when a better control group is established, compared with the 
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original cross-border pairs, significantly negative effects appear again.  
  As for the traditional panel data approach, the key point is that besides corresponding fixed 
effects, how should underlying time and regional trends in employment be accounted for 
(Allegretto et al., 2011). The follow-up work based on the panel data approach is claimed by 
Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) and Schmitt (2013) to show indiscernible impacts on 
employment using meta-analysis. However, contrary to their conclusions, Neumark et al. (2013) 
use polynomial time trends to capture cyclical effects, and significant negative effects re-appear. 
There is also the recent work on a panel of OECD countries by Dolton and Bondibene (2012a) 
who find a large negative effect of the minimum wage on youth employment, with an elasticity of 
around -0.3. Also Addison and Ozturk (2012) using the same OECD panel approach find a 
significant negative effect of the minimum wage on the adult female employment/population rate. 
Thus there seem to be quite strong negative minimum wage effects on low productivity groups in 
the international panel-based literature.  
  Considering high welfare replacement rates in European countries (since high welfare also acts 
as a wage floor and can obscure minimum wage effects), the negative effect of the minimum 
wage, though small in some studies, is even more credible than had been expected. In conclusion, 
there is controversy on the employment effects of minimum wages in recent literature for 
developed countries, but this influence of minimum wages on employment is still apt to be 
traditionally negative. 
The minimum wage and employment in developing countries 
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Studies on minimum wages and employment are limited in developing countries compared with 
those in industrial ones. For each country, there are only several published or working papers in 
English (Neumark and Wascher, 2006; Lemos, 2009). Studies using panel data, especially 
covering long time periods, are relatively common, such as Fajnzylber (2001), Foguel et al. 
(2001) and Lemos (2009) for Brazil from the 1980s to around 2000; Gindling and Terrell (2007) 
and Comola and Mello (2011) for Indonesia from around 1990 to around 2000; Gindling and 
Terrell (2009) for Honduras between 1990 and 2004; and Alaniz et al. (2011) for Nicaragua from 
1998 to 2006. At the same time there are case studies adopting DID methods as well. For instance, 
Harrison and Scorse (2004) look at minimum wage hikes accompanied by anti-sweatshop activity 
in Costa Rica. Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012) check the influence of minimum wages when 
previous uncovered sectors are suddenly regulated in South Africa. Magruder (2013) investigates 
minimum wages in Indonesia in the 1990s. It can be seen that studies for developing countries 
generally follow the standard framework from those for industrial countries. 
  Most of studies for developing countries investigate respective effects in formal and informal 
sectors, the separation of which is one of the most important differences of LDCs from industrial 
countries. Disemployment after rising minimum wages tends to be found more often in formal or 
covered sectors rather than in informal or uncovered sectors, as is reasonable (Foguel et al., 2001; 
Gindling and Terrell, 2007; Gindling and Terrell, 2009; Alaniz et al., 2011; Comola and Mello, 
2011; Dinkelman and Ranchhod, 2012; Jales, 2012). The general explanation is that the job 
losses in covered sectors are compensated for by job gains in uncovered sectors because of 
mobility between the two sectors (Comola and Mello, 2011), and such “crowding” effects are 
what basic theory would predict. However, in another opinion, Jales (2012) argues that the 
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probability of migration between sectors is near to zero by the density discontinuity approach. 
Similarly, Fajnzylber (2001) shows negative employment effects in all sectors (formal, informal 
and self-employed sectors), and informal sectors even display more disemployment than formal 
sectors. At the same time, Lemos’s (2009) research for Brazil finds no minimum wage 
disemployment effect in either sector (see also Magruder’s (2013) study of Indonesia). It seems 
that results are rather mixed, but inclined to exhibit negative effects in formal sectors and positive 
effects in informal sectors of employment. 
The minimum wage and employment in China 
Most studies on minimum wages in China again concentrate on employment effects. Although 
these studies are far from reaching a consensus, among them Wang and Gunderson’s (2011) and 
Fang and Lin’s (2013) studies are perhaps most reliable. This is because: (i) their covariates are 
commonly used in conventional literature; (ii) their framework is clear; (iii) their elasticities of 
employment with respect to the minimum wage are in the range of what has been found in the 
literature in both the developed and less developed countries; and (iv) their control variables have 
the theoretically expected signs, which reinforce the credence of their main results.; and (v) it is 
written in English and hence subjected to a more rigorous peer review process than the literature 
in Chinese. Thus this review will mainly follow their framework and focus. 
  Specifically, Wang and Gunderson’s study (2011) looks at rural migrant workers in 30 
provinces over 2000-2007, adopting the methodology of a “pre-specified research design” 




negative employment effects in slower growing regions (central and western regions); larger 
negative effects in non-state-owned organizations that tend to be more responsive to market 
pressures; much larger lagged effects reflecting the time needed for adjustments to occur; no 
adverse employment effects in the prosperous and growing eastern region; and a positive 
employment effect in state-owned enterprises in the east – consistent with monopsonistic 
behaviour. (Wang and Gunderson, 2011, p.392) 
At the same time, Fang and Lin (2013) look at 16 provinces from 2002 to 2009, presenting 
evidence of significant disemployment effects in the eastern and central regions, as well as for 
females, young adults and low-skilled workers.   
  (i) Rural migrant workers versus urban permanent residents 
  Wang and Gunderson (2011) and Fang and Lin (2013) focus on rural migrant workers in urban 
areas or treat them as sub-samples, as is the case in most of the literature. Under the 
dual-economy of China, rural migrants in municipalities often work in informal sectors. Without 
household registration (hukou) and the corresponding entitlement to benefits, they are always the 
most vulnerable group when facing rising minimum wages. Employment effects are likely to be 
more marked for them than urban permanent residents. Therefore, in this discussion, the literature 
on rural migrant employment and total urban employment will be reviewed separately. 
  Overall, negative impacts of minimum wages on rural migrants are found (Wang and 
Gunderson, 2011; Ding, 2010; Fang and Lin, 2013), but positive effects are not rare (Luo, 2007a 
and 2007b; Li and He, 2010; Research Group in Shandong University (RGSU), 2011). On the 
one hand, Wang and Gunderson (2011) report that the total elasticity of employment with respect 
to the current and lagged minimum wage is between -0.1 and -0.3. Ding (2010) indicates nearly 
an 8% reduction of employment in Guangdong and Fujian provinces (eastern China) in 2008 
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under strict enforcement of minimum wages. Fang and Lin (2013) conclude an elasticity of -0.22 
to -0.28 for migrants. On the other hand, Luo (2007a) suggests the elasticity of employment in 
Shanghai between 1993 and 2005 is positive, and almost 0.4. This result survives various 
sensitivity tests (Li and He, 2010, RGSU 2011). Thus there is no consensus on employment 
effects for rural migrants. 
  However, if the sample is expanded to all urban employment including both rural migrants and 
urban residents, things are different. Overall it can be seen that the effect of minimum wages for 
all urban employment is inclined to be negative (Ma et al., 2012; Shi, 2009 and 2010; Wang and 
Gunderson, 2012; Fang and Lin, 2013). In Ma et al.’s study (2012), covering 1998 to 2007, the 
minimum wage elasticity is -0.06 on average, and Shi (2009, 2010) finds a similar negative 
elasticity between -0.08 and -0.13 for a similar period, 1996 to 2007. Fang and Lin’s elasticity 
(2013) is much larger and the total effects from the sum of current and lagged minimum wages 
are between -0.72 and -0.86. At the same time, Wang and Gunderson’s (2012) study of the change 
in the minimum wage system from 2003 to 2004 (for the eastern areas only) finds insignificant 
and weak negative effects, in that 15 workers per 10,000 will not be employed after the 
reinforcement of the minimum wage system in 2004. Shi (2009 and 2010) also finds an 
insignificant short-term effect of minimum wages using an Error Correction Model. The only 
exception is Ni et al.’s results (2011) which show a positive but insignificant effect, with the 
elasticity of the employment with respect to the minimum wage being 0.15 over 30 provinces 




  The magnitudes of the results for urban employment, whether positive or negative, are smaller 
than those of the rural migrant group alone, with the exception of Fang and Lin (2013). This 
conclusion is robust across different definitions of dependent variables. Both Wang and 
Gunderson (2012) and Fang and Lin (2013) use the ratio of employment relative to the 
population as the dependent variable following the classic literature. Ma et al. (2012) use the 
log-form of employment at an individual firm level. Ni et al. (2011) and Shi (2009 and 2010) use 
log employment as well but at a macro provincial level. In particular, Wang and Gunderson (2012) 
only look at the eastern region, and Ni et al.’s (2011) sample excludes employment in SOEs 
considering the dramatically decreasing employment of SOEs after 1997 due to other government 
policies. This special sample in Ni et al.’s (2011) study can be seen as one of the explanations for 
their evidence of positive effects. The smaller magnitude of employment effects compared with 
the rural migrant sample is another consensus result for all urban employment. 
  Change in working hours is an important supplement to the headcount disemployment effects 
of the minimum wage. Jia and Zhang (2013) find significant results for all urban employment. 
They find that as the minimum wage rises, the weekly working hours of male workers rises, but 
the employment of female workers falls (suggesting a substitution of females by males). These 
two effects become greater as the minimum wage increases. Once it reaches more than 30% of 
the original level, even male employment decreases. Du et al. (2008, 2009) discuss the 
working-hour effect of the minimum wage as well and find that both migrants and residents have 
negative effects. 
  In conclusion, research findings on the employment effect of minimum wages for rural 
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migrants are rather mixed, while for total urban employment, the evidence is more consistent. In 
general, employment effects for total urban employment are inclined to be smaller (but still 
generally negative) than for rural migrant workers, which is clearer than the experience in other 
LDCs reviewed in the last section. Finally, rising working hours under fixed monthly minimum 
wage rates affords supporting evidence for negative headcount employment effects. Overall, the 
separation between rural migrants and total urban employment is meaningful and deserves further 
exploration. 
  (ii) Regional patterns of employment effects 
  As one of the largest countries in the world, China exhibits obvious regional diversity. The 
government also implements different policies in the prosperous eastern region, developing 
central region and slowly growing western region. First, literature for rural migrant workers will 
be reviewed, and then that for total urban employment. 
  For rural migrants, a cautious summary for the eastern region so far may be no adverse effect 
when using macro-level data. Specifically, insignificantly positive effects are normally explained 
by the monopolistic buyer market in eastern areas (Wang and Gunderson, 2011 and 2012; Fang 
and Lin, 2013; Luo, 2007b). But positively significant effects are also supported by RGSU (2011), 
Luo (2007a), and Li and He (2010), though the last two studies are only for several cities in 
eastern areas. Significantly negative effects are also found using the DID method in Ding’s study 
(2010), which investigates the two provinces of Guangdong and Fujian in the eastern region. 
Results therefore are mixed and most of them are not negative irrespective of significance levels.   
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  Employment effects in the central and western regions are simpler to summarise than those in 
the east. For central regions, impacts are inclined to be weakly negative. In particular, Wang and 
Gunderson (2011) and RGSU (2011) find significant negative results. Luo (2007b) finds a 
negative impact as well but it is insignificant. Lastly Fang and Lin’s study (2013) exhibits 
insignificantly positive effects. As for the western region, effects are stronger than those in the 
eastern and central regions, whether they are negative (Wang and Gunderson, 2011; Fang and Lin, 
2013) or positive (Luo, 2007b; RGSU, 2011). Especially for the positive effect, Luo (2007b) 
finds the elasticity as large as 1.9, which is supported by RGSU (2011) in that three out of nine 
western provinces have an elasticity larger than 1. Therefore, three regions display distinctive 
employment effects. 
  As far as total employment in urban areas is concerned, results are similarly diverse, though 
evidence for the eastern region is in fact generally negative. However, sometimes this negative 
effect is significant (Ma et al., 2012; Shi, 2009; Fang and Lin, 2013) and sometimes not (Wang 
and Gunderson, 2012; Ni et al., 2011). Elasticities also vary, with Ma et al. (2012) and Fang and 
Lin’s (2013) studies finding only -0.01 and -0.07, respectively. Shi (2009) shows an elasticity of 
-0.23 within the range of literature. But when DID methods are executed for Guangdong and 
Fujian provinces or cities in the east by Ma et al. (2012), the employment elasticity jumps from 
-0.88 to -0.97. Thus the magnitude of employment effects in the east is controversial based on 
uniformly negative signs. 
  As for the other areas, in central areas employment effects are also mixed. Significantly 
negative (Ma et al., 2012; Fang and Lin, 2013) and significantly positive effects (Ni et al., 2011), 
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as well as insignificantly zero effects (Shi, 2009), are reported. At the same time, in western areas 
the employment effect is inclined to be significantly negative (Ma et al., 2012; Shi, 2009). 
However, Ma et al. (2012) report an elasticity of -0.2, while Shi (2009) gives only -0.06. Fang 
and Lin’s (2013) sums of current and lagged minimum wages are similar to Shi’s (2009) 
magnitude, with insignificance. Ni et al. (2011) show insignificant results as well, with the sum 
of current and lagged minimum wages being 0.28. As was the case for rural migrants therefore, 
regional diversity of results is shown in total whole urban employment as well. 
  So far the picture is that of no consensus for both rural migrants and the whole sample 
(migrants and residents). Still, it appears that consideration of separate effects for migrants is 
likely to be important. Though rural migrants are under-represented in this sample, this study will 
try to look at different employment effects in formal and informal sectors instead, based on the 
fact that most migrants are employed in informal sectors. We expect to find smaller in formal 
than informal sectors, as has generally been shown in existing literature. Again, as regards 
regional differences, fewer negative effects are expected in the east than country as a whole. 
  (iii) Ownership patterns of employment effects 
  The ownership of enterprises is also important. As a main component of the previous 
planned-economy, SOEs nowadays still enjoy government subsidies and preferential policies, and 
at the same time undertake social obligations and follow laws and rules strictly. They are quite 
different from their private sector counterparts which are more responsive to market pressure, as 
illustrated in Chapter 1 (Introduction). In line with part (ii), the literature for rural migrant 
workers will be reviewed first, then for total urban employment.  
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  The results for both ownerships are even more conflicting than before. The consideration of the 
ownership of firms is still based on the framework of the formal-and-informal sector. Specifically, 
SOEs can be seen as representatives of the government in the market that comply with minimum 
wages strictly. Non-SOEs are more responsive to market pressure. Thus SOEs belong to formal 
sectors and non-SOEs to informal sectors, though there are some informal departments existing 
within SOEs and workers there do not enjoy the same welfare and protection as their other 
counterparts in SOEs. On the other hand, SOEs are also supposed to provide better employment 
protection. These complicated roles of SOEs may explain why the results below are conflicting.  
  For rural migrant workers, SOEs, as expected, have a smaller (Wang and Gunderson, 2011; 
Ding, 2010; Fang and Lin, 2013) and sometimes less significant (Wang and Gunderson, 2011) 
negative response to rising minimum wages compared with non-SOEs. This is clearer in the 
central (Wang and Gunderson, 2011) and western regions (Wang and Gunderson, 2011; Fang and 
Lin, 2013). At the same time, Wang and Gunderson find significantly positive impacts for SOEs 
in the eastern region (2011), and insignificantly smaller positive effects on SOEs over the country 
compared with non-SOEs (2012). In contrast, as for all employment in urban areas, Wang and 
Gunderson (2012) find insignificantly positive effects for SOEs. For non-SOEs, only Ni et al. 
(2011) indicates significant positive impacts for collective firms. In the remaining private 
domestically-invested, foreign-funded and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao funded enterprises, the 
effects are insignificantly positive (Ni et al., 2011) or insignificantly negative (Wang and 
Gunderson, 2012). Thus there is hardly a consensus for both ownerships, respectively.  
  In summary, though there is no consensus, it seems that results for all urban employment are 
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apt to be insignificant for both SOEs and non-SOEs, and rural migrant employment in non-SOEs 
has the largest response to rising minimum wages. Thus the factor of SOEs cannot be overlooked 
in the specifications, though it is hard to predict the significance and sign of SOE variables. 
Furthermore, the magnitudes of employment effects may be the largest in the informal sectors. 
  (iv) Industry patterns of employment effects 
  Industry is another factor in understanding employment effects. As in other countries all over 
the world, manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail business, and private service 
industry employ large numbers of low-wage workers. Several studies look at the employment 
effect in these industries separately. Normally studies investigate the effects according to workers, 
but seldom do they also consider industry outputs or added value as dependent variables. Now 
the literature on rural migrants will be reviewed first, and then all urban employment. 
  For rural migrants, results are mixed as usual. Significantly positive (Luo, 2007b; Li and He, 
2010) and negative (RGSU, 2011) employment effects of minimum wages exist in the 
manufacturing industry, and significantly positive (Li and He, 2010; RGSU, 2011) and negative 
effects (Luo, 2007b) exist in the construction industry as well. Positive effects are also found in 
the wholesale and retail industry by RGSU (2011). As for the outputs or added value of these 
industries, they exhibit significantly positive effects on employment (Luo, 2007b; Li and He, 
2010; RGSU, 2011) except for significantly negative effects in the manufacturing industry from 
Luo (2007b). Overall, though it is hard to come to a definitive conclusion, at least positive 
employment effects on migrants in the construction and service industry are more often observed 
than negative effects. Thus when factors of the construction and service industry are considered 
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in the specification, positive signs are expected more than negative ones for informal sectors. 
Notice that though they are not dependent variables in this study as in the literature above, they 
can offer supplementary evidence. 
  When the whole urban labour force is considered, the results for employment effects remain 
mixed as usual. For the manufacturing industry, both insignificantly positive (Wang and 
Gunderson, 2012) and significantly negative effects (Ma et al., 2012) are found. Ni et al. (2011) 
show results with regional heterogeneity, in which significantly negative effects are found in the 
eastern region, insignificant negative effects in the central region and significantly positive ones 
in the western region. As for the construction industry, Wang and Gunderson (2012) indicate 
insignificant positive effects. For the wholesale, retail and restaurant industry, insignificant 
impacts are shown (Wang and Gunderson, 2012; Ni et al., 2011) but significantly positive effects 
are reported for the western region (Ni et al., 2011). Thus, if only significant results are 
considered, the manufacturing industry employment effects are inclined to be negative and the 
service industry is positive though with mixed results. For this study therefore, negative signs for 
the manufacturing industry and positive signs for the service industry for the whole sample (both 
formal and informal sectors) can be expected when these two industries are included in the 
specification.  
  (v) Other patterns of employment effects 
  Some other sub-samples are used to investigate employment effects. Ding (2010) looks at 
regulation according to his sub-samples. He divides the sample into high- versus low-wage 
enterprises and finds that the employment of rural migrants in low-wage firms under strict 
43 
 
regulation will fall 7% more than those in high-wage ones. Furthermore, according to a special 
question in the survey, Ding (2010) separates the rural migrant sample into two groups according 
to whether the Employment Contracts Law has a great impact on firms. Empirical results show 
that under strict regulation, firms with a great relevant impact will reduce the number of migrants 
employed compared with those with minor impacts. Ding (2010) concludes that disemployment 
effects are larger and more significant under stricter regulation. This offers evidence for the 
expectation that after 2004 when the minimum wage system was reinforced, employment effects 
should become larger. 
  Fang and Lin (2013) also look at the employment impacts of minimum wages for at-risk 
groups, young adults, different age cohorts, and low educational attainment. The effects of 
current minimum wages in young adults are similar to the whole sample, while they have larger 
lagged effects. However, as Brown (1999, p.2126) indicates, the significance of an employment 
effect depends on the inclusion of the education enrolment of teenagers, and Fang and Lin (2013) 
do not control this variable. Another group of at-risk people can be defined by wages earned 
between the minimum wages of two periods, and they exhibit much larger impacts than the 
whole sample on both current and lagged minimum wages. The minimum wage also has 
significantly negative effects on young female workers and workers with low education (high 
school education or below). Overall, their results are consistent with simple theoretical 
expectations for each sub-sample. Since two of their groups (young adults and age cohorts) 
coincide with this study, detailed comparison between their results and the thesis’ will be given in 
the empirical chapters later.  
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Conclusions on employment effects  
In this section the employment effect of minimum wages has been reviewed first for 
industrialised countries, then for developing countries and for China. For industrialised countries, 
there is no consensus on employment effects though a huge body of literature exists, but the 
impact of minimum wages on employment is traditionally inclined to remain negative. For LDCs, 
the results are mixed as well, though they tend to exhibit negative effects in formal sectors and 
positive effects in informal sectors of employment as expected by the “crowding out” effect. As 
far as China is concerned, the focus is on different aspects of an informal-sector framework in 
literature on minimum wages in LDCs. Specifically, rural migrants are more inclined to be 
influenced by minimum wages than other workers - though perhaps more likely to be in firms 
which do not comply with the minimum. It is necessary therefore to consider the issue of 
non-compliance as we will do below. 
  As for this research, first of all, standard methods will be followed to study employment effects 
in China, mainly based on the studies of Wang and Gunderson (2011) and Fang and Lin (2013). A 
formal-informal-sector framework will be adopted following literature in developing countries. 
Although empirical results for different patterns in China rather conflict, some predictable 
impacts can still be referred to for this study, as described at the end of each pattern (regions, 
industries, SOEs and so on). 
2.4. The minimum wage and the gender wage gap 
The literature on the gender wage gap in China is relatively rich compared with that on minimum 
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wages, though none of the Chinese studies relate minimum wages to the gender wage gap. In fact, 
across the world, few studies directly relate minimum wages to the gender wage gap. Thus, in 
this section, the general picture for the gender wage gap in China will be given first, looking at 
data, decomposition methodologies, and empirical results in turn. Then the literature on the 
minimum wage and gender differentials will be discussed, taking direct decomposition methods, 
direct regression methods, and indirect comparison of gender patterns.  
The gender wage gap in China 
Table 2.1 summarises results from the main decomposition studies of the gender wage gap in 
China1. All of them decompose the wage differential into “explained” and “unexplained” parts as 
will be explained below. As regards the data, there are three main sources, i.e. China Health and 
Nutrition Survey conducted by the Carolina Population Center (Zhang, 2004; Chen and Duan, 
2009); the Household Income Project conducted by a team of international scholars and 
researchers at the Institute of Economics and at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(Gustafsson and Li, 2000; Appleton et al., 2005; Bishop et al., 2005; Demurger et al., 2007); and 
sub-samples of UHS (Ge, 2007; Ng, 2007; Chi and Li, 2008; Zhang et al., 2008; Ge and Zeng, 
2011). As for the sample periods, the earliest year is 1987 (Chi and Li, 2008), and the latest year 
is 2005 (Chen and Duan, 2009), roughly covering the sample period 1995-2007 in this thesis. 
However, only four studies contain consecutive years comparable with this sample. They are 







Zhang et al. (2008). The remaining studies only take selected years and investigate the difference 
among them. Overall, sample data and periods in literature can be compared with those of this 
thesis, which however uses consecutive and more recent years. 
  As noted, most of the literature investigates gender discrimination by constructing a 
counterfactual wage structure. That is, supposing female workers have the same wage structure as 
males, what would female wages be given female productivity characteristics? Based on this idea, 
the different decomposition methodologies focus on how to define a counterfactual wage 
structure, using one of two methods. One is to decompose means based on conventional linear 
regression models, and the other is to decompose wage distributions based on quantile or 
semi-parametric models. Guo et al.’s literature review (2011) summarises and gives a detailed 
discussion of the main decomposition methods, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
  According to Guo et al. (2011) in Figure 2.1, research has moved from decomposition of 
means based on conventional linear models towards decomposition of distributions based on 
semi- or non-parametric models. The basic decomposition idea begins with Oaxaca (1973) and 
Blinder (1973) who decompose the wage gap into a composition part and a discrimination part 
(see also Cotton, 1988 and Neumark, 1988). Taking another direction, Brown et al. (1980) 
introduce the factor of occupational segregation to the decomposition using the multinomial 
probit model, and this has been explored more  recently by Appleton et al. (1999). Juhn et al. 
(1991) introduced a residual decomposition method based on mean decomposition and later 
expanded their method to the whole wage distribution (Juhn et al., 1993). In more recent methods, 
DiNardo et al. (1996) construct a counterfactual wage structure by reweighting estimates based 
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on semi-parametric models. Machado and Mata (2005) decompose wage gaps using conditional 
quantile regressions. Most recently, Firpo et al. (2009) use unconditional quantile regression 
models.  
  When it comes to the empirical results, they are quite consistent despite different 
decomposition methods. The overall gender wage gap in China first begins to increase in the 
1990s until around 2002, which is mainly caused by a rising unexplained component or 
discrimination. In fact, up until around the beginning of the 1990s, the gender gap is relatively 
small and stable compared to international levels (Gustafsson and Li, 2000; Demurger et al., 
2007), and the difference in workers’ characteristics can explain a large part of (Chen and Duan, 
2009) or at least about half of the gap (Gustafsson and Li, 2000), suggesting that discrimination 
was small. Then, discrimination seems to increase (Gustafsson and Li, 2000; Zhang, 2004). 
Notice that based on the previous review of decomposition techniques, all studies except Zhang 
et al. (2008) look at different returns to characteristics between for males and females as 
discrimination, while Zhang et al. (2008) only take different returns to unobserved skills (i.e., 
residuals of wage distribution) as discrimination, following Juhn et al.’s method (1991). 
  Findings on the gender wage gap appear consistent, though different datasets and periods are 
studied and different techniques are adopted. Specifically, starting from the end of the 1980s, the 
gender gap rises. This trend continues until the beginning of the 2000s, when some signs of 
stability show in the gap. The main reason for the gender gap changes is that discrimination 
effects take the place of composition effects. As regards studies of separate effects at different 
quantiles of the wage distribution (e.g., Zhang et al., 2008 and Ge and Zeng, 2011), it appears 
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that in the 1990s the gap at the lower end of the distribution was larger than other parts, while 
after 2000, an increasing trend appears in the middle and upper end. More details will be 
discussed later in Chapter 6.  
The minimum wage effect on the gender gap 
The literature on the minimum wage effect on the gender wage gap is limited. Also, most of 
research is on developed countries, especially in Europe. Only one study is on LDCs2. 
  First, two studies directly decompose the gender wage gap, and show mixed results. Based on 
the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition, McGuinness et al. (2011) examine the 
gender wage gap in Ireland. They find no obvious effect of minimum wages for the gender gap in 
full-time labour markets, but substantial effects for part-time females. In contrast, Mumford and 
Smith (2007) find evidence of gender wage gap reduction in relation to the national minimum 
wage in the UK. They also adopt the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition. 
  Another two studies include minimum wages in the investigation of gender wage differentials, 
though without decomposition. Blau and Kahn (2003) regress a standardised gender gap (based 
on characteristics of US workers) on minimum wages using data from 22 developed countries for 
the period 1985-1994. They find significant reduction effects. However, those effects disappear if 
they control for an extra collective bargaining variable, suggesting that the minimum wage 
impact relies on collective bargaining institutions. Robinson (2005) uses the difference-in- 
difference method to examine the effect of the minimum wage on the gender wage gap in the UK. 
                                                              




She finds that the minimum wage reduces the gap by 1 to 2 percentage points, and the effects are 
most concentrated on regions with a relatively large share of low-earning women and regions 
with relatively low wages. Thus these two studies both suggest that minimum wages reduce the 
gender wage gap, at least in developed countries. 
  The remaining relevant studies compare the different gender patterns of minimum wage effects. 
Manning and Dickens (2002) compare different effects of the NMW on genders in the UK based 
on wage reweighting and propensity score reweighting methods. They find that the introduction 
of the NMW reduces the gap by 0.3-0.4 percentage points. Similarly, Perugini and Selezneva 
(2013) show the minimum wage reduces the gender wage gap at the lower end of wage 
distribution in Eastern Europe by comparing gender quantile regressions. The other two studies 
only adopt statistics to describe minimum wage effects on the gender wage gap. Dex et al. (2000) 
point out that the NMW does improve the gender pay ratio at the lower end of the pay 
distribution in the UK. Simon (2012) indicates that countries with higher minimum wages tend to 
have lower gender wage gaps in Europe. At the same time, the only study on LDCs is of the 
Ukraine from Ganguli and Terrell (2009). They examine gender patterns of minimum wage 
effects on wage distribution through spillover effects. Larger positive coefficients for females 
than males show a significant reduction effect on the gender differentials at the lower end of the 
distribution. Overall, indirect comparison of gender patterns supports the conclusion that 
minimum wages favour gender equity, not only for developed countries but also for LDCs. 
  In summary, this section reveals that there is a gap between the literature of the minimum wage 
effect on the gender wage gap in China and that for other countries. On the one hand, there are 
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some studies on the gender wage gap in China that are consistent. They suggest an increasing 
trend of a gap with first fast but later slow stages, and before 2000 discrimination keeps rising. 
On the other hand, some literature investigates the minimum wage effect on the gender gap for 
other countries, though these are limited. Most of relevant studies indicate that the minimum 
wage can effectively reduce the gender wage differentials. Thus this gap will be addressed in a 
later chapter and it is expected that a significant reduction effect of the minimum wage on the 
gender gap in China will be found. 
2.5. Conclusion 
Overall, there are several conclusions from this literature review chapter. Taking first the effects 
of minimum wages on inequality, the literature indicates that the minimum wage discernibly 
reduces inequality, whether it be in developed or developing countries, or in formal or informal 
sectors. This large wage impact, coupled with apparently small employment impacts of the 
minimum wage, is a puzzle, and certainly it will be of interest to find whether it is repeated in the 
present study. In fact, for China the relevant literature is scarce. What evidence there is indicates 
that minimum wages have quite strong impacts on poverty and income inequality reduction 
though more research is needed here. Thus, based on the literature and methodology on 
developed countries, as well as that from developing countries, further study of the minimum 
wage and inequality in China is of interest. 
  Turning next to the employment effect of minimum wages, we reviewed evidence for 
industrialised countries, then for developing countries and for China. For industrialised countries, 
there is no consensus on employment effects though recent results suggest that the impact of 
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minimum wages on employment is negative for low productivity groups such as youth. For 
LDCs, while the results are also mixed, there is a tendency for negative effects in formal sectors 
and positive effects in informal sectors of employment as expected by the “crowding out” effect. 
As far as China is concerned, it appears that rural migrants are more likely to be influenced by 
minimum wages than other workers, perhaps because they are employed more in firms which do 
not comply with the minimum. Therefore, for China it is necessary to consider the issue of 
non-compliance as we will do below. For this research, the emphasis will be on standard methods 
study employment effects, mainly based on the studies of Wang and Gunderson (2011) and Fang 
and Lin (2013), within a formal-informal-sector framework.  
  Finally, as regards the impacts of minimum wages on the gender wage gap, we have found that 
there are few studies, and none for China. The literature on the gender gap itself for China finds 
that starting from the end of the 1980s, the gender gap rises. This trend continues until the 
beginning of the 2000s, when it stabilizes. Using decomposition analysis, the main reason for the 
gender gap changes appears to be that discrimination effects take the place of composition effects. 
The literature on the minimum wage effect on the gender gap is limited, as noted, but suggests 
that the minimum wage reduces gender wage differentials. This thesis represents the first attempt 






Source: Adapted from Guo et al. (2011) 
 
Figure 2.1: Decomposition methods 
 
 
Notes: JMP denotes Chinhui Juhn, Kevin M. Murphy, and Brooks Pierce; MM denotes José 
AF Machado and José Mata; DFL denotes John DiNardo, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas 
Lemieux; FFL denotes Sergio Firpo, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   































































































































































3. DATA  
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter gives detailed information on the two datasets used in this study, and how they are 
combined. One dataset is a sub-sample from the Urban Household Survey (UHS). This is a 
respected national survey in China with a long history, which contains rich individual information. 
The other dataset gives minimum wages at the municipal level during 1994-2007. It was 
compiled from central government and municipal publications by the researcher specifically for 
this PhD research project.  
  These datasets present several advantages. First of all, since the minimum wage data is at 
municipal level over several years it presents good variation for testing effects of minimum 
wages. It should be remembered that, unlike the position in the UK, minimum wages in China are 
set both by provincial governments and also often at municipal level. However, there is no 
publicly available dataset giving all levels of minimum wage across years, especially at the 
municipal level. Thus, municipal minimum wage data for 1994-2007 had to be collected 
specifically for this study from several official sources. Currently, this dataset is almost unique 
for China, since only Fang and Lin (2013) have studied Chinese minimum wages at the 
municipal level.      
  The other advantage is that the UHS gives rich information on individuals in many 
municipalities over a long period. It is a national survey with approximately 161,000 individuals 
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overall (see Table 3.2) in 180 municipalities. This means that adequate regional variation is 
exhibited. Moreover, there is time variation, with data points for some towns beginning in 1988 
and ending in 2007. This is a long sample period for China studies considering economic reforms 
only began in the 1980s. 
  In order to take full advantage of these two datasets, this study combines them at both the 
municipal level and the individual level. Normally the municipal level is adopted, for example, 
for analysis of the municipal inequality indices (section 4.3, Chapter 4), and municipal 
employment rates (Chapter 5). Here, municipal level data are obtained by averaging individuals 
from the UHS, taken in combination with municipal minimum wages. However, sometimes 
individual data can be used directly, for example when analysing wage distributions (section 4.4, 
Chapter 4; Chapter 6). Relevant details are shown in section 3.4. 
  Of course, limitations exist in the data. The most important is underrepresentation in the UHS 
of rural migrants in urban areas. According to the literature review in Chapter 2, one target group 
of studies on China’s minimum wage is rural migrants. Lack of information on individuals in this 
group means our results can only partially describe the impact on welfare of the minimum wage 
policy. In particular, care should be taken when interpreting the empirical results later, since most 
of the sample consists of urban residents. As noted in the introduction, urban residents and rural 
migrants are treated differently, and some of dead-weight loss caused by the minimum wage may 
eventually be borne by rural migrants. 
  In the following sections, the UHS and minimum wage data are discussed in more detail. 
Definitions of variables used in later empirical chapters are discussed as well, together with 
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general statistical information. Lastly, a conclusion is drawn. 
3.2. Data of the Urban Household Survey 
The Urban Household Survey (UHS) is large national survey with a long history. It is conducted 
every year by the statistical authority and serves as the base for the China Statistics Yearbook. 
However, it must be remembered that the UHS data used in our study are only a sub-sample. So 
an overview of the specific sample limitations in this study is given, including sample provinces 
and periods.  
An overview of UHS data 
The Urban Household Survey (UHS), also known as the Urban Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (Gibson et al., 2003) or State Statistical Bureau Survey Data (Bramall, 2001), 
is a large household survey, as well as one of the most comprehensive surveys in the world 
(Bramall, 2001; Gibson et al., 2003). This survey is conducted by the Department of Urban 
Surveys, National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China, which is the former State Statistical 
Bureau. It covers household and individual samples over the whole of China, including 31 
provinces (Taiwan excluded), municipalities and autonomous regions. Over 60,000 households 
are randomly chosen, surveyed, rotated and renewed every three years. Sample households keep 
diaries every month, mainly on daily income and expenditure over the course of the year, which 
is combined with demographic information. These records are collected by enumerators in 
regional branches of the NBS, and aggregated and published as the China Statistics Yearbook. 
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  The UHS has a long history and provides part of the statistical basis for government policies, 
including GDP accounting, annual CPI reference, and nutrition and poverty management (NBSC, 
2007, p.38). The survey was stopped during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), but then was 
slowly restored, and in 1985 was re-organised into its present form. The current UHS databank 
comprises four phases: (i) 1988–1991; (ii) 1992–2001; (iii) 2002–2006; (iv) from 2007 to the 
present. The sample size steadily rises from 17,000 households before 2002 to more than 40,000 
in 2002 and 65,400 in 2006. The areas covered have been expanded as well from 146 cities and 
80 towns before 2002 to 418 municipalities in 2002 (NBSC, 2007, pp.3-41). Overall, UHS data 
can be taken as reliable and representative. 
  The survey is drawn based on a two-stage stratification (NBSC, 2007, pp.4-7). First, 
municipalities are selected and all municipalities are sub-stratified according to geographic 
regions and population size. For each sub-stratum the sample size is determined proportional to 
the corresponding areas. Then all municipalities are ranked according to per capita wages of 
employees from higher to lower and the accumulation of population for each municipality is 
calculated. Finally, a random equidistant PPS (probability proportionate to size sampling) method 
is applied to decide which municipalities are surveyed. In the second stage of stratification, 
household samples are selected. In particular, a master sample is first surveyed, and the UHS 
sample is randomly chosen from it considering surveyed per capita income. The master sample is 
re-established every three years from three stratifications, i.e. for each municipality street blocks 
(jiedao) are selected, then resident committees (juweihui) within each street block are chosen and 
lastly households are drawn from each resident committee. Furthermore, if the selected 
household refuses to be surveyed, it is reported and there is a pre-determined rule of substitution. 
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This two-stage stratification method thus ensures that the UHS sample is representative of the 
urban population (though, as noted, rural migrants in urban areas are underrepresented).  
  As regards the contents of the survey, daily and monthly household information is recorded. 
The main contents include (NBSC, 2007): 
(i) General demographic information about household members such as age, gender, 
nationality, employed status, employed occupation and industry. 
(ii) Cash month-end income and expenditure of households. Total income is separated 
into several categories including earnings from full-time and part-time jobs. Thus, 
while hours worked is not available, our analysis can be based on earnings from 
full-time jobs only. 
(iii) Detailed consumption expenditure of households (not directly relevant for our study, 
though important for computing price inflation). 
 
  A further advantage of the UHS is its monthly frequency. A third of the chosen sample is 
rotated every year so it is renewed every three years; consequently, every household keeps a diary 
of their income and expenditure for at least 12 months but no more than 36 months. UHS annual 
data is aggregated from these monthly data. Normally, annual survey data are extrapolated from a 
sample of months within the year, as happens for example in the Labour Force Survey in the UK 
and Current Population Survey in the US. If the UHS data are compared with such extrapolations, 
we find that the UHS method allows a more accurate calculation of income/wage dispersion. In 
particular, Gibson et al. (2003) suggest that inequality indices are overstated by as much as 
65-100% when based on simple annual extrapolation data instead of annual aggregates based on 
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monthly records.  
  The most criticised aspect of the UHS is that its sample includes too few migrants from rural 
areas, defined as individuals with rural and non-local household registration. This is a particular 
disadvantage for this study since migrant workers are one of the main groups affected by 
minimum wages. Furthermore, ignoring the wages of rural migrants means that urban inequality 
is understated. Thus, this study can be seen as providing a lower bound estimate of inequality and 
minimum wage effects.  
  Other problems are not so serious. It is true that people require some education to record data 
diaries, but this is more of a problem in the Rural Household Survey, since in the UHS it is rare 
for every member in a household to be illiterate (Bramall, 2001). There is also a narrow 
definition of income (Bramall, 2001) which does not include all subsidies for family members. 
However, these problems are not relevant to this study which does not consider urban-rural 
inequality or non-working-age family members. Thus, we may conclude that the UHS affords a 
solid data foundation.  
UHS data used in this study 
The main UHS datasets that have been accessed consist of two parts. One is aggregated annual 
data at an individual level from 1988 to 2003. It includes five provinces, Liaoning, Zhejiang, 
Guangdong, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and one municipality, Beijing. Their geographic locations are 
indicated in the map in Figure 3.1. Beijing, Liaoning, Zhejiang and Guangdong belong to 
prosperous eastern coastal areas, and Shaanxi and Sichuan belong to less-developed western 
61 
 
inland areas. There is no province for developing central inland regions. Though there are only 
six provinces, all of them are important and representative economic zones in China.  
  The other dataset consists of monthly individual data from 2004 to 2007. It includes nine 
provinces, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, and 
two municipalities, Beijing and Shanghai, shown in light shading in Figure 3.1.The east includes 
seven provinces, i.e. Beijing, Shanghai, Hebei, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian; the 
central region involves four, i.e. Heilongjiang, Jilin, Shanxi and Anhui; and there is no province 
for the west. These eleven provinces from 2004 to 2007 comprise nearly half of the population of 
all 32 provinces in China, and three are among the top ten provinces with the highest GDP: 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Liaoning.1 A large body of the national economy, therefore, has been 
included in this dataset. 
  For the above two datasets, this study has several combinations. For example, 21 consecutive 
years of data are obtained if monthly data from 2004 to 2007 are aggregated and combined with 
the 1988-2003 dataset. The advantage of this combination is the extended period of time covered, 
while the shortcoming is maybe the structural break caused by the different coverage of the two 
datasets. Another important approach is to take advantage of the rotated sample and construct 
individual panel data. Every year a third of households are rotated out of the survey, so the 
shortest is a 12-month individual panel, but some 48-month panels are available. The third 
dataset that can be constructed is balanced panel data which only includes three provinces from 






Information on the specific data combination used in the empirical analysis is given in each 
empirical chapter below, and sometimes different combinations are used to test for robustness of 
the main results. 
3.3. Data on minimum wages 
The availability of disaggregated data on minimum wage laws is the main problem for minimum 
wage analysis in China. A municipal minimum wage database (chengshi zuidi gongzi shujuku) 
has been constructed by the Institute of Population and Labour Economics and the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (see Du and Wang, 2008). However, this dataset is not available to 
the public. Thus, this section describes my study’s collection of a disaggregated dataset.  
  In fact, some studies refer to government websites (Luo, 2007b; Du et al., 2008; Ni et al., 2011; 
Fang and Lin, 2013), which provide official files on minimum wages. However, generally these 
minimum wages are at the provincial level, instead of the municipal level used in this study. 
Business databases are another way to set up minimum wage data (Wang and Gunderson, 2011 
and 2012; Shi, 2009), but these are also province level in the main. A third approach, followed 
here, is to use information from local newspapers, municipalities are required to publish their 
minimum wages. Using this method, government websites and business databases can be used to 
cross-check reliability.  
  The provincial authorities do publish some disaggregated data. Basically, these official files 
can be separated into three types. Firstly, several provincial governments show minimum wages 
for each municipality directly in their notifications. One example is Anhui province. Its 
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announcement is so detailed that some districts within municipalities are even specified. Another 
similar example is Shaanxi province. Data collection for this type of notification is simple since 
original official files are easy to find on relevant provincial government department websites. 
  In the second type of notification, provincial governments set several levels of minimum wage 
for different grades of municipalities. Normally the more prosperous the area is, the higher the 
minimum wage. The difficulty in this situation is that definitions are obscure for different grades. 
For example, during 2004-2006 Hebei province set three levels of minimum wage with the 
lowest for poverty towns (pinkun xian). However, poverty towns are classified into national, 
provincial and municipal levels. Which standard should be applied? There is no clear requirement 
in official files. In this kind of situation, a search for local news at that time is needed. Another 
difficulty is that there are several districts in a big municipality, and sometimes two levels of 
minimum wage are applied within one municipality, such as Dalian city in Liaoning province, 
Shuozhou city in Shanxi province and Shenzhen city in Guangdong province. In this kind of 
situation, the level of the district where the municipal government lies was usually adopted. Data 
collection is therefore difficult for several municipalities for this type of government 
announcement. 
  In the third type of notification, provincial governments only set “reference” minimum wages 
at several levels and municipal governments are left to decide a minimum wage by themselves, 
such as Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong and Sichuan provinces. Since 
official files for small municipalities are hard to find, even for recent years, most of the time was 
spent on this type of data collection.  
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  Data collection proceeded as follows. The first stage was to check government websites. 
Provincial Departments of Human Resources and Social Security have their own official websites 
where local official files on minimum wages for recent years are often kept. Then local 
newspapers were searched for minimum wage announcements. This search included printed 
provincial and municipal annals, as well as Web databases including the “Full-text Database for 
Important Newspapers in China” (zhongguo zhongyao baozhi quanwen shujuku), China Full-text 
Academic Journals (CNKI net) (zhongguo zhi wang), and China Infobank (zhongguo zixun 
hang). 
  A further important source for minimum wage data was the Website of China Labour 
Consultation (zhongguo laodong zixun wang, www.51labour.com). This business website collects 
news on labour and human resources, contains databases on labour laws and regulations, and 
offers consulting services on labour laws, including a database specifically on minimum wages at 
the municipal level. The important feature of this database is that it attaches original official files 
as well as local news after each minimum wage adjustment, thus its data are verified. Though this 
database does not include all minimum wages over the whole period, it provides about half of our 
data points.  
  Hopefully, the result of this effort is improved accuracy. First of all, as mentioned above, 
nearly all the data are verified by original official files or local news, not taken from secondary 
sources. That is perhaps why errors are found in the data for Heilongjiang province in 2004 and 
2005 cited by Wang and Gunderson (2011, p.399), even though their data are from the database 
of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of China. Furthermore, more detail is 
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available in my data. For example, since July 2005 Shanxi province has set special minimum 
wages for workers in the mining industry (RMB1000-1200 per month, i.e. GBP100-120 per 
month), which is almost twice as high as the minimum wage for workers in other industries 
(around RMB550 per month, i.e. GBP55 per month). Another example is Beijing municipality. It 
announced minimum wage adjustments twice in 2004: RMB495 (GBP49.5) per month on 1st 
January and RMB545 (GBP54.5) per month on 1st July. However, in Wang and Gunderson’s 
study, only one number appears (2011, p.399). The same case is for Wuxi city and Yixing city, in 
Jiangsu province, which also set minimum wages twice, in 2004 and in 2007 respectively.  
  The appendix tables (Appendix 3a, b, c and d) show nominal minimum wages sample 
provinces in this study, with details at the municipal level for an example province - Zhejiang. 
There are 102 municipalities in six provinces during 1993-2003 and 101 in eleven provinces 
during 2004-2007. In total, there are 183 municipalities taking into account overlaps in two 
periods. For these areas from the first year of minimum wages to 2007, there are 87 unique values 
of nominal minimum wages, which gives good variation for regression estimation. The 
adjustment dates are indicated along with the minimum wages. Every fixing is shown in bold. 
Notice that Wang and Gunderson (2011) exhibit a similar table on the minimum wage. However, 
their table only contains the highest level of minimum wage for each province, and does not 
present the specific fixing dates. Also, their sample period only begins in 2000. Furthermore, a 
table with municipal minimum wages in Zhejiang province ((Appendix 3d) is attached as well, 
which works as an example of municipal minimum wages and shows the uniqueness of my data. 




  From the appendix tables, diversified patterns of minimum wage fixing among provinces are 
seen; some are once or twice every year, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Jiangsu; some are once 
every two or even three years, like Hebei, Heilongjiang and Liaoning. Furthermore, there are 
different levels within each province, with the exception of Beijing and Shanghai. For example, 
Anhui has ten levels and Guangdong involves eight levels. Finally, Guangdong always sets the 
highest minimum wages among the sample provinces, and Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang follow. 
Since these provinces are all coastal areas, it can be seen that the eastern region has higher 
minimum wages than the central and western regions. 
3.4. Covariates and statistics 
This section first demonstrates the combination of the above two datasets and then gives 
definitions of the main covariates in this study. Details are given on how to combine micro 
(individual) and macro (municipality) data. The important minimum wage variable is also 
reviewed, as well as definitions of other covariates such as the employment to population ratio. It 
is worth emphasizing at this point that this study is restricted to full-time employed people above 
16 years of age, excluding the farming industry and the self-employed. Students are excluded as 
well. In addition, an upper ceiling for age is not set since retired people returning to work may be 
a vulnerable group directly influenced by minimum wages (though sensitivity tests are performed 
to check whether restriction to the under 65 age category changes results).  
Combination 
This part describes combination of the above two datasets at the micro (individual) and macro 
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(municipality) level respectively. The common information/variable is municipality (name). The 
macro level data needs summary information from the UHS individual data at the municipal level. 
For example, the education level information of the individuals in a given municipality is used to 
calculate the average education level in that municipality. Section 4.3 in Chapter 4 (municipal 
inequality indices and the minimum wage) and Chapter 5 (municipal employment rates and the 
minimum wage) use the macro (municipality) level data. 
  As for the micro level data, the constructed municipal average variables are merged with the 
UHS individual data. Thus, all individuals in one municipality share the same municipal control 
variables and municipal minimum wages. Section 4.4 in Chapter 4 (wage distribution and the 
minimum wage) and Chapter 6 (the gender wage gap distribution and the minimum wage) use the 
micro (individual) level data.      
The Minimum wage 
The minimum wage is defined as the annual minimum wage, monthly weighted. For example, on 
1st July 1999 Liaoning adjusted its minimum wage from 210 Yuan per month to 280 Yuan and 
kept the same rate in 2000. Thus the minimum wage in 1999 equals 2940 Yuan (210×6 + 280×
6) and in 2000 it equals 3360 Yuan (280×12). This is similar to the time-weighted minimum 
wage used by Fang and Lin (2013, p.10). The weighted annual minimum wage concept has the 
advantage of being sensitive to variation in monthly minimum wages, in that for the same 
monthly rate different annual rates are expected, as in the example above.  
  Note that in general this study does not transform the minimum wage variable into a Kaitz 
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index, i.e. take the ratio of minimum wages to average wages in a municipality. This is because 
the Kaitz index puts strong restrictions on the coefficients of interest (requiring changes in the 
minimum wage and the average wage to have equal and opposite coefficients, as noted by 
Neumark and Wascher, 2008, p.62). Therefore, in the empirical analysis below, the municipal 
average wage is used as a separate control. 
  However, for summary purposes the Kaitz ratio is useful, and Tables 3.1a and 1b show this 
ratio (calculated from weighted annual minimum wages to average annual wages) for different 
regions and periods. Here the second highest level of minimum wage is chosen for sample 
provinces, instead of the top as in many other studies. The reason for this is that some top 
minimum wages are set exclusively for the capital city or special economic zones, such as 
Zhejiang province before 1997, Liaoning during 2000-2003, Guangdong and Fujian. In contrast, 
the second highest level covers both large and medium cities, and is more representative than the 
top level.2   
  From Tables 3.1a and 3.1b, trends and ranges of relevant ratios can be observed. First, it can be 
seen that before 2004, the overall trend of the ratio is downward, for example in Beijing from 38% 
in 1995 to 31% in 2003; Liaoning from 42% in 1995 to 34% in 2003; and Shaanxi from 48% in 
1995 to 35% in 2003 (see also Du et al. 2008). However, after 2004 the trend stabilises, even 
with a slight increase; for example, Beijing from 29.5% in 2004 to 30.2% in 2007; Liaoning from 
28.2% in 2004 to 33.2% in 2007; and Zhejiang from 28.6% in 2004 to 29% in 2007. Exceptions 
                                                              






are Jiangsu, Shanxi and Anhui, three out of eleven sample provinces. As for the range of ratios, it 
is between 23.4% and 47.6%, which is comparable to ratios in industrial countries, and consistent 
with existing literature for China (Han, 2006; Luo, 2011; Fang and Lin, 2013).  
  Finally, more generally, Figure 3.1 presents a scatter graph of the link between average wages 
and minimum wages at the municipal level. As can be seen, there is a strong positive relationship 
between the two. Richer cities set higher minimum wages, as is reasonable.  
Other covariates 
The main variables we examine are wages and employment, defined as follows: Wages are 
defined as earnings from full-time jobs, excluding any income from part-time jobs. Annual wages 
for the sample period of 2004-2007 are the sums of 12-month wages in each year. Real wages in 
all chapters are based on 1988 price levels. The minimum wage we have already discussed, but 
also relevant is the issue of compliance, since as noted, developing countries have problems of 
non-compliance, and China is no exception. Thus, below we will make use of a compliance ratio 
variable, defined as Ci/Ei, where C denotes people who earn wages at least the minimum wage, E 
denotes total employment and i represents municipality i. It is an important variable and is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
  As regards employment, the main dependent variable is the employment-population ratio. Here, 
employment is defined as workers in full-employment aged between 16 and 65 with reported 
annual wages. Following this rule, working people aged above 65 are excluded even though a 
sub-minimum wage and non-compliance is widely seen in this group (around 48% in the sample, 
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see Table 4.1 in Chapter 4). Excluding workers over 65 is conventional, and in any case such 
workers represent only 3.7% (see Table 5.1a in Chapter 5) of all old people above 65. In fact, as 
discussed later, this exclusion does not change conclusions regarding minimum wage effects on 
employment. The population variable is constructed similarly, including all persons aged between 
16 and 65.   
  Other important variables are as follows. Education is defined as education levels according to 
the relevant question in the survey. In total there are seven levels valued from one to seven: 
illiterate and semi-illiterate, primary school, junior high school, vocational high school, senior 
high school, college, university and postgraduate. These categories are consistent with those in 
the China Labour Statistic Yearbook. 
  College enrolment is defined as the ratio of college students to the trimmed sample in each 
municipality per year. That is, the number of college, university and postgraduate students is 
divided by the number of individuals in the trimmed sample per municipality per year. Since this 
variable only has much influence in the employment ratio, rather than individual wage levels, it 
will be used in Chapter 5 alone.     
  Experience is calculated as the difference between an individual’s age and the year when they 
first began work. This procedure seems crude for women workers since it omits intermittent 
participation due to childbirth, but is standard in the literature. However, in China, women 
workers’ parents usually help them to take care of children after their maternity leave ends. Thus, 
basically this definition of experience will not much bias results.  
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  Industry is grouped into ten categories excluding the farming industry: (i) mining, 
manufacturing, and power production and supply; (ii) construction; (iii) transportation, postal 
service and information technology; (iv) wholesale, retail sales, hotels and restaurants; (v) 
finance and real estate; (vi) scientific research, and technical services; (vii) commercial and 
personal services; (viii) education, health care, social security and welfare, culture, sport and 
entertainment; (ix) government and social organisations; and (x) other industries. 
  Occupation is defined as six groups, excluding farming: professionals and technicians, officials 
and managers, clerical staff, commercial and service staff, manual workers and operators, and 
soldiers and others. The UHS adjusts its categories of occupation constantly. But the above six 
broad categories can be reasonably defined. 
  Ownership is grouped into six categories: (i) state-owned; (ii) collective-owned; (iii) mixed 
ownership including stock company, foreign enterprises and enterprises owned by residents 
living in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan; (iv) private-owner; (v) employees in private enterprises; 
and (vi) others including retired people returning to work. Notice that there is no relevant data 
offered before 1992.  
  Unemployment rate is calculated from my whole UHS sample, instead of trimmed sample, 
according to the standard definition. That is, the ratio of unemployed people to the sum of 
employed plus unemployed people. Specifically, there is a relevant question in the survey which 
can be used to distinguish the working status. Note that in China welfare is very low, so people 
without regular jobs have to find informal employment (e.g. selling lottery tickets), so we should 
rather speak of underemployment. 
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  Table 3.2 shows the means of these covariates by province from the annual dataset. As shown 
in the last row, taking the 1988-2007 period as a whole, there are 180 municipalities in all and 
161,271 observations (individuals). Among them, around 45% are women; the average education 
level is high school or vocational high school; the average college enrolment is 20%; the average 
experience is 20 years; around 38% work in the manufacturing sector, and the remainder in the 
service sector; around 57% work in SOEs; and the average unemployment rate is 5.28%. Those 
average numbers seem plausible. Moreover, the variables exhibit good variation across provinces. 
In particular, average real wages are highest for the eastern provinces, and lowest for western, 
indicating the different levels of prosperity.   
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter describes the data used in this study and gives general statistical information. The 
UHS dataset is our main source, and is reliable since it is conducted by the national statistics 
authority. It contains accurate information for households and individuals, particularly on 
employment and income. Although one problem is underrepresentation of rural migrants, overall 
the UHS data maintains a high quality. The data cover only some of the provinces in China; 
however, most of them are significant economic zones. Before 2004, there are annual data for six 
provinces; after 2004, there are monthly data for eleven provinces. Thus, different combinations 
of year and provinces can be used in this study, which gives diversified robustness checks for the 
main results. 
  The other advantage of the data is that the minimum wage data was collected by the researcher 
from reliable sources, i.e. government files, relevant news and business databases. Each 
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minimum wage in the data relates to official files or local news, not an individual value. 









Figure 3.1: UHS panel data in China 
 
Notes: Six provinces (Liaoning, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Beijing) 
during 1988-2003 are indicated by grids; eleven provinces (Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, 
Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Beijing, and Shanghai) during 
2004-2007 are indicated by light shadow. Therefore the Beijing, Liaoning, and 





















Figure 3.2: Scatter graph for real annual average wages and log real annual minimum 
wages at the municipal level. Each black point represents one municipality. The solid 
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4. THE MINIMUM WAGE AND WAGE INEQUALITY 
4.1. Introduction 
Minimum wages are often defended as a means of redistributing earnings and so helping the poor. 
This chapter looks at such redistribution effects at the municipal level since the “bite” of 
minimum wages is at this level. Without wage effects, minimum wage policy would have no 
employment effects. Thus, wage effects of minimum wages are investigated in this chapter, 
before examining employment effects of minimum wages in Chapter 5.  
  This study contributes to the literature on minimum wages within LDCs in several ways. First, 
this is the first study to look within China at the direct relationship between urban wage 
inequality and the minimum wage. China’s experience is valuable for this field given its low 
social security “floor”, which makes it relatively easy to assess the effects of the minimum wage 
because there are no extra wage floors to worry about (e.g. as in France). Second, China is the 
largest LDC in the world, with all the important characteristics of labour markets in LDCs ‒ as 
depicted in the introductory chapter - namely, multiple minimum wage levels, non-compliance, a 
dual-economy, and both formal and informal sectors in urban areas. Minimum wage research on 
this country, therefore, will provide meaningful insights for similar LDC studies. Lastly, China is 
also a transition economy, with the co-existence of a planned-economy and market economy, and 
so may provide lessons for transition economies in Eastern Europe.    
  To briefly preview this chapter’s findings, we find that the minimum wage appears to reduce 
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overall wage inequality at the municipal level. The channel of this equity effect is through raising 
wages at the lower end of the wage distribution, with the effect continuing up to the 50th 
percentile, thus compressing the bottom half of the wage distribution. A reasonably high, 7%, 
non-compliance ratio is also found. Given definite non-compliance, the finding of significant 
increases in wages above the bottom decile may indicate the existence of a lighthouse effect1 (see 
the literature review in Boeri et al., 2011), i.e. those workers not directly affected bargain for 
higher wages than they would without the minimum wage. Finally, we find that all the above 
effects tend to be stronger after 2004, showing the impact of the stronger minimum wage policy 
enforced by the central government after 2004.  
  The following sections first discuss the compliance issue, investigating determinants of 
compliance ratios in Section 4.2. Second, in Section 4.3, overall inequality and the minimum 
wage is examined. Third, following Lee (1999) and Bosch and Manacorda (2010), 
re-distributional effects are further investigated by examining wage percentiles in Section 4.4. An 
endogeneity concern here is that measurement errors (see Lee, 1999) may produce an upward 
bias on the estimated effects of minimum wages. Thus, an instrumental variable (a Kaitz index 
from another dataset) approach is used in this section. Furthermore, spillovers of the minimum 
wage are examined at the end of this section. A conclusion is given in Section 4.5. 
4.2. Compliance 
As Starr (1981) points out, non-compliance with minimum wage laws is one of the characteristics 
                                                              
1  Note that  in developed countries without non‐compliance, effects of minimum wages on the wage distribution 




of labour markets in LDCs. In a developing, poor country, non-compliance may be an 
equilibrium in the sense that market wages are smaller than the minimum wage (Indeed, some 
non-compliance is found even in developed countries, as noted below.). However, even if 
non-compliance exists, minimum wages can still have effects by affecting firm behaviour as is 
shown below.  
  This section is organised as follows. First an overview of the compliance issue is presented, 
including theoretical explanation and China’s general picture of compliance. Then spikes on 
wage distributions are shown, which is a direct way to look at compliance. Next the statistical 
characteristics of workers whose earnings are below (i.e. non-compliance), equal to and above 
minimum wages are presented. Finally, in order to investigate compliance further, regression 
estimation results are exhibited. 
An overview of compliance 
Non-compliance is widespread in developing countries, with Latin America and Africa showing 
non-compliance rates of around 20-40% (see Saget, 2006, 2008; Basu et al., 2010). Indeed, 
non-compliance appears as one of the most important characteristics of labour markets in 
developing countries when studying minimum wages (Harrison and Leamer, 1997; Ashenfelter 
and Smith, 1979). Indeed, Starr (1981, p.148) states in his book: “…those who are most in need 
of minimum wage protection are precisely the groups of workers for whom enforcement is most 
difficult.” 
  Economic models can explain the rationality of non-compliance. The pioneering work is 
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provided by Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) and Grenier (1982), with different assumptions about 
penalties for non-compliance. Chang and Ehrlich (1985) reconcile the conflicting reasoning from 
the above two perspectives and conclude that non-compliance will raise the marginal cost of 
labour above the free competitive market level, thus the non-complying employer will hire 
employees between the competitive market level and the minimum wage. Yaniv (2001) extends 
their theory and makes compliance endogenously decided by the profit-maximising behaviour of 
firms. Basu et al. (2010) then consider subminimum wage dispersion and construct a model of 
minimum wage policy with imperfect competition, imperfect enforcement and imperfect 
commitment. They also suggest that “turning a blind eye to legislation” may in fact be an 
equilibrium result for government (for example where enforcement is costly). 
  Starr’s work (1981) is illuminating. He argues that non-compliance in developing countries can 
be understood in three ways (Starr, 1981, pp.148-149). First, some labour laws and regulations 
are only partly enforced. Therefore, minimum wages are, in effect, more likely to be a gradual 
aim in economics and politics rather than a legal wage floor (see also Gindling and Terrell, 2009). 
Second, workers with extremely low wages are always a component of labour markets 
considering the dual-economy with informal, unregistered work in developing countries. Finally, 
low compliance does not mean that minimum wages are invalid in informal sectors, as is shown 
with the famous lighthouse effect. Here, informal wages - which are not subject to the minimum 
wage -still develop a spike at the minimum wage (see literature review in Boeri et al., 2011). 
Consequently, a higher minimum wage may push workers from the formal to informal sectors, or 
attract lower skilled workers from the informal to formal sectors (Boeri et al., 2011). 
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  Of course, the above conclusions are applicable to China as well. First, workers with low 
wages are common considering the almost unlimited labour supply from rural areas to 
municipalities. Furthermore, rural incomes are low compared with earnings in urban areas. Thus, 
even subminimum municipal wages are higher than rural incomes, and workers prefer to accept 
such illegal jobs. Finally, a type of lighthouse effect, with wages in the non-compliant sectors 
increasing with the minimum wage, is also observed in this thesis. In sum, minimum wages in 
China still have impacts on wages (and employment), even though non-compliance exists. 
Minimum wage spikes on the wage distribution 
A straightforward way to investigate the impact of minimum wages is to observe spikes (or 
“bumps”) around the minimum wage in the wage distribution. Figure 4.1 presents kernel density 
wage distributions and minimum wages by years for the three provinces of Beijing, Liaoning and 
Zhejiang over the period 1990-2007, as well as for the three provinces of Hebei, Shanxi and 
Fujian for 2004-2007. The reason for choosing Beijing, Liaoning and Zhejiang is that they are the 
three provinces with a long run of data. On the other hand, Hebei has the highest minimum to 
average wage ratio among all sample provinces; Fujian is representative of a middle income 
coastal province; and Shanxi has the highest minimum to average wage ratio among the sample 
central region provinces.  
  In Figure 4.1, all wages and minimum wages are nominal, and provincial minimum wages are 
obtained from a weighted average of municipal minimum wages. The horizontal axis gives wages 
in log form, ranged uniformly between 3.5 and 11, and the vertical axis is density, ranged 
uniformly between 0 and 0.8, so that all scales are comparable. 
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  In Figure 4.1, a mixed picture of spikes/bumps shows. Although minimum wages began in 
Beijing in December, 1994, bumps only begin to show from 2001. For Liaoning, bumps also 
appear after 1999, though less obvious than those for Beijing. Zhejiang’s bumps are even smaller. 
However, for the other provinces observed over 2004-2007, bumps are generally found in most 
years. This mixed result of spikes/bumps is similar to the evidence for other developing countries 
(Gindling and Terrell, 2007, p.497). 
  Why is there no apparent spike or bump, for some provinces or in some years? One reason is 
that minimum wages are too low to generate a spike, as happened in the US in the 1980s (Lee, 
1999, p.983). However, Table 3.1 shows that ratios of minimum wages with respect to average 
wages are quite high ‒ around 30%, and only a few percentage points lower than ratios for the 
UK and US (Low Pay Commission Report 2013, pp.28-29; Cooper, 2013, p.5). The reason may 
be that non-compliance in China is widespread as we discuss below.  
Characteristics of workers earning minimum wages 
Characteristics of workers grouped by wages relative to minimum wages are summarised in 
Table 4.1. In the entire sample over thirteen years, 7.24% earn less than minimum wages, that is, 
are non-compliant. We see that 10% of females are non-compliant, compared to only 4.9% of 
males, showing the lower pay of female workers. As regards region, since only eastern areas have 
full 1995-2007 data, only this region is shown, and we see it is close to the total (as also found in 
Fang and Lin, 2013). As regards age, we see that young and old workers (particularly aged over 
65) are more likely to be non-compliant, which is reasonable given that these groups contain the 
lowest earners. As regards the education cohorts, the higher the education level, the less people 
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earn below minimum wages, again as is reasonable. Industry patterns and occupation patterns are 
consistent considering that workers in restaurants, hotels and personal services are generally low 
skilled, so more than 10% earn less than minimum wages. Finally, as expected, state-owned 
enterprises have the fewest workers earning less than minimum wage (though still not zero) while 
private companies have the most.  
  Statistics in Table 4.1 are consistent with Fang and Lin (2013) and Ma et al. (2012). Fang and 
Lin (2013) show a non-compliance ratio of 5.62% during 2004-2009, and Ma et al. (2012) find 
falling non-compliance ratios from 18% in 1998 to 6% in 2007. Ma et al.’s evidence (2012) 
supports the evidence in Table 4.1even more than Fang and Lin’s (2013) in that their data are 
drawn from a different source2; while Fang and Lin (2013) also use the UHS, though over a 
shorter period compared with our UHS sample. Though some non-compliance ratios in Table 4.1 
might seem high (e.g.47.96% for workers over 65), they are comparable to ratios for uncovered 
sectors of developing countries in the recent literature (Gindling and Terrell, 2009; Alaniz et al., 
2011).  
  In conclusion, some non-compliance is always apparent in our data even for people with a 
college education or above, or working as professionals or officials3, as well as in state-owned 
enterprises. On average, if people whose earnings are less than or equal to minimum wages are 
added together, then about 7% of the workforce (7.24% non-compliance plus 0.05% exactly on 
the minimum wage) are potentially covered by minimum wages, which is quite similar to the 
                                                              
2  Ma  et  al.  (2012)  use  firm data  and  construct  the  average wage per  firm by  the  overall  firm wage divided  by 
employed workers. 
3  It  is strange that the non‐compliant group  includes professionals, technicians, and officials.  It may be caused by 
reporting  occupations  or wages wrongly. However,  this  group  is  only  0.25%  of  the  sample,  and  the  results  are 
unaffected by their inclusion. .       
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coverage in the UK and US, as well as the covered sectors in developing countries. Especially 
high non-compliance ratios exist only in a few groups, comparable to uncovered sectors in 
developing countries. Thus, a picture comparable to that literature is to be expected in later 
sections and chapters. 
What determines the compliance ratio? 
In order to investigate compliance ratios further, a set of simple regressions on compliance ratios 
are now presented, with conventional labour market covariates on the right-hand side. lnmw is the 
municipal nominal minimum wages in log form. lnwage is the average nominal wage for each 
municipality in log form. Year fixed effects are used to control period variation, including price 
levels, thus it is not necessary to use variables in real terms. manufacture and construction are 
average proportions of labourers in the manufacturing and construction industry per municipality, 
respectively. service is labourers in either the sales, hotel and restaurant industry, or commercial 
and personal service industry. female, SOE, unemployment and migrant are average proportions 
of female workers, workers in state-owned enterprises, unemployed and migrant workers per 
municipality respectively. All covariates are calculated year by year as described in Chapter 3.  
  The results are shown in Table 4.2. The sample period is 1995 to 2007, when minimum wages 
extended over the whole country. All sample provinces are included. All variances are robust. The 
first column is a pooled OLS regression without municipal dummies, and the remainders are 
municipal panel data regressions. However, the last two columns adopt different sample periods, 
i.e. 1995-2003 and 2004-2007. Most coefficients appear reasonable: minimum wages are 
negatively related to compliance ratios with strong effects, suggesting that high minimum wages 
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raise compliance difficulties. High municipal average wages strongly increase compliance (and 
municipal unemployment rates have the opposite effect), suggesting that high wage businesses 
(in richer cities) can more easily comply. The percent female and percent migrant variables 
usually negatively affect compliance, as would be expected for disadvantaged groups. Finally, 
compliance in cities with more people in SOEs is significantly higher, again as would be 
expected.  
  Three points deserve further consideration. First, municipal average wages explain a large part 
of compliance ratios in that R-squared rises considerably once average wages are included. 
However, this variable captures effects of other covariates, since once it is included all the other 
variables become insignificant except minimum wages. Two specifications with and without 
average wages are, therefore, presented for some regressions. Second, coefficients for female 
workers appear to be slightly negative with average wages included, but significantly and 
strongly negative (-0.11) without. This result suggests that low compliance for women is mainly 
because they are employed in low paying firms, rather than because they are women as such. 
Finally, columns (8) and (9) have the same specifications but different sample periods. After 2004, 
it can be seen that minimum wages have stronger (negative) effects on compliance. Also, both the 
negative effects of female proportions and positive effects of SOE workers become significant. 
These facts together may indicate a stronger effect of the minimum wage after 2004, which is 
reasonable given the strengthening of minimum wages then, and is investigated further in later 
sections. 
 In sum, like many other developing countries, there is definite evidence of non-compliance 
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in China, with a non-compliance ratio of 7.24% on average. Of course, non-compliance ratios are 
particularly high for workers in fringe categories, such as other occupations and other industries. 
These categories may be seen as part of the informal sector characteristic of a developing country. 
That is why spikes/bumps do not show in every wage distribution in Figure 4.1. Nevertheless, 
even with non-compliance, minimum wages can still have real effects. That is why there is 
evidence of spikes/bumps in some of the wage distributions. In later sections, further evidence of 
these effects is tested for. 
4.3. The minimum wage and overall wage inequality 
This section gives an overview of rising minimum wages and falling inequality. From descriptive 
evidence of the whole pooled sample, it is observed that there is an obvious decrease in inequality 
accompanied by a sudden increase of the minimum wage from 2003 to 2004, when minimum 
wages were strengthened. In the regression section, a basic model is adopted to look at the effect 
of minimum wages on inequality at a municipal level. Empirical results here suggest that rising 
minimum wages reduce inequality significantly.  
Descriptive evidence 
The next part shows descriptive links between increasing minimum wages and decreasing 
inequality. First, inequality needs to be measured, whether via Gini coefficients, wage variance, 
or log wage gaps. Simple regressions exploring minimum wage determinants are then presented. 
Of course, this picture alone cannot establish any causality relationship between inequality and 
minimum wages. Further work using panel methods is performed in later parts. 
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  In this study, standard calculations of inequality based on municipalities are used. The Gini 
index, wage variance, and the 50-10 gap and 90-10 gap (estimated as the difference between log 
wages at the 90/50 percentile and log wages at the 10 percentile) are investigated. The Gini index 
follows the formula below: 
           ,     ,  , , , 
where yi and yj stand for the wage of individual i and j, respectively; n stands for the population; u 
is the average wage. Gini indices for each municipality can be easily obtained by downloading 
STATA commands. Moreover, the Gini indices in this study are directly calculated from the 
original individual household survey data used for the regressions here, so they contain richer 
information than general Gini indices downloaded from databases.  
  Figure 4.2 shows trends of the above four inequality indices, as well as real annual minimum 
wages over years. The horizontal axis is the year, from 1988 to 2007; the left vertical axis is 
inequality and the right is minimum wages in log form. Different symbols of scatters indicate 
trends of inequality indices and minimum wages. Figure 4.2a is for all eleven sample provinces. 
Its inequality indices are calculated by pooling individual real wage data over the sample 
provinces between 1988 and 2007, while minimum wages of the sample provinces are obtained 
through weighted municipal levels from 1995, when all provinces began minimum wages. We 
can observe that while the Gini index gives a small, steady increase over 20 years; both the 50-10 
and 90-10 gap first rise then fall from 2002. Since the 50-10 gap is flatter than the 90-10 gap, 
their difference widens with time. However, the situation for wage variance is a little strange, 
with a sudden drop in 2002. This may be related to the new stratification areas of the UHS 
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beginning from 2002, as indicated in Chapter 3. In the UHS sample in this study, the number of 
municipalities increases from around 35 before 2002 to around 96 for the same six provinces. At 
the same time, real minimum wages keep rising through the years.  
  Figures 4.2b, 4.2c and 4.2d exhibit inequality indices and minimum wages for Beijing, 
Liaoning, and Zhejiang provinces, respectively, as they are the only three sample provinces that 
have data for the whole period of 1988-2007. Liaoning and Zhejiang’s minimum wages are 
weighted means from municipal levels. Trends for the three provinces are similar to those for the 
total sample. 
  Figure 4.3 further gives scatter graphs between inequality and minimum wages at a municipal 
level. The vertical axes are inequality indices and the horizontal axes are minimum wages in each 
municipality. Both wages and the minimum wage are in real terms based on 1988 price levels. 
The red lines are fitted values obtained from regressing minimum wages on inequality. These 
scatters allow exploration of the link between minimum wages and inequality. Generally 
speaking, there appears to be no clear association between inequality indices and minimum 
wages, except for the wage variance. The wage variance at least shows a negative link between 
minimum wages and inequality, which is in the direction expected.  
  Before taking up the regression link between minimum wages and inequality, it is interesting to 
investigate the determinants of the minimum wage itself. Accordingly, Table 4.3 presents a set of 
simple regressions on minimum wages. The same labour market covariates as in the compliance 
regressions in section 4.2 are included on the right-hand side, including lnwage, manufacture, 
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construction, service, female, SOE, unemployment and migrant4. An extra variable compliance 
ratio is involved in two out of four regressions considering compliance is closely related to 
minimum wages and may capture information from other covariates. Columns (1) and (2) are 
pooled OLS regressions without municipal dummies, and the remaining columns (3) and (4) are 
municipal panel data regressions. In Table 4.3, it can be seen that the higher municipal average 
wages are, the higher minimum wages are, and migrant proportions are positively related to the 
minimum wage, while female proportions have a negative relationship, which suggests that the 
minimum wage determination may consider female residents, but not migrants. Compliance is 
negatively related to the minimum wage, as we have already found. Furthermore, once municipal 
fixed effects are controlled, significant effects from the manufacture and service industry, SOEs 
and unemployment disappear, but the municipal average wage becomes stronger. This indicates 
that the minimum wage depends strongly on municipal prosperity which of course relates closely 
to municipal average wages (see also Xing and Xu, 2015). Overall, in this part, Figures 4.2 and 
4.3 give a basic idea on falling inequality after the early 2000s, and rising minimum wages. For 
Figure 4.2a, a jump from 2003 to 2004 happens in minimum wages, consistent with 
strengthening of the system described in Chapter 1. Correspondingly, the 50-10 gap, 90-10 gap 
and wage variance fall at the same time. After 2004, inequality keeps falling as minimum wages 
keep rising. The same happens in Beijing, Liaoning and Zhejiang province.  
Estimation results 





municipal level. First, the municipal level data is investigated, including three sets of results: the 
whole period beginning from the year when minimum wages covered the whole country, i.e. 
1995; then the period before minimum wages were reinforced, i.e. 1995-2003; and the period 
after that, i.e. 2004-2007. Provincial level data are then further checked to compare with the 
literature. Finally, endogeneity concerns about minimum wages and inequality are discussed and 
a summary is given. 
  The effects of minimum wages on inequality are investigated by a panel data model as below: 
Inequalitymt = α+ β1·MWmt +β2·MWmt-1 + λ·X’mt +γ1·Dt +γ2·Dm + εmt , 
where dependent variables are inequality indices for the region m in year t. Among independent 
variables MWmt and MWmt-1 is the corresponding minimum wage rate and its one-year lag in log 
forms, and X’mt represents a set of control variables to describe local labour markets. Dt and Dm 
are vectors of fixed effects for years and regions respectively, capturing unobserved time and 
regional characteristics, like business cycles, price level and local culture. εmt is the error term. 
Thus, coefficients β1 and β2 are of interest, and are expected to be negative (at least the sum of β1 
and β2 should be negative), showing minimum wages decrease inequality.  
  Full results on the impact of minimum wages on inequality are presented in Tables 4.4a, 4.4b 
and 4.4c; and summarised in Table 4.4 on which we will concentrate. The deterministic variables, 
in addition to the minimum wage, involve the compliance ratio; average wages in log form; 
average education level; proportion of female workers, as well as manufacturing, construction, 
service, SOE and migrant workers; and lastly the unemployment rate. In each regression, both 
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municipal and year effects are included. Furthermore, another specification with extra 
region-specific time effects following the literature (Neumark et al., 2013) is shown as well. 
Finally, some municipalities appear only before 1995 and hence are dropped. Thus, there are in 
total 170 municipalities in regressions over the whole period, instead of 180 as given in the 
sample statistics.  
  Table 4.4 gives us clear evidence of minimum wage effects on inequality. As we can see, 
almost all coefficients of the current minimum wage are highly significant with negative signs. A 
few of the positive effects (generally from the lagged minimum wage) are insignificant with 
small magnitudes, and all summed impacts are negative. Interestingly, for the wage variance and 
the 50-10 wage gap, effects after 2004 are apparently stronger than those for the sample before 
2004. In particular, when current minimum wages rise by 10%, wage variance falls by more than 
0.045 (-0.401 and -0.482 in Table 4.4, also see column (3) and (4), Table 4.4c) during 2004-2007. 
Similarly, the current effect on the 50-10 wage gap for the 2004-2007 period is nearly double 
(-0.859 and -0.893 in Table 4.4, also see column (5) and (6), Table 4.4c) that for the 1995-2003 
period (-0.454 and -0.329 in column (5) and (6), Table 4.4b). Admittedly, effects on the Gini 
index and 90-10 wage gap appear no stronger in the 2004-2007 period than before. However, that 
there are stronger effects after 2004 for some inequality measures is in line with stricter 
implementation of minimum wages which is reasonable. Overall, empirical results give 
supporting evidence on minimum wage effects reducing inequality.  
  Full regressions are exhibited in Tables 4.4a, 4.4b and 4.4c. As for the results of the whole 
                                                              




sample period in Table 4.4a, compliance ratios have strongly negative effects on inequality, and 
unemployment rates have significantly positive effects. At the same time, high average education 
levels raise wage variance and the 50-10 gap of a municipality. This is understandable since 
highly educated workers will obviously have higher wages - and in addition, returns to education 
in China have been increasing (see Ren and Miller, 2012).  
  Furthermore, results before and after 2004 (Tables 4.4b and c) exhibit interestingly different 
patterns. In the sample before 2004, control variables show strong effects, while in the sample 
after 2004 the effects of minimum wages become stronger and those of control variables are 
weaker. It seems that minimum wages after 2004 capture most effects of other control variables 
on inequality. Supporting evidence is given by the coefficients of compliance ratios, which are 
closely related to minimum wages as already seen. In fact, significant negative impacts of the 
compliance ratio on inequality before 2004 drop by around half after 2004, while the negative 
impact of the minimum wage becomes stronger – perhaps indicating stricter implementation of 
minimum wages. Thus full regressions in the set of Tables 4.4a-c support the conclusion that 
minimum wage effects reduce inequality.  
  Robustness tests using provincial data with the same specifications are summarised in Table 
4.5. All variables re-calculated from the pooled municipal data of each province. Minimum wage 
rates in each province are measured at the second highest levels6, which are consistent with the 
statistics in Table 3.1. As can be seen, while the results show that minimum wages effects 






the same, in that minimum wages after 2004 have significantly negative effects on inequality. 
Effects are particularly large for the 50-10 wage gap after 2004.  
  The last panel of Table 4.5 then presents results at the provincial level using data for the whole 
country taken from the China Labour Statistic Yearbook (2004-2007). This dataset is more 
representative. Apart from inequality indices and compliance ratios, all other variables are 
re-calculated based on statistics yearbooks (details are recorded above in Chapter 3). Results 
support previous outcomes and exhibit negative effects of minimum wages, with three out of four  
(for lagged minimum wages) being significant. In summary, provincial data results in Table 4.5 
reinforce the conclusion drawn from Table 4.4. 
  In sum, our results suggest that municipal minimum wages reduce inequality significantly. 
Effects after 2004, when the minimum wage system was reinforced, tend to be stronger, as 
expected. Effects on the 50-10 wage gap are larger than those on other inequality indices, like the 
90-10 wage gap, which is reasonable since the minimum wage should affect the lower tail of the 
distribution. Most coefficients of other control variables are also consistent with expectation. 
Also, the robustness checks conducted using provincial level data, which follow previous 
literature, are generally supportive. Therefore, it can be said that so far the results show that 
minimum wages reduce (urban) inequality; this association is now explored further. 
4.4. The minimum wage and the wage distribution 
This section investigates the effect of minimum wages on wage distribution compression, giving 
more details on the inequality reduction effects discussed in the last section. There are four parts 
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in this section. The first discusses theory and methodology. The difficulty in identifying minimum 
wage effects lies in establishing a counterfactual distribution, i.e. the inequality trend absent the 
minimum wage. One method from Lee (1999) establishes a theoretical relation between the latent 
wage gap and minimum wages, to identify the effect through observed wage gaps. More 
importantly, after parameterisation of Lee’s model (1999), effects of minimum wages can be 
obtained directly by regressions of actual wage differentials on the effective minimum wage and 
its square. Furthermore, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) expand this model and permit specific 
latent inequality trends for each municipality. The empirical results in this section are based on 
this expanded model and further reveal the effects of minimum wages on inequality. 
  The second part shows the empirical results using fixed effect models. The sample data involve 
14 provinces during 1995-2007. This sample is adopted in the remaining two empirical parts. 
Four specifications are tried. Apart from those based on Lee (1999) and Bosch and Manacorda 
(2010), the remaining two specifications introduce extra province-specific trends following 
Allegretto et al. (2011) and Dube et al. (2010). 
  Another problem, measurement error, can produce an upward bias when estimating Lee’s 
model (1999). As Bosch and Manacorda (2010) indicate, instrumental variable methods (IV) can 
alleviate this problem. Based on IVs in previous literature, effective minimum wages are 
instrumented using a quasi-Kaitz index calculated from another dataset. It is argued that this IV 
satisfies the requirements for a valid IV, and thus consistent and unbiased results can be obtained. 
Furthermore, two robustness checks give extra support to the main conclusion. 
  Finally, the last section shows minimum wage effects on the wage distribution at an individual 
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level, so that conclusions at the municipal level can be strengthened. This section presents 
evidence on spillovers as well. First, annual individual data by percentiles is analysed over 
different periods. Then monthly panel data regressions at the individual level are analysed. 
Overall, this section exhibits minimum wage effects on wage distribution compression at both 
municipal and individual levels, offering strong evidence on the minimum wage and inequality 
reduction from another angle. 
Theory and methodology 
This section discusses the theoretical relation between latent wage gaps and effective minimum 
wages, based on studies from Lee (1999) and Bosch and Manacorda (2010). The latent wage 
dispersion is defined as the wage inequality that would exist without minimum wages. The key is 
to distinguish effects of minimum wages from latent inequality trends. The method used by Lee 
(1999) is to establish a separating-equilibrium model to describe observed wage gaps through the 
latent wage gap and the wage minimum. After parameterisation of Lee’s model (1999), it is 
possible to obtain the effects of the minimum wage by regressions of actual wage differentials on 
the effective minimum wage and its square. Furthermore, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) expand 
this model and permit specific latent inequality trends for each municipality. 
  The difficulty in evaluating the effect of minimum wages lies in separating it from latent wage 
inequality. Lee (1999) describes the theoretical relation between latent and observed wage 
inequality through the channel of effective minimum wages. First of all, he defines the effective 
minimum wage as the difference between log minimum wages and the log q-th percentile of 
earnings distribution. This q-th percentile is high enough so that above it there are no spillover 
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effects from minimum wages. Wage inequality is expressed as wage dispersion measured by the 
difference between the other log wage percentiles and q-th wage percentile. There are three cases 
for the relation of latent and observed wage dispersion under effective minimum wages: 
censoring, spillovers and truncation. A reasonable starting point is the censoring model (Bosch 
and Manacorda, 2010, p.137). According to this model, effects of minimum wages can be 
identified from the average growth in latent wage inequality. 
  The censoring model assumes that there are no spillovers and no disemployment. So once the 
minimum wage is established, all wages below will be raised to it. Another assumption is that 
latent wage distributions or their variation are the same across minimum wage areas, such as 
states, provinces and municipalities. That is, there is only one average latent wage dispersion or 
one average variation rate over the whole country, with the relation below: 
* *p q p q
mt mt mt mtW W W W    if 
*p
mtmtW MW  
p q q
mtmt mt mtW W MW W    if 
*p
mtmtW MW , 
where MWm is the minimum wage in municipality m; m represents wage areas, such as 
municipalities; t is time; and the asterisk is used to denote a latent wage distribution; p and q 
indicate (log) wage percentiles (Bosch and Manacorda, 2010, p.138). On one hand, if wages at 
the p-th percentile are higher than minimum wages, the actual wage dispersion is just the latent 
wage distribution. This is based on the assumption of no spillovers, which implies that minimum 
wages do not influence the wage distribution above the q-th percentile and, therefore, the 
observed wage gap equals the latent wage gap. On the other hand, if wages at the p-th percentile 
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are lower than or equal to minimum wages, the observed wage gap equals the difference between 
minimum wages and wages at the q-th percentile. 
  Supposing q is the 60th percentile, after a process of parameterisation and simplification, Lee 
(1999) suggests the model below: 
60 60 60 2
1 2[ ] [ ]
p
mt mt t mt mt mt mt mtw w MW w MW w u             (1). 
In other words, the actual p-th to 60th percentile gap (wP - w60) is a quadratic function of the gap 
between the minimum wage and the 60th percentile (MW – w60), which Lee also calls the 
“effective” minimum wage since this is the minimum wage relative to some level of local 
earnings unaffected by the minimum wage. 
  Furthermore, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) relax the assumption of the same latent wage 
dispersion or variation of dispersion over the country, and permit different municipal trends:  
'p p p
t m t mtX      , 
where αpm and α
p
t are the municipal and time fixed effects at the p-th percentile respectively. X’mt 
is a vector of control variables for municipal characteristics at time t. If this expression is inserted 
into Lee’s equation (1999), we get: 
60 ' 60 60 2
1 2[ ] [ ]
p p p p p p
mt mt m t mt mt mt mt mt mptw w X MW w MW w u                 (2). 
This implies, in principle, that a regression of observed wage gaps on the effective minimum 
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wage and its square, combined with municipal and time fixed effects, helps us to distinguish 
effects of minimum wages from latent wage inequality. In particular, as Bosch and Manacorda 
(2010, p.139) point out, the parameters β1 and β2 also allow for situations where workers receive 
wage premia (spillovers) or penalties (noncompliance) relative to the minimum wage. 
  One important feature of this theory and the models (1) and (2) is that the existence of 
endogeneity problems can be tested. According to the theory, where minimum wages cannot 
influence the wage distribution ‒ whether at the lower-tail or the higher-tail ‒ the latent wage 
differential is observed. This implies that at higher percentiles where spillovers do not happen, 
the observed wage gap is equal to the latent one. That is to say, βp1 = β
p
2= 0. On the other hand, if 
this null hypothesis at higher percentiles is rejected, it suggests that the effective minimum wage 
is endogenous to the error term, indicating the existence of some spurious relation between 
minimum wages and wage differentials. Thus, endogeneity problems for this topic become 
testable.  
  In summary, Lee (1999) and Bosch and Manacorda (2010) provide a model that can be used to 
estimate net impacts of minimum wages on inequality. In Lee’s model (1999), when minimum 
wages take effect, latent inequality trends are replaced by the difference between minimum wages 
and the boundary percentile of spillovers; if they do not, latent inequality is equal to what is 
actually observed. Furthermore, parameterisation of the model makes it possible to get empirical 
results for minimum wage effects. Bosch and Manacorda (2010) express average latent wage 
inequality over the whole country as a function of time and municipal fixed effects, combined 
with municipal controls. Below, therefore, net impacts of minimum wages are empirically 
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obtained by regressions of wage gaps on the effective minimum wage and its square. 
Empirical results: Fixed effect estimates 
This section gives empirical results based on sample data for fourteen provinces over 1995-2007. 
Wages at the 60th percentile are adopted as the boundary of spillovers (q = 60), for reasons 
discussed below. Firstly, a scatter graph compares inequality trends of sample municipalities in 
1996 and 2004, to identify the latent inequality and minimum wage effects. Then models (1) and 
(2) are estimated separately, controlling municipal and time fixed effects, as well as 
province-specific trends. Endogeneity problems are also discussed based on reported F-test 
values. Finally, conclusions are drawn. 
  Figure 4.4 shows data points corresponding to the theoretical relation between the latent wage 
inequality and effective minimum wages at the 10th relative to the 60th percentile. The two solid 
lines are fitted lines obtained from regressions of the 10-60 wage gaps on the effective minimum 
wage and its square. Two outliers are dropped in order to get a better scale for the graph. One 
outlier is with a 10-60 wage gap smaller than -3, and hence is far below the other points. The 
other has an effective minimum wage larger than zero, and hence is to the far right of the other 
points. In this sense, they are outliers. Notice that these two outliers are only dropped from the 
graph, and still kept in regressions. 
  Figure 4.4 suggests that structures of latent wage inequality from 1996 to 2004 have changed 
since the intercepts of two curves exhibit different forms. However, there appears to be no change 
in the extent of latent wage inequality since the heights of two lines are similar. Furthermore, it 
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seems that minimum wages have stronger effects on inequality in 2004 than in 1996. One reason 
is that the curve form in 2004 is more similar to that in classic literature, i.e. an upward concave 
curve. Moreover, the fitted curve is steeper in 2004 (the less effect minimum wages have, the 
flatter the curve is). However, we should remember that time and municipal fixed effects are not 
controlled in the figure, so the regression results below should be clearer. Overall, the figure 
gives further evidence on a stronger effect of minimum wages on inequality in 2004 than in 1996. 
Table 4.6 reports empirical results based on the models (1) and (2) using municipal panel data. 
Each column represents one specification, so in total four specifications are tried. Each row 
corresponds to a different dependent variable, taking in turn differences between the consecutive 
deciles of the wage distribution and the 6th decile (q = 60). The reason for choosing the 6th decile 
is that it is the boundary of spillovers of minimum wages, which is shown later. 
  For clearer interpretation, entries are calculated as the first derivative of each explained 
variable with respect to the effective minimum wage at the weighted sample mean: βp1 + 2×β
p
2
×[MW – W60]. No subscript mt means that effective minimum wages here are the mean over all 
municipalities and all years. Asterisks for significance levels are the higher of the linear and 
quadratic terms. Furthermore, for the regressions of wage differentials above the spillover 




2= 0), shown in square 
brackets. Asterisks are the significance level for F-test statistic values. Finally, all regressions are 
estimated using municipal panel data from year 1995 to 2007.  
  Column (1) in Table 4.6 gives the simplest specification of Lee’s theory (1999), i.e. model (1). 
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It only uses fixed municipal and time effects to control the latent wage gap across different 
municipalities, though standard errors are clustered by province. Total effects of effective 
minimum wages are calculated based on both the coefficients of linear and quadratic terms in 
each regression. The impact on the 10-60 wage gap shows that a 10% increase in average 
effective minimum wages will pull down 10-60 wage gap by around 2.6% (0.256×10%). Notice 
that this figure is different from section 4.3, since whereas the 50-10 wage gap is positive, the 
10-60 wage gap is negative. Thus, a positive coefficient here indicates a decline of wage gaps. 
Consistent with our expectation, the higher the percentile gap, the smaller the impact of minimum 
wages. Moreover, above the 60th percentile, all impacts appear insignificant, which is plausible. 
However, two out of three F-tests (for the joint significance of the effective minimum wage and 
its square) significantly reject the null hypothesis of zero effects of effective minimum wages 
above the 60th percentile. This suggests that there exists some endogeneity problem in this 
specification, which makes our estimates inconsistent. Thus, further investigation of other 
specifications is required. 
  Taking next column (3) (without province×year interactions, considered later), we add the 
usual municipal controls7. Compared with column (1), in column (3) both magnitudes and 
significance levels have plausible changes, showing the empirical importance of municipal 
controls. For example, the wage at the first decile will rise by around 8.8% with respect to the 6th 
decile corresponding to a 10% increase in effective minimum wages. This magnitude is more 
than three times larger than that in column (1) and is more significant. These significant effects 
                                                              





extend up to the 5th decile. Furthermore, it should be noted as well that the endogeneity problem 
almost disappears in column (3) in that only one out of three F-tests is significant at the 10% 
significance level, which is more reasonable than the results in column (1). 
  Columns (2) and (4) additionally control province-specific time trends. That is, provincial 
fixed effects and interactions of each province times each year are included in the specification, 
so the standard errors for columns (2) and (4) are clustered by region (east, central and west) to 
avoid repeated controls. This type of trend has been put forward by Allegretto et al. (2011) and 
Dube et al. (2010) to capture latent trends of inequality within each statistical unit. Allegretto et 
al. (2011) argue that only if the effects of minimum wages are not sensitive to the inclusion of 
state-specific trends, can they be seen as valid. However, Neumark et al. (2013, p.5) doubt this 
perspective, and point out that “a great deal of valid identifying information” is discarded along 
with those over-identified controls. In summary, the province-specific trends cannot be ignored 
though there is no conclusive word on them yet.  
  The other reason to include province-specific trends is that provincial characteristics are 
important for the case of China. Although it has a centralised system of government, its provinces 
enjoy autonomy to some extent. On the other hand, the central government assigns different 
policies to different regions and provinces. After all, every province has a different history, 
geography and culture. As a result, provincial differences are allowed within central policies. 
Minimum wage setting reflects this situation. Specifically, as has been illustrated in Chapter 1, 
provincial governments decide the fixing date, frequency and levels of minimum wages 
themselves according to the law or rules announced by the central government. 
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  However, at least in this study, the inclusion of province-specific trends gives less reasonable 
estimation results, supporting Neumark et al.’s (2013) view. As can be seen in column (2), almost 
all effects of minimum wages below the 70th percentile vanish. Also, endogeneity problems are 
exacerbated in that all three F-tests significantly reject the null hypothesis that both linear and 
quadratic terms of minimum wages are zero for the higher percentiles. Column (4), with the full 
set of municipal controls, presents this problem more clearly. Not only F-test statistic values but 
also positive coefficients above the 50th percentile become significant, implying a spurious 
relation between minimum wages and wage gaps. Thus, later, the specification in column (3) is 
adopted, i.e. municipal and time fixed effects plus municipal controls, leaving provincial 
information in clustered standard errors. In conclusion, panel data models based on Lee’s (1999) 
model show significant effects of minimum wages on reducing wage differentials up to the 6th 
decile of the wage distribution. 
Empirical results: IV estimates 
This section gives instrument variable estimates based on the specification of Table 4.6’s column 
(3). As already noted, Lee (1999) indicates that measurement error can produce an upward bias 
when estimating his model. IV may alleviate or eliminate this problem. Based on IVs in Bosch 
and Manacorda (2010), effective minimum wages are instrumented with a quasi-Kaitz index, 
calculated by the difference between nominal minimum wages and nominal average wages from 
the China Labour Statistical Year Books. It is argued that this IV satisfies requirements for a valid 
IV and consistent and unbiased results can be obtained by using it. Furthermore, two robustness 




  One main concern in Lee’s method (1999) is measurement error. As Lee (1999) points out, a 
“mechanical relation” may exist between wage differentials (dependent variable) and effective 
minimum wages (independent variable) since 6th decile wages are used to construct both 
variables. If measurement error plays an important role in the variation of the 6th decile wage, a 
spurious positive relation will be produced between dependent and main independent variables, 
known as a division bias problem. Furthermore, it is difficult to identify this spurious relation 
since independent variables and other controls will be correlated with error terms at the same 
time because of sample measurement errors. To avoid this problem, Lee (1999) uses a trimmed 
effective minimum wage to enable robustness checks. However, Autor et al. (2010) suggest that 
this method might only settle this problem to a small extent. Other methods like instrumental 
variable estimates therefore seem more plausible. 
  Valid IVs can predict problematic variables well, provided they are not connected to stochastic 
errors at the same time. In previous literature, Autor et al. (2010) take state minimum wages as 
instruments since some of them are higher than the exogenous federal minimum and vary 
independently. Dolton and Bondibene (2012) adopt the left- or right-wing political complexion of 
a government as their instrument for the minimum wage. Bosch and Manacorda (2010) 
instrument the minimum wage with a different effective minimum wage calculated from another 
dataset. However, similar IVs in China are either not suitable or hard to access. Thus, based on 
the literature, a different IV from the above is chosen for this study. 
  The IV adopted is a quasi-Kaitz index calculated from the China Labour Statistical Year Books. 
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That is, the difference is taken between the nominal minimum wages of each municipality and 
the nominal average wage of the corresponding province. Four considerations arise when using 
this IV. First of all, it is calculated from another set of data, and so is uncorrelated with 
measurement errors of the UHS sample in this study. This idea is based on Bosch and Manacorda 
(2010). Second, average wages are near to the 60th percentile wage. According to Bosch and 
Manacorda (2010), their IV is the difference between the minimum and the 60th percentile wage. 
However, given that extra data is inaccessible to calculate another 60th percentile wage, using 
average wages is the best choice. Third, the Kaitz index is a widely accepted measure of effective 
minimum wages. As Brown et al. (1982, pp.499-500) indicate, this index has the advantage of 
summarising much local labour market information in a single variable. This index is, therefore, 
closely related to the main independent variable – municipal minimum wages minus 60th 
percentile wages.  
  There remains the issue of normalizing via provincial mean wages instead of municipal wages 
(giving a “quasi” Kaitz). For one thing, provincial mean wages are more exogenous to municipal 
minimum wages and other controls than municipal mean wages. After all, they are calculated 
from all municipalities in the corresponding province and are more representative. In any case, 
the correlation coefficient between the main independent variables and provincial IVs (around 
0.28) is similar to that between the main independent variables and municipal IVs (around 0.26), 
indicating just as good a relation. Based on the above considerations, the IV used in this study has 
a good chance of giving a good prediction of the independent variable, and also being 
uncorrelated with stochastic errors.   
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  Table 4.7 presents IV estimates based on municipal panel data. The effective minimum wage 
and its square are instrumented with the quasi-Kaitz index and its square respectively. All 
regressions take the specification in column (3) in Table 4.6, i.e. municipal and time fixed effects 
combined with municipal controls. Column (1) can, therefore, be compared directly with column 
(3) in Table 4.6. On the one hand, the significance of the coefficients increases and all effects are 
significant at a 1% level up to the 5th decile. On the other, all magnitudes decline, and even 
insignificant effects above the 5th decile become smaller than estimates from fixed effect models. 
This is consistent with the expectation since measurement error normally leads to an upward bias 
of minimum wage effects. When effective minimum wages rise by 10%, the bottom 10th 
percentile wage now rises by 7.9% relative to the 60th percentile wage, around 1 percentage point 
lower than estimates without IV (8.8%). Correspondingly, the 70th percentile wage will fall by 
0.15% insignificantly, again about 1% lower than non-IV estimates (+0.8%). Moreover, all F-test 
values are insignificant, indicating IV estimates have eliminated the measurement error problem. 
In sum, the IV estimates offer further support for the result that minimum wages reduce wage 
inequality. 
  Two robustness checks are given in columns (2) to (5). Columns (2) and (3) investigate 
minimum wage effects before and after 2004. As expected, for percentiles below the 7th decile, all 
effects for 2004-2007 are stronger than those for 1995-2003, which shows larger impacts caused 
by the reinforced minimum wages after 2004. In particular, corresponding to a 10% increase in 
effective minimum wages, wages at the bottom decile will rise by 9.6% over 2004-2007, 2.2% 
higher than before 2004 (7.4%). On the other hand, at higher percentiles, such as the 5thand 7th 
deciles, effects in the two periods are similar and small, indicating much weaker effects of 
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minimum wages at higher percentiles in both periods, as expected. Overall, robustness checks 
before and after 2004 support the hypothesis that lower wage inequality is caused by rising 
minimum wages with stronger effects post-2004. 
  Columns (4) and (5) look at minimum wage effects for male and female workers separately. As 
in Bosch and Manacorda (2010), the impact is smaller for females than for males, which is 
difficult to explain. As can be seen, at the bottom decile, this gender difference is as large as 4% 
(5.6% versus 9.6%) corresponding to a 10% increase in minimum wages. However, the gender 
difference becomes smaller at higher percentiles since both groups are less affected by the 
minimum wage. The reason for the higher impact of minimum wages on earnings inequality for 
males than females might simply be that earnings inequality is higher for males in the first place, 
giving more scope for the minimum to reduce inequality. In a later chapter using quantile 
regressions (Chapter 6, Appendix tables 6a and b), we find that the minimum wage acts to raise 
women’s pay in the bottom decile much more than men’s, which is more what we would expect.   
  As a final point on the use of IVs, it can be seen that Table 4.7’s F-test values at the top deciles 
become significant again for both gender groups, suggesting a spurious relationship to some 
extent that cannot be eliminated by IVs. This may be caused by the construction of IVs, i.e. the 
deflator of minimum wages is pooled provincial average wages, irrespective of gender. Note that 
Bosch and Manacorda (2010) exhibit some significant F-test statistics in their robustness checks 
as well. In case, the minimum wage is not likely to affect wages in the top deciles, so it is not 
surprising that the model fits less well. Overall, results for two robustness checks are basically 
plausible and consistent with this thesis’ expectation.  
116 
 
  Several features need to be noted. The first is that the above results are comparable to those for 
Mexico from Bosch and Manacorda (2010). For example, with municipal controls their 
coefficient shows that the bottom decile rises by 7% corresponding to a 10% increase in 
minimum wages (column 4, Table 2, p.141), only about 1% lower than Table 4.7’s result. They 
use a similar IV technique – effective minimum wages calculated from another dataset – and their 
results are reassuringly similar. The second point is that under IV estimates, more control 
variables exhibit significance than before when the full regressions reported in Table 4.6a (simple 
panel) and Table 4.7a (IV) are considered. Moreover, the signs of the coefficients are plausible. 
For example, below the 70th percentile, low-paid workers in SOEs have higher wages than those 
in non-SOEs (e.g. the 10-60 wage gap is smaller in SOEs), while beginning from the 70th 
percentile high-wage workers in SOEs have relatively lower wages. In other words, SOEs offer 
more compressed wage distributions.  
  The third point is that the results provide evidence on a type of lighthouse effect. As is 
mentioned in the compliance section above (section 4.2), noncompliance does not mean there is 
no effect for workers below minimum wages. Although on average 7% of workers earn less than 
minimum wages, the effects of the minimum wage on the bottom decile still display the largest 
magnitude with strong significance levels. This result supports the suggestion (Boeri et al., 2011) 
that workers not directly covered by the minimum still bargain for higher wages than they would 
without it. In sum, therefore, IV estimates reinforce the conclusion that rising minimum wages 
reduce wage differentials at the lower end of the wage distribution. 
A further check: Individual level data 
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This section turns to analysis of minimum wage effects on the wage distribution using individual 
level data. There are two objectives for this robustness check. Firstly, the assumption of the 
spillover boundary at 60% needs to be defended. Secondly, results based on individual samples 
can provide further evidence to prove the impact of minimum wages on wage distribution 
compression. Effects by percentiles over 1995-2007 using annual individual data are examined 
and separate regressions before and after 2004 are presented. Then panel data regressions for 
2004-2007 are shown. These monthly data enable us to follow minimum wage fixing month by 
month, so that spillovers can be checked more carefully.  
  Spillovers describe minimum wage effects on non-binding parts of the wage distribution. As 
noted above, there are several reasons to expect spillovers, for example in Teulings’s (2000) 
model, a higher minimum wage eliminates unskilled workers from the labour supply, so raising 
demand for slightly better skilled workers and pushing up their wages. Alternatively, the need to 
maintain differentials (Aeberhardt et al., 2013) for the efficiency wage or fairness reasons could 
cause spillovers as well. Spillover effects are controversial in minimum wage studies. In the UK 
there is no agreement on the evidence on spillovers so far (Stewart, 2012). In the US, Lee (1999) 
finds that the boundary of spillovers is the median wage (Lee, 1999), however in Mexico (Bosch 
and Manacorda, 2010), and France (Aeberhardt et al., 2013), spillovers appear to extend up to the 
70th percentile. Let us now consider evidence for China. 
  Spillover effects by percentile of the wage distribution can be described by an OLS model 
adapted from Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012) as follows: 
wpit = α+ β1·MWmt + β2·MWmt-1 + λ·X’mt + γ·x’i + η1·Dt + η2·Dm + εmt , 
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where the dependent variable wpit means that the log wage of individual i belongs to the p
th 
percentile of the wage distribution in year t. In practice, wage distributions in each year are 
separated into ten percentiles, and then all wages within the same percentile are pooled together. 
Thus, superscript p for dependent variables indicates the percentile, i.e. 10th percentile, 20th, … 
and 90th. Among independent variables, MWmt and MWmt-1 is the corresponding minimum wage 
and its one-year lag in log form, X’mt represents a set of control variables to describe local labour 
markets, and x’i indicates control variables for individual i’s characteristics. Dt and Dm are the 
usual vectors of fixed effects for years and municipalities respectively, and εmt is the error term 
(since year effects are included, both individual wages and minimum wages are in nominal terms). 
In this model, we see that coefficients β1 and β2 are of interest, and they are expected to be 
positive for percentiles affected by minimum wages.  
  Table 4.8 summarises the results of this exercise (full results are given in Tables 4.8a-c). The 
sample is individual data from 14 provinces for 1995-2007. Municipal controls include 
compliance ratios and log mean wages. Individual controls involve experience and its square, 
education levels, gender, industry, occupation and whether working in SOEs. Each column 
represents the percentile of the wage distribution. Specifically, two specifications are adopted for 
each percentile. One includes municipal and time effects, and the other involves extra provincial 
effects and province-specific trends following Allegretto et al. (2011) (indicated as “Province×
year”). Standard errors are in parentheses. For the simple time effect specification, standard 
errors are clustered by provinces; for the Province×year specification, they are clustered by 
regions (east, central and west). Each panel represents different sample periods, so that effects 
before and after 2004 can be considered separately.  
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  The results reported in Table 4.8 indicate spillover effects up to the 4th decile, with little effect 
for percentiles above this point. The upper panel reports the sample from 1995 to 2007. Minimum 
wage effects appear strongest at the bottom decile, and keep falling as percentiles rise, which is 
reasonable. In particular, when minimum wages increase by 10%, individual wages at the 10th 
percentile rise by around 1.5% to 6.2% (0.15×10% and 0.62×10%, using the sum of current 
and lagged coefficients) on average. In contrast, wages at the 30th percentile only rise by 0.9% to 
2.1%. Above the 40th percentile, minimum wage effects are never significant, so only results 
below the 60th percentile are reported. As can be seen, lag terms show weak effects, indicating 
prompt responses of firms to the fixing, which is consistent with the reality of China and 
estimations in previous parts. As in previous estimations, specifications with province-specific 
trends exhibit larger effects than specifications without. Since there is no conclusive word about 
the need to include such trends, results of both specifications are given. Our conclusion on 
spillover effects is that – given that about 10% of workers are directly affected by the minimum 
wage - spillover effects begin from workers at the 20th percentile of the wage distribution and 
continue up to the 40th percentile. 
  The middle and bottom panels of Table 4.8 summarise minimum wage effects before and after 
2004. Effects after 2004 are stronger than those during 1995-2003, as we have already found. For 
the bottom decile, effects after 2004 are three to eleven times larger than those before, indicating 
the minimum wage helps the poor considerably after 2004. However, spillovers do not differ 
much after the 20th percentile for both periods. At the 30th percentile, spillovers during 1995-2003 
become insignificant. Tables 4.8a, b and c present relevant full regressions. All coefficients are 
plausible, and the R-squared for all estimations are as high as 0.9, indicating a strong predictive 
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power. The only exception is the 10th percentile where the R-squared for the estimations are only 
around 0.4 to 0.5, suggesting some hidden personal characteristics for the poor. In sum, separate 
wage effects for two periods reinforce the finding of minimum wage effects on the whole lower 
tail of the wage distribution, showing a spillover effect up to the 40th percentile. 
  We now turn to further robustness checks using individual monthly panel data during 
2004-2007. These data allow fixed effect models which control time-invariant individual 
characteristics and identify minimum wage effects better. Furthermore, monthly panel data enable 
the effects to be observed more accurately than annual data. In particular, governments announce 
the dates when new fixed minimum wages begin. For annual data, time-weighted minimum 
wages are used to allow for this factor, but for monthly data, the exact month when new standards 
take effect can be identified. Thus, before that month, the prior minimum wage is used; after that, 
the new minimum wage is used. With individual panel data combined with identification of 
monthly minimum wages, our results should be stronger. 
  Table 4.9 summarises these results (an example of full results is given in Table 4.9a following). 
For this individual fixed effect model, only time-varying characteristics can be controlled. 
Municipal controls, therefore, include only compliance ratios and log mean wages; and individual 
controls comprise experience and its square, industry, occupation and employment in SOEs. The 
percentile dependent variables are presented in the first row of each panel. All standard errors are 
clustered by provinces.  
  It can be seen that the results in Table 4.9 support those in Table 4.8, exhibiting significant but 
decreasing effects of minimum wages from the bottom decile to the higher decile. The only 
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difference is that spillovers now appear to spread to the 50th percentile, higher than the 40th 
percentile in Table 4.8, which may be caused by better identification from panel data models. 
Furthermore, the magnitudes of effects are closer to Table 4.8’s specification without 
province-specific time trends, suggesting this specification is more suitable for the sample data. 
Overall, therefore, Table 4.9 provides further evidence of spillover effects, indicating they reach 
the 50th percentile of the wage distribution. 
4.5. Conclusions 
This chapter looked at the effect of the minimum wage on wage inequality. The non-compliance 
issue was first discussed. Then we considered the link between inequality and the minimum wage, 
taking first overall inequality and then effects on the wage distribution percentile by percentile. 
Here we used methods based on Lee (1999) and Bosch and Manacorda (2010). Finally, spillover 
effects of the minimum wage were examined.  
  As regards non-compliance, we find that: the average non-compliance ratio over the sample 
period 1995-2007 is about 7%, but this ratio is closely and negatively related to levels of the 
minimum wage. The implication is that some firms avoid the minimum wage when it is raised. 
However, despite the existence of non-compliance, our results point to the minimum wage still 
reducing wage inequality significantly.  
  As regards the impact of the minimum wage on inequality, we found that the minimum wage 
significantly compresses the overall wage distribution. A 10% increase in the minimum wage 
raises the wage at the 10th percentile by up to 6% (Table 4.8). It also reduces the 10-60 wage gap 
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by almost 10% in some specifications (see Tables 4.6 and 4.7), and has spillover effects spreading 
up to the 40th or 50th percentile of the wage distribution. All the above effects are stronger during 
2004-2007 when the minimum wage system was reinforced, approximately doubling the 
pre-2004 wage effects (see Table 4.8). 
There are several caveats to be made regarding the conclusions in this chapter. First, this 
chapter only gives a partial picture about the redistributive effect of the minimum wage since the 
sample does not include rural migrants. It is true that the minimum wage is one of the few 
policies that are applied to all urban working people, irrespective of their household registration 
status, i.e. residents or migrants, especially rural migrants. Nevertheless, rural migrants usually 
work in informal sectors, and are therefore especially likely to fit into the non-compliant group, 
and not be helped by the minimum wage. Second, as is mentioned in Chapter 2’s literature review, 
workers receiving the minimum wage are not always those in the poorest households. However, 
our results relate to earnings, not income inequality, which deserves further investigation. Lastly, 
inequality reduction may be counteracted by the disemployment effect of the minimum wage so 
this topic is investigated in the next chapter. 
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  Figure 4.4: Wages inequality and the minimum wage by municipality, 1996 & 2004. 
 
  Notes: The solid lines are fitted lines obtained from regressions of 10-60 wage gaps on the 
effective minimum wage and its square. The dashed line is a 45 degree line. Black 
marks are for 1996, and xs are 2004. 
 
• 1996  × 2004  - - - - MW-60p
2004 
1996 







Percent of Total (%) 7.24 0.05 92.7
Eastern Region (%) 7.67 0.06 92.26
Percent of Male (%) 4.88 0.02 95.09
Percent of Female (%) 10.04 0.09 89.87
Age (%)
Age 16-29 9.71 0.07 90.22
Age 30-49 5.31 0.05 94.64
Age 50-64 10.89 0.06 89.06
Age Above 65 47 96 0 52 04  . .
Educational Attainment (%)
Primary School or Below 13.78 0.07 86.15
Junior High School 10.52 0.09 89.39
Senior and Vocational High School 7.03 0.06 92.92
College or Above 2.97 0.01 97.02
Industry (%)
Mining and Manufacturing 6.85 0.04 93.11
Construction 6.2 0.02 93.78
Transportation and IT 4.58 0.03 95.39
Commerce, Hotel, and Restaurant 11.18 0.09 88.73
Finance and Real Estate 4.94 0.03 95.02
Scientific Research and Public Facility 3.57 0.02 96.41
Commercial and Personal Service 16.24 0.17 83.59
Education and Public Service 3.43 0.02 96.55
Government and Social Organization 4 0.05 95.95
International Organization and Others 24.52 0.09 75.39
Occupation (%)
Professional and Technician 2.73 0.01 97.26
Official and Manager 0.8 0.01 99.19
Clerical 5.3 0.03 94.68
Commercial and Service Staff 16 28 0 18 83 54   . . .
Manual Worker 7.92 0.05 92.03
Armyman and Others 23.49 0.14 76.37
Ownership (%)
State-owned 3.92 0.03 96.05
Collective-owned 10.44 0.09 89.47
Mixed Ownership 7.88 0.03 92.09
Private Ownership 18.67 0.2 81.13
Others 38.24 0.22 61.53
Observations 161271 11683 87 149501
Notes: Variable definitions for later regressions, including those in Chapter 5 (please refer to Chapter 3 and its tables
for more details).
lnmw: ln (minimum wage), a variable at municipal level; its means is 8.30. 
lnmw  lagged: ln (minimum wage) with one year lagged; its means is 8.23.
kaitz : Kaitz ratio,Kaitz = ln(MW) - ln(average wage), a variable at municipal level; its means is -0.71
kaitz  lagged: Kaitz ratio with one year lagged; its mean is -0.68
employment rate : employment-population ratio, the municipal employment divided by the municipal population in
each year, a variable at municipal level; its mean is 0.61 (see Table 5.1 for more details).
lnwage : ln(mean annual wage), a variable at municipal level. Once the year fixed-effects are controlled, it is in
nominal term. Here its mean in real term is 4489.97 (See Table 3.2).
f l h i f f l k h h l l i h i i li i bl i i l l lema e : t e proport on o ema e wor ers to t e w o e emp oyment n eac mun c pa ty, a var a e at mun c pa eve ;
its mean is 0.45.
education : the average education level in each municipality (seven levels including illiterate and semi-illiterate,
primary school, junior high school, vocational high school, senior high school, college, university and postgraduate), a
variable at municipal level; its mean is 4.0, indicating the level of vocational high school.
manufacture : the proportion of workers in the manufacture industry to the whole employment for each municipality, a
variable at municipal level; its means is 0.34 (for the ten industry categories, please refer to the table above and
Chapter 3). 
construction : the proportion of workers in the construction industry to the whole employment for each municipality, a
variable at municipal level; its mean is 0.03.
service : the proportion of workers in the service industry to the whole employment for each municipality a variable at
unemployment: the ratio of unemployed people to the sum of employed plus unemployed people, calculated from this
UHS sample, a variable at municipal level; its mean is 0.05.
migrant: this measure is from China Statistic Yearbook, a variable at provincial level. It indicates the ratio of migrant
workers imported by all enterprises to all urban employment of each province. Its mean is 0.29.
,
municipal level; its mean is 0.62.
enrolment : the ratio of college students to the whole sample in each municipality per year, a variable at municipal
level; its mean is 0.20. 
soe: the proportion of workers in SOE to the whole employment for each municipality, a variable at municipal level;
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3: Regressions on the Minimum Wage
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
compliance ratio -1.5976*** -0.8787***
(0.1834) (0.1440)
lnwage 0.3753*** 0.5919*** 0.1083*** 0.2828***
(0.0212) (0.0264) (0.0296) (0.0447)
female -0.2666** -0.1309 -0.1721 -0.1794*
(0.1214) (0.1204) (0.1067) (0.1065)
manufacture 0.2024*** 0.1682*** 0.0627 0.0238
(0.0461) (0.0388) (0.0627) (0.0539)
construction -0.1733 -0.1069 -0.2160 -0.2636
(0.2446) (0.2045) (0.2944) (0.2706)
service 0.1684*** 0.2584*** -0.0489 -0.0112
(0.0489) (0.0528) (0.0637) (0.0679)
soe -0.2165*** 0.0011 -0.0170 -0.0068
(0.0407) (0.0405) (0.0451) (0.0449)
unemploymt -0.7009*** -0.6631*** 0.0387 0.0222
(0.1259) (0.1190) (0.1350) (0.1562)
migrant 0.2770*** 0.1913*** 0.3370*** 0.2578***
(0.0642) (0.0528) (0.0811) (0.0693)
constant 4.4990*** 3.9117*** 6.6716*** 6.0275***
(0.2091) (0.1718) (0.2673) (0.3041)
Municipal effects No No Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality 180 180 180 180
R-squared 0.8633 0.9028 0.7833 0.8511
-within — — 0.8653 0.8808
-between — — 0.7717 0.8606
Observations 845 845 845 845
Pooled OLS Municipal Panel
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(annual minimum wages ) in each municipality. Robust 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.6: The Impact of the Minimum Wage on Wage Differentials: 1995-2007. Panel Estimates
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
p10-p60 0.256** 0.308 0.883*** 1.418*
p20-p60 0.286* 0.350 0.6*** 0.959*
p30-p60 0.186 0.243 0.385** 0.685
p40-p60 0.131** 0.179** 0.224*** 0.382**
p50-p60 0.06* 0.082 0.101** 0.190
p70-p60 0.099 0.186 0.082 0.232*
F-test [12.96***] [8.79*] [3.27*] [9.77*]
p80-p60 0.169 0.305 0.139 0.416*
F-test [4.73**] [9.67*] [2.25] [43.48**]
p90-p60 0.194 0.370 0.169 0.572**
F-test [1.73] [12.35*] [1.46] [59.16**]
Municipal effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province*year No Yes No Yes
Municipal controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 843 843 843 843
Notes: Each entry in the table is corresponding to a separate regression. Each row corresponds to
a different dependent variable, and each column corresponds to a different specification.
Minimum wage effects are reported at sample means. Specifically, each entry is calculated as the
first derivative of each explained variable with respect to the effective minimum wage at the
weighted sample mean. For example, the third entry in the first row 0.883 is calculated from
column (1) in Table 4.6a: βp1 + 2×βp2×[MW – W60] = 2.5526 + 2*0.7590*(-1.1) = 0.883. Here -
1.1 is the weighted sample mean of effective minimum wage squared. Significance levels are the
higher of the effective minimum or its square. F-test refers to an F-test on both the minimum and
its square. Values of F-tests are shown in square brackets and asterisks indicate significance
levels. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.7: The Impact of the Minimum Wage on Wage Differentials: IV Estimates and Robustness Checks
All 1995-2003 2004-2007 Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
p10-p60 0.789*** 0.743*** 0.962*** 0.955*** 0.562***
p20-p60 0.494*** 0.425*** 0.698** 0.421*** 0.350***
p30-p60 0.310*** 0.283*** 0.45** 0.243* 0.249***
p40-p60 0.193*** 0.161*** 0.25** 0.209** 0.161***
p50-p60 0.082*** 0.073*** 0.086** 0.159 0.175***
p70-p60 -0.015 -0.003 -0.007 0.076 0.002
F-test [1.45] [3.43] [0.50] [1.76] [0.01]
p80-p60 -0.023 -0.041 0.053 0.038 0.037
F-test [2.41] [2.12] [2.22] [2.89] [1.16]
p90-p60 0.035 -0.043 0.141 -0.006 0.223*
F-test [0.51] [3.47] [3.18] [5.58*] [14.84***]
Municipal effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 843 843 843 843 843
Notes: Each entry in the table is corresponding to a separate regression. Each row corresponds to a different
dependent variable, and each column corresponds to a different specification. Minimum wage effects are
reported at sample means. Specifically, each entry is calculated as the first derivative of each explained
variable with respect to the effective minimum wage at the weighted sample mean. For example, the first
entry 0.789 is calculated from column (1) in Table 4.7a: βp1 + 2×βp2×[MW – W60] = 2.4973 + 2*0.7763*(-
1.1) = 0.789. Here -1.1 is the weighted sample mean of effective minimum wage squared. Significance levels
are the higher of the effective minimum or its square. F-test refers to an F-test on both the minimum and its
square. Values of F-tests are shown in square brackets and asterisks indicate significance levels. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Dependent variable











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.9: Minimum Wages Spillover Effects by Percentiles, 2004-2007 Individual Panel Data - Summary
(Example results are given in Tables 4.9a below)
Minimum Wage Measure p10 p20 p30 p40
Minimum wage 0.135** 0.105** 0.088** 0.079**
(0.058) (0.044) (0.038) (0.032)
Minimum wage lagged 0.034 0.084*** 0.007 0.027
(0.025) (0.023) (0.017) (0.020)
Sum current and lagged 0.169 0.189 0.095 0.106
Observations 53,549 46,574 45,576 45,529
p50 p60 p70 p80
Minimum wage 0.037 0.001 -0.020 -0.065
(0.035) (0.020) (0.026) (0.041)
Minimum wage lagged 0.030 0.064** 0.042 0.058
(0.030) (0.022) (0.033) (0.041)
Sum current and lagged 0.067 0.065 0.022 -0.007
Observations 45,968 46,898 46,333 45,791
Source: Calculated from the minimum wage estimates of Table 4.9a.
Notes: The dependent variables are individual wages at the 10-80th percentile. Each
number corresponds to a minimum wage effect from a regression which has the same
specification as Table 4.9a. Province-clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5. THE MINIMUM WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT 
5.1. Introduction 
The welfare and employment implications of the minimum wage are of vital importance. 
This is especially true when one takes into account the possibility that a rising minimum 
wage may reduce employment of low-wage workers (or increase employment of uncovered 
workers), though these effects are not clear cut (see, for example, Salverda and Mayhew’s 
multi-country study, 2009). Indeed, as has already been found, China’s minimum wages 
have affected wage distribution and they may, therefore, also have had employment effects. 
This chapter on employment effects can be seen as a complement to the previous chapter. 
The combination of Chapters 4 and 5 will give a fuller picture of the effect of minimum 
wages in China. 
  Theories predict mixed employment effects of the minimum wage, and so empirical 
investigation is important. This is especially relevant for China. First of all, as a large 
developing country, it displays considerable regional diversity in its economy. Of its three 
regions, the eastern, coastal region is the prosperous area; it almost has a free market 
economy with relatively little government intervention and it is the main area that rural 
migrants flow into. Conversely, the western region covers the poorest inland areas with a 
low level of marketisation of the economy. The situation of the central region is between 
that of the east and the west. Such regional diversity implies the possibility of different 
responses of employment to the minimum wage in different areas, and these regional 
differences are taken into consideration in the later empirical sections.  
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Secondly, informal sectors are different from formal sectors in urban areas. Most of the 
workers in informal sectors are rural migrants, and they provide an “unlimited” supply of 
labour moving from rural areas to urban areas, given the dual-economy structure of China 
(Cai and Wang, 2010). The labour market for these informal sectors can be taken as 
competitive, both for labour supply (unlimited rural migrants) and labour demand (many 
small informal businesses). Correspondingly, some monopsonistic power exists in the 
labour market for formal sectors, such as large SOE employers. A further consequence is 
that, relative to formal employers, informal employers are harder to police, and thus, are 
less likely to comply with the minimum wage. The formal employers (larger firms and 
SOEs) are more likely to comply. For this reason, the compliant and non-compliant workers 
(paid less than the minimum wage) are discussed separately in the later sections since 
non-compliant workers are reasonably numerous (as seen in Chapter 4). 
  Third, the role of SOEs is important, and their reaction to the minimum wage policy is of 
interest for several reasons. In the first place SOEs may exhibit monopsonistic power in the 
labour market. Specifically, they may face a rising price for labour since they consider 
social external costs and wage equity more than their private counterparts (Wang and 
Gunderson, 2011). Thus, rising minimum wages could push up SOEs’ employment. SOEs 
also laid off a large number of workers during the reform period around 2000, with SOE 
employment decreasing by around 5 percent each year during 1997-2005 (Ni et al., 2011). 
This decline may confound measurement of employment effect of minimum wages in the 
same period. A further point is SOEs are not completely profit driven and need to protect 
the interests of low-wage workers, so the disemployment effect is not necessarily their 
response to the minimum wage. In sum, employment effects of the minimum wage are 
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likely to be complex in the Chinese context. 
This chapter uses individual annual data from the UHS during 1995-007, a period of 
minimum wage policy change, to examine the employment effect of the minimum wage. It 
is the second study regarding this topic at the municipal level, with the first being Fang and 
Lin (2013). However, my study covers a much longer period (1995-2007) than theirs 
(2004-2009), and also examines non-compliance in more detail. My main findings are that 
China’s minimum wages have definite negative effects on urban employment in both the 
short run and the long run, and these effects are stronger on full-compliance groups than on 
total employment. The main groups adversely affected are young workers, women workers, 
and those aged 50 and above which is in line with the literature. The above conclusions are 
sharper after 2004 when the minimum wage policy was reinforced.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews basic theories and predictions 
for competitive and monopsonistic markets, as well as for formal and informal sectors in 
developing countries. The empirical specifications are developed here too. Section 5.3 
presents empirical evidence from baseline models considering the compliance issues. 
Section 5.4 presents a dynamic and long-run perspective result using the System-GMM 
method. This method is also helpful in dealing with the potential endogeneity of minimum 
wages. Employment effects across age and gender cohorts are examined in section 5.5, 
including further robustness checks. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter with some 
discussion of policy implications.    
5.2. Theory and model specification 
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This section reviews standard models describing employment effects of the minimum wage. 
First, the conventional textbook model for a competitive market is presented where the 
minimum wage causes unskilled employment to fall. Then the model of monopsonistic 
markets is discussed, showing the opposite effect (at least for reasonably small minimum 
wage increases). Next, a simplified model of minimum wage effects for formal and 
informal sectors is illustrated. Finally, the regression specification is discussed.  
  For a competitive market, a standard textbook model normally includes three basic 
assumptions (Brown et al., 1982; Neumark and Wascher, 2008, p.39 and pp.50-53). First, 
the (unskilled) market is competitive, with only formal employment. This assumption 
guarantees that all workers are covered1 by the minimum wage without non-compliance. 
Second, all unskilled workers are homogeneous. They have identical skills and effort levels, 
which are exogenous; therefore, and these factors in the model do not need to be considered. 
Third, each firm wants to minimise its cost both before and after the minimum wage is set. 
Under the basic assumptions, Figure 5.1, based on Brown et al. (1982), gives the change in 
unskilled employment2. 
In a competitive market, the employment effects of the minimum wage are expected to 
                                                              
1   In  this  study,  the  terms  formal/informal  sectors  versus  covered/uncovered  versus  compliant/non‐ 
compliant  are  taken  to  have  the  same meaning.  Strictly  speaking,  formal/informal  sectors  are  normally 
measured by whether the worker’s household registration is accepted by her enterprise, and/or whether she 
pays  taxes. Workers  in  formal  sectors  are  normally  covered  by  the minimum wage  since  they  are  being 





leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  long‐run  demand  curve  will  be more  elastic  than  the  short  run.  One 





be negative. In Figure 5.1, when a minimum wage is set above the original equilibrium 
wage W0, labour demand will decrease. This situation is most likely in unskilled labour 
markets, where wages are low to start with, so the minimum wage is binding. The new 
level of employment is Em, and the difference between E0 and Em indicates the fall in 
employment. Furthermore, the disemployment effect may be more severe than first thought, 
because the long-run labour demand curve is more elastic than the short-run (see Baker et 
al., 1999). Overall, a disemployment effect under minimum wages is expected in a 
competitive unskilled labour market. 
Turning to the monopsonistic market model, the employment effect is expected to be 
positive for small increases in the minimum wage (Brown et al., 1982; Neumark and 
Wascher, 2008, pp.53-57, Ashenfelter et al., 2010). Figure 5.2, based on Brown et al. 
(1982), gives an illustration of this result. For a firm with monopsony power, its marginal 
cost is always higher than the labour supply curve it faces, i.e. its average cost. Initially, the 
intersection of the demand curve and the marginal cost curve decides the original 
equilibrium employment E0 and the corresponding equilibrium wage rate W0. When the 
minimum wage is set, three situations can be distinguished. First, the minimum wage is 
higher than W0 but lower than W2, the equilibrium wage obtained in a competitive market. 
MW1 in the figure is for this case. The new employment would be E1, which is higher than 
the original E0, but lower than the level under a competitive market. As long as MW1 is 
between W0 and W2, employment will increase. When the minimum wage is set at W2, the 
employment will be equal to the level under a competitive market, i.e. E2, which 
corresponds to E0 in Figure 5.1. This is the second situation. In the last situation, the 
minimum wage is higher than W2; therefore employment begins to fall, just as happens in 
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Figure 5.1. The reach of the monopsony model has been extended by Manning (2003), who 
argues that “thin” labour markets, and difficulties for workers in moving between jobs 
confer widespread monopsony power. Overall, in a monopsonistic market, employment is 
expected to rise or to be less negatively affected, corresponding to a “small” increase in 
minimum wages. 
For China, the situation is complicated as is discussed in the introduction (section 5.1) by 
the coexistence of formal and informal sectors in urban areas. Formal sectors are markets 
where compliance is high. In contrast, the informal sectors have low compliance. Therefore, 
the compliance issue needs to be considered, as we do next. 
  Figure 5.3 presents a conventional economic analysis (see Gramlich et al., 1976, also 
Boeri et al., 2011). Here, W0 is assumed to be the wage prevailing in both sectors prior to 
the introduction of the minimum wage, WM. In the covered sector, the introduction of the 
minimum wage reduces employment to LC. Some of the unemployed workers will attempt 
to find jobs in the uncovered sector, pushing the supply curve there to S’U. In the uncovered 
sector, wages in this simple competitive model should go down to WU and employment 
increases to LU. However, a “lighthouse effect”
3, whereby the setting of WM influences 
wages positively in the uncovered sector, has also been found in some countries (see 
Chapter 2, also Boeri et al., 2011), in which case an increase in uncovered employment will 
not occur or be less than the prediction. Overall, this model points to the need to analyse 
covered and uncovered employment separately, and the conventional prediction is for 
                                                              




negative employment effects in the covered sector, matched with possible positive effects 
in the uncovered sector. 
  In this chapter, a fixed-effect panel data model is used to investigate possible 
employment effects, specified as below:  
ln(EmpRate)mt =  
α+ β1·lnMWmt + β2·lnMWmt-1 +γ1·lnWmt + γ2·lnWmt-1+ λ·Xmt + η1Dt +η2Dm + εmt , (1) 
where the dependent variable is the log employment-to-population ratio for a particular 
worker group (including unskilled categories such as young workers) for municipality m in 
year t. Note that the analysis uses municipalities as data points, so the dependent variable is 
obtained from municipal employment divided by the municipal population in each year. 
Among the independent variables, MWmt and MWmt-1 is the minimum wage rate and its 
one-year lag in log form, and Wmt and Wmt-1 is the municipal average wages and its lag, 
included to allow for the effect of municipal prosperity on employment. Other variables are 
shown by Xmt, which represents a set of control variables to describe local labour market 
conditions, and vector λ the corresponding coefficients. Dt and Dm are vectors of fixed 
effects for years and municipalities, with η1 and η2 their corresponding coefficients. The 
year and municipal fixed effects help alleviate endogeneity of the minimum wage variables, 
e.g. a rich municipality might have expanding employment and rising minimum wages, but 




  A common simplification used in equation (1) is to express the minimum wage in terms 
of the Kaitz ratio; that is, the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage, in log terms: 
Kaitz = ln(MW) - ln(W). This simplification implies that the coefficient on the MW term is 
equal opposite to the coefficient on the wage. Sometimes this restriction is not true, and for 
completeness, the average wage term is included alone as well. The final model used for 
this chapter is below: 
ln(EmpRate)mt =  
α+ β1·Kaitzmt + β2·Kaitzmt-1 +γ·lnWmt + λ·Xmt + η1Dt +η2Dm + εmt, (2) 
The coefficients β1 and β2 are, therefore, of interest, and they are expected to be negative in 
total for competitive markets for workers whose employers comply with the minimum 
wage (i.e. the covered sector), but perhaps positive for non-compliant workers (the 
uncovered sector). However, for monopsonistic markets, the total effects of β1 and β2 are 
positive by theoretical prediction. Nevertheless, caution is needed in interpreting any 
positive sign of β1 and β2 as being induced by monopsonistic power since there is no direct 
measure of monopsony in this study, though the SOE variable is meant to control for “large” 
firm power.  
  Finally, the sample used in this chapter is different from Chapter 4 in that employment is 
defined as people in full-employment aged between 16 and 65 with reported annual wages. 
This restriction follows conventional practice, but means that individuals aged over 65 are 
excluded even though a sub-minimum wage and non-compliance is widely seen in this 
group (around 48% in the sample, see Table 4.1 in Chapter 4). Nevertheless the over-65s in 
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work represent only 3.7% (see Table 5.1a in Chapter 5) of the population over 65, so their 
exclusion does not change the main conclusion 4 . The sample further excludes 
self-employed people and individuals employed in the farming industry, including fishing, 
forestry and ranching. The sample period is still from 1995 to 2007.  
5.3. Empirical results 
In this section, the dependent variable, the employment-to-population ratio, as well as the 
main independent variable, the minimum wage, is discussed first. In particular, the 
properties of the Kaitz index of the minimum wage, is discussed. Then results of three 
specifications are given: one including the minimum wage and its lag, the second including 
extra-municipal controls, and the third using instrumental variable techniques. Finally, 
results for different cohorts, regions and periods are investigated. 
  Tables 5.1a-c report summary statistics of dependent variables across different cohorts, 
regions and periods. The employment rate for any given group is measured in a 
municipality-specific way, as employment of that group in a municipality divided by 
municipality population for that group. In Table 5.1a, for the sample as a whole, the overall 
employment-to-population ratio is 0.61, and three regional rates are similar (0.61 for the 
east, 0.62 for the west and 0.60 for the central region). For different periods, employment 
rates for 1995-2003 are higher than those for 2004-2007, suggesting a decreasing trend in 
employment rates since the economic reform began in 1978. As regards gender, the female 
employment rate, 0.55, is on average lower than the male, 0.68, which is the usual result 
                                                              
4  Including working people above 65  in  the  same  regressions  reported  in  the  text gives  similar  signs and 
significance levels.       
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given women’s greater non-market-work family commitments. As regards age, apart from 
the above 65’s (excluded in the main analysis), the youth category (16-29) has the lowest 
employment rate (0.44) on average, which is less than half of the prime-age category’s rate 
(0.89). Considering also the higher proportion of youth paid at or below the minimum 
(9.8%) compared with the prime-age category (4.9%) in Table 4.1, it is evident that the 
youth group in China as elsewhere (see Neumark and Wascher 2008, p.83), are likely to be 
most affected by the minimum wage. 
  Moreover, each employment-to-population ratio in Table 5.1a can be divided into two 
parts, i.e. a compliant employment rate in Table 5.1b and a non-compliant rate in Table 5.1c. 
For example, the overall employment rate for the whole sample is 0.61 in Table 5.1a, which 
is the sum of 0.55 (the compliant employment rate) in Table 5.1b and 0.06 (the 
non-compliant employment rate) in Table 5.1c.  
  Thus in Tables 5.1b and 5.1c, there are some changes across regions, years and cohorts in 
compliant and non-compliant employment rates. There is little regional difference in 
compliant employment rates, but period differences exist. Specifically, compliant 
employment rates during 2004-2007 (0.51) are lower than those during 1995-2003 (0.59) 
and the non-compliant employment rates during 2004-2007 (0.062) are correspondingly 
higher than those during 1995-2003 (0.058). Below we will test for whether this fall in 
compliance can be linked to the strengthening of minimum wages during 2004-2007.  
  As regards gender and age groups, Table 5.2b shows that compliant employment rates for 
females (0.47) are lower than those for males (0.63). The youth category also has the lowest 
compliant employment rates (0.40), as might be expected. Non-compliant employment 
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rates generally move in the opposite direction. 
Table 5.2 links to the minimum wage directly. For the key variable, the minimum wage, 
this section uses the Kaitz index as the measure, defined as the difference between log 
minimum wages and log mean wages in each municipality. In the literature on the 
minimum wage in China, almost all relevant studies simply adopt the real minimum wage. 
This measure is simple but does not follow standard practice in the international literature 
(Neumark and Wascher, 2008, pp.28-29; Wang and Gunderson, 2011 and 2012; Fang and 
Lin, 2013) which uses the Kaitz index. We therefore take the Kaitz index as a starting point 
in this study. Our results can then be compared with the literature. In addition, use of the 
Kaitz index removes issues of deflating the minimum wage (see Neumark and Wascher, 
2008, p.62). However, as noted above, use of the Kaitz index does constrain the coefficient 
on the average wage to being equal and opposite to that on the minimum wage itself. 
Sometimes this restriction will not be true, and so for comparison, the municipal average 
wage term is also included separately in the regressions. 
  As can be seen from Table 5.2, the minimum wage is negatively correlated with the total 
employment rate (-0.432), and the negative link is even stronger for the lagged minimum 
wage (-0.441). Interestingly, the Kaitz index is also negatively correlated with the log 
minimum wage (-0.566), which goes along with the fact that cities that set high minimum 
wages have higher average wages (0.877), as we have already seen in Chapter 4 (Table 4.3). 
The end result is a positive correlation between the Kaitz index and the various 
employment rates. However, as will become apparent, in the full multivariate analysis 
below, the link between the Kaitz and employment rates generally turns negative (just as 
159 
 
does the link between the minimum wage proper and employment rates). 
  For the empirical parts in this section (section 5.3), results are reported for the full 
sample, the eastern region and, as usual, the two periods before and after 2004. Results 
across further groupings (by gender and age5) are reported and discussed in a later section 
(section 5.5). For all these sub-samples, results for groups that comply with the minimum 
wage versus those that do not comply are considered separately as well6. Compliant firms 
are likely to be more “formal” (e.g. the SOE category7), while non-compliant firms will be 
the informal, small, grey-market type. Thus, of the compliant and non-compliant worker 
groups are examined separately to investigate the possible different employment effects of 
the minimum wage in formal and informal sectors (see Figure 5.3).  
The employment effects 1995-2007, Tables 5.3a-c 
The set of Tables 5.3a-c shows results of the minimum wage regression on employment 
rates for the entire sample and the youth sub-sample for 1995-2007, for all sample regions. 
All dependent variables are the corresponding log employment-to-population ratios. 
Columns (1) – (3) refer to the whole sample while columns (4) – (6) refer to the sub-sample 
of young adults. Both samples include three specifications: the first column only includes 
the Kaitz index and its lag, controlling municipal and time fixed effects. Standard errors 












controls as shown in the table. The third column additionally involves instrumental 
variables (IV), instrumenting the Kaitz index with the quasi-Kaitz index calculated from the 
data in the China Labour Statistical Year Books. The quasi-Kaitz index, the same as in 
Chapter 4, is defined as the difference between the municipal minimum wage and the 
provincial mean wage. Here, the IV technique is used to alleviate possible endogeneity 
problems caused by simultaneity between the minimum wage and unemployment (for 
example, where high municipal unemployment causes the setting of lower minimum wages 
– see Dolton and Bondibene, 2012a).  
  Taking first Table 5.3a8, since the key variables on both sides are in log form, the 
coefficient of the minimum wage represents the elasticity of the employment rate with 
respect to the minimum wage. We see in column (1), during 1995-2007, when the current 
minimum wage increases by 10%  the total employment rate falls by 1.01% significantly, 
keeping municipal and time effects constant. The lagged effect would drive the 
employment rate down by 0.64%, also at the 1% significance level. If municipal controls in 
column (2) are added, the negative current effect becomes insignificant, while the lagged 
effect retains its magnitude (0.54% corresponding to a 10% increase in lagged Kaitz ratios) 
and significance. Finally, if IVs based on column (2) are added, the result does not change 
much with a 0.84% insignificant employment rise for current effects and a 0.84% 
significant fall for lagged effects. Overall, significantly negative employment effects for 
lagged minimum wages are found for the entire sample, and there is no fundamental 
                                                              
8  All  independent  variables  follow  Chapter  4.  That  is,  lnwage  is  average municipal  wages  in  log  form; 
education  is the average education  level  in each municipality; female, soe and migrant  is the proportion of 
female, SOE, and migrant workers  in each municipality, respectively; manufacture, construction and service 
indicate the proportion of  labourers working  in the manufacture, construction and service  industry  in each 
municipality, respectively. The specific catalogues within each variable are described in Table 4.1 in Chapter 4; 
and the summary statistics are given in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3.       
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difference among three specifications. 
  Looking at the youth group in Table 5.3a, it is noticeable that in column (4) the 10% 
increase in the current minimum wage has a positive effect, pushing up youth employment 
by 3.27% significantly. The lagged effect is insignificantly negative (1.49%) and the total 
effect is positive. However, when municipal controls in column (5) are added, things are 
different. The positive current effect becomes much smaller and insignificant (0.60%) with 
the lagged effect remaining almost the same (-1.55%) but at a 10% significance level, and 
the summed effect now is significantly negative. Moreover, this negative total effect 
(0.97%) is larger than the corresponding total effect for the entire sample (0.66% in column 
(2)). It is even larger if only significant effects (0.54% in column (2) versus 1.55% in 
column (5)) are considered. This larger negative effect for the youth group is consistent 
with this study’s expectation and existing literature on China (Fang and Lin, 2013). The 
result with IVs in column (6) is similar to that in column (5), and the negative lagged effect 
is even larger (4.92%). In summary, for the youth employment rate, the minimum wage 
also exhibits significant negative effects, which are larger than the entire sample once 
municipal controls are included. 
  Notice that the municipal control variables in Table 5.3a have plausible signs (where 
significant), which is reassuring. First, average municipal wages have significantly positive 
effects on the overall urban employment rate, suggesting a type of “wage curve” (see 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990; Card, 1995). The wage curve literature finds that wages 
fall as unemployment rises, which is similar to the findings here, using 
employment-population-rates as the opposite of unemployment. Second, the average 
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education level in a municipality has significantly positive effects for the employment rate 
of the entire sample, which is plausible given that higher education generally goes with 
lower unemployment. Third, the municipal proportion of manufacturing industry and SOEs 
both have significantly negative effects for the youth employment. This indicates 
disadvantage for the youth in municipalities with a concentration of SOEs and 
manufacturing industry (which tend to go together). These sectors are likely to require 
skills and experience which young workers have not yet attained. Finally, both the 
municipal proportion of service and construction industry show positive effects, though 
insignificant, on the employment of the entire sample and the youth, which is plausible 
considering entrance into such employment is easier here than in other industries.  
  Since non-compliance is a special phenomenon for developing countries including China, 
as noted above, a further analysis is necessary. Therefore, workers who are paid in full 
compliance with the minimum wage (wages are equal to or more than the minimum wage) 
are separated out from the full sample so the remainder are non-compliant (wages are less 
than the minimum wage). Table 5.3b shows results for the compliant group and Table 5.3c 
for the non-compliant. As discussed in section 5.2, simple competitive theory predicts more 
negative effects for the compliant sample than for the non-compliant, since where the 
minimum wage “bites” workers will crowd into the non-compliant sector. 
  In Table 5.3b, the results are consistent with this expectation. In particular, for the entire 
sample, both current effects and lagged effects for the three specifications display 
significantly negative effects with larger magnitudes than results for the full sample in 
Table 5.3a. For example, when the minimum wage increases by 10%, the current effect 
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would be -2.91% at a 1% significance level (column (2), Table 5.3b), which is much larger 
than the corresponding effect in Table 5.3a (-0.12%, column (2)). The lagged effect would 
be -0.45% (column (2), Table 5.3b), similar to that in Table 5.3a (-0.54%, column (2)), and 
the total effect is -3.36% which is larger than that in Table 5.3a (-0.66%, column (2)). For 
the youth category as well, there are significant negative effects, particularly when using 
municipal controls and instruments (columns (5) and (6)). 
  Overall, negative employment effects can be said to be more pronounced for the 
compliant group of workers than for the full sample. The implication is that negative 
employment effects are smaller for the non-compliant group (or even positive, as 
regressions below show), in line with simple crowding models. For the compliant group, 
the sum of current and lagged effects for the Kaitz term implies an employment elasticity of 
-0.2 to -0.3 with respect to the minimum wage, depending on whether specification (2) or 
(3) is taken. Employment effects are also more negative for young workers in the compliant 
group, with an implied elasticity of -0.4 to -0.9 depending on specification.  
  In Table 5.3c for the non-compliant sample, the positive effects are consistent with the 
simple model as well. For the total sample, there are positive effects in contrast to the 
compliant sample in Table 5.3b. For example, taking the sum of current and lagged Kaitz 
coefficients irrespective of significance, it can be seen from column (2) that non-compliant 
employment would rise by 18.4% if the minimum wage increases by 10%. On the other 
hand, corresponding compliant employment would drop by 3.36% (column (2), Table 5.3b), 
and the overall effect (taking the compliant and non-compliant together, see Table 5.3a) is a 
fall of 0.66% (column (2), Table 5.3a). As for the youth group, the situation is similar with 
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non-compliant workers showing a positive elasticity and compliant workers showing a 
negative one. Again, the overall elasticity is negative as already seen, indicating that the 
positive employment effect for the non-compliant does not outweigh the negative effect for 
the compliant. 
The employment effects in the east: Tables 5.4a-c 
A sub-sample for the prosperous eastern region in the set of Tables 5.4a-c is now 
considered. The east is separately investigated because this is the only region with a 
continuous sample period from 1995 to 2007, across 13 years. Concentrating on cities in 
the east will help us to exclude uncontrolled regional diversities better, since the group of 
eastern regions is more homogeneous than the sample as a whole. We find in fact that the 
east generally exhibits similar patterns to the whole country, both for the entire sample and 
for the youth group. That is, significant negative lagged effects are generally found, with 
similar magnitudes for the whole country. For example, if the lagged minimum wage 
increases by 10%, the employment of the entire sample with municipal controls for the east 
would drop by 0.66% significantly (column (2)), which is close to the 0.54% estimate for 
the whole country in corresponding column (2), Table 5.3a. Youth employment for the east 
would correspondingly drop by 1.22%, which is a little smaller than the 1.55% for the 
whole country in column (5) of Table 5.3a.  
However, a difference does appear for the IV specification, in that the disemployment 
effect becomes larger for the entire sample in the east compared with the whole country, 
while it becomes smaller (summed) for the youth in the east compared with the whole 
country. For the entire sample in the east, the negative lagged effect is 1.45% in column (3), 
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larger than the negative effect 0.84% in corresponding column (3), Table 5.3a. The negative 
effects on the youth (-1.47% taking summed coefficients, column (6), Table 5.4a) are 
smaller than the 3.47% drop (summed) in column (6), Table 5.3a. This suggests that the 
disemployment effect of the youth for the east may be a little weaker than that for the 
whole country, which may be due to the east’s greater prosperity, and is consistent with 
Wang and Gunderson’s (2011) and Fang and Lin’s (2013) results.   
  Second, for the compliant sample in Table 5.4b, generally significant negative effects of 
the minimum wage are still found for employment rates. As was the case in Table 5.3b, 
these negative effects for the compliant group in Table 5.4b are larger than for the overall 
sample in Table 5.4a. As regards the non-compliant sample in Table 5.4c, the situation in 
the east is similar to that found in the whole country, with significant positive effects of the 
minimum wage on the employment rates. In sum, the effects of the minimum wage in the 
eastern region are similar when compared to those in the whole country, but with less 
significance for the youth group perhaps because economic development in this prosperous 
region offsets some “bite” of the minimum wage.  
Before and after 2004: Tables 5.5a-c and Tables 5.6a-c 
Finally, the employment effects of the minimum wage in different periods are considered. 
Since the minimum wage policy was reinforced in 2004, a stronger effect is expected for 
the period of 2004-2007 than for the period 1995-2003. Thus, the set of Tables 5.5a-c 
shows regression results for 1995-2003, and the set of Tables 5.6a-c shows results for 
2004-2007. Table 5.5 summarises these results.  
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  The summary in Table 5.5 shows that the comparison of results for the compliant sample 
pre- and post-2004 does accord with the expectation, though it does not for the full sample. 
Concentrating on column (2), which has the more robust uninstrumented specification, the 
sum of current and lagged Kaitz coefficients for the compliant group is -0.24 pre-2004, and 
is considerably larger, -0.32, post-2004. For the compliant youth group the difference is 
marked as well, with the summed Kaitz coefficients in column (5) being -0.44 pre-2004 and 
-0.81 post-2004, though insignificant as yet. The non-compliant groups also tend to have 
larger (positive) coefficients post-20049. On the other hand, the insignificant effect for the 
youth post-2004, combined with the smaller disemployment effects in the east (Tables 
5.4a-b), may be explained by the shortage of labour which happened around 2004 (Cai and 
Wang, 2010). Overall, if the compliance factor is controlled, there are signs that the 
minimum wage policy did become stricter post-2004 in that it had larger employment 
effects. 
  Overall, this section shows that China’s minimum wage generally appears to have 
significant negative employment effects. The regional difference is not obvious, and at least 
the east’s employment effect is similar to that of the whole country. As for different periods, 
the pattern after 2004 is somewhat different from that before 2004, showing stronger 
impacts, particularly for the compliant worker group, which is consistent with this thesis’s 
expectation. For the youth category, the negative effects are somewhat larger than for the 





          ln(EmpRate)mt = α + β1∙MWmt + β2∙MWmt‐1 +θ∙MWmt∙Dummy2004 + λ1∙X’mt + λ2∙Dt + λ3∙Dm + εm , 
where Dummy2004  ≦is equal to 1 if year>2003, 0 if year 2003. Θ is found to be significant, suggesting stricter 
implementation of the minimum wage after 2004.       
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5.4. A dynamic and long-run perspective: the System-GMM estimator 
This section presents a long-run perspective on the employment effect of minimum wages, 
using the system generalised method of moments (System-GMM), as programmed in 
Stata10. One consideration behind this approach is that System-GMM models permit use of 
IV to remove the endogeneity caused by possible reverse causality between employment 
and minimum wages. In particular, System-GMM estimators can include an autoregressive 
process for the dependent variable and use IVs constructed from a set of moment conditions. 
A further consideration is that a lagged dependent variable can be introduced into the model. 
Therefore the important long-run effects of the minimum wage can be investigated based 
on the dynamic property of the System-GMM model.  
The System-GMM estimator 
By employing panel data and taking differences based on equation (2) in section 5.2, the 
municipal fixed effect can be removed (see Baum 2006, p.233): 
△ln(EmpRate)mt = β·△Kaitzmt + γ·△Kaitzmt-1 + λ·△X’mt + η ·△Dt + εmt,       (3) 
In the GMM model, therefore, instrumental variables could be constructed for the 
first-difference variables in equation (3) under some assumptions11 from the following 
moment conditions (Arellano and Bond, 1991): 
                                                              
10  The estimator used  is the Arellano‐Bond  IV estimator xtdpdsys described  in Cameron and Trivedi (2010, 
p.301); see also Baum (2006, section 9.3) on dynamic panel‐data models. 




E (β·Kaitzmt-s·△εmt) = 0,                         (4) 
with s ≥ 1 if the minimum wage is determined by previous employment shocks 
(predetermined), and s≥2 if the minimum wage is determined by current employment 
shocks (endogenous). That is, lags of the endogenous variables can instrument the 
first-differences of the endogenous variables in equation (3). 
  However, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) find that the above 
instruments may be weak, especially for variables with a strong persistence over time, 
because the correlation between the lagged variables and the first-differences will be very 
low for these variables. This weak instrument problem will lead to biased estimation for 
finite samples. Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) then supplement the above moment 
conditions with more moment conditions under some assumptions (a restriction on the 
initial conditions12): 
E (△Kaitzmt-s·(η·Dm + εmt)) = 0,                   (5) 
with s≥1 if the minimum wage is predetermined and s≥2 if the minimum wage is 
endogenous. That is, lags of the first-differences of the endogenous variables can 
instrument the level variables in equation (3). 
  Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) show that, in the case of endogeneity, the combination 
of the two sets of moment conditions (4) and (5) gives a more consistent GMM estimator 
                                                              




which is labelled as the System-GMM estimator.  
  Specifically, the model in this section is as below: 
ln(EmpRate)mt = α+ β1·Kaitzmt+ β2·Kaitzmt-1 + θ1·ln(EmpRate)mt-1 + θ2·ln(EmpRate)mt-2 + 
λ·X’mt + η1·Dt + η2·Dm + εmt, (6) 
where ln(EmpRate)mt-1 and ln(EmpRate)mt-2 are the log employment-to-population ratio of 
the whole population between the ages of 16 and 65 or of the youth group for the 
municipality m in year t-1, and year t-2 respectively. Kaitzmt and Kaitzmt-1 are the municipal 
minimum wage rate and its one-year lag in log form respectively. X’mt represents a vector of 
control variables to describe local labour market conditions. Dt and Dm are vectors of fixed 
effects for years and municipalities, and εmt is the error term. 
  The dependent variable, ln(EmpRate)mt , is modelled as a second-order autoregressive 
process (i.e. the maximum lag is a two-year lag) because in most of the GMM regressions 
below, the AR(3) test does not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the error 
term, while the AR(2) test does, suggesting that the suitable maximum lag is two. Therefore, 
the sum of β1 and β2 represents a short-run effect of the minimum wage, while a long-run 
effect is calculated as (β1+β2)/(1–θ1–θ2). Since enterprises can adjust their fixed investment 
and sign new labour contracts with employees in a long run, one expects to see larger 
effects for a long run than for a short run (see Baker et al. (1999) for Canada, noted in 




Table 5.7 summarises the results from the System-GMM estimator, with full results given 
in Tables 5.7a-d. As in previous sections, separate results for total employment and for 
youth by compliance status are reported (Table 5.7a), as well as for the eastern region 
(Table 5.7b), and for periods before and after 2004 (Tables 5.7c and d).  
Let us first consider short-run effects as summarised in Table 5.7. We see that the basic 
pattern is similar to the results for the panel and IV estimators in section 5.3 (Tables 5.3a-c). 
The minimum wage has significant negative effects on the total employment, for example, 
in the first column the estimate is -0.10 (=−0.13+0.03). As we have already seen, there also 
appear to be larger negative effects for the full-compliance group, for example in the first 
column for the compliant group the estimate is -0.19. Again, there are positive effects for 
the non-compliant group, 1.34, suggesting crowding.  
However, the stronger disemployment effect for the youth group observed in Tables 
5.3a-c does not appear with the System-GMM technique. Taking the second column, for all 
sample provinces (top panel) we see an insignificant short-run effect, 0.10, becoming more 
negative for the compliant group, -0.26, but still insignificant. Only post-2004, in the final 
panel, do we see a significant negative effect for the compliant group, -0.68.  
  Let us next consider the long-run effects of the minimum wage, also summarised in 
Table 5.7. As can be seen, long-run effects on total employment rates are generally 
significant, with plausible signs. Considering the first column, there are negative long-run 
effects for the total (-0.15) and compliant groups (-0.25). There is also the usual positive 
effect (1.53) for the non-compliant group. Thus, for total employment, long-run effects are 
consistent with the pattern of the simple crowding model.  
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  Also consistent is the finding that most long-run effects are larger than short-run effects, 
suggesting a larger long-run elasticity of employment, which is plausible. On the other 
hand, there are some implausibly high positive estimates for some non-compliant groups, 
particularly post 2004 (last panel), where we see an elasticity of 3.87 for the total 
non-compliant sample, and also high figures for the youth group. This result can perhaps be 
seen as a kind of overshooting since the non-compliant group is comparatively small. 
  Finally, if long-run effects pre- and post-2004 (the bottom two panels in Table 5.7; and 
Tables 5.7c-d) are compared, we see that the post-2004 effects appear larger and more 
significant, which is reassuringly in line with our previous results. For example, in the first 
column of Table 5.7, the long run effect for compliant employment in the third panel is 
-0.13 pre-2004. However, the post-2004 coefficient in the final panel is much larger, -0.28. 
For the non-compliant group there are positive effects, 1.08 pre-2004 and larger, 3.87, post 
2004 (almost too large, as noted). These results suggest that the stricter minimum wage 
implementation post-2004 makes more compliant workers disemployed, and compresses 
more people to the non-compliant group. 
  We now take up the results of the Sargan tests in Table 5.7. The null hypothesis of the 
Sargan test is that over-identifying restrictions are valid, that is, the instruments as a group 
appear exogenous. The rejection of the null hypothesis means that the results are not robust 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p.185). As can be seen, in Table 5.7, about half of the 
regressions have insignificant Sargan statistics, suggesting that only half of the results 
contain valid instruments and are therefore, robust. For example, the first regression with a 
Sargan test statstic of 263.12*** does not pass the test, so its regression coefficients cannot 
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be trusted. On the other hand, the second column’s top panel for youth has a Sargan statistic 
of 167.16 which passes the test, so its regression coefficients are acceptable. All the robust 
results are shadowed in Table 5.7.  
  Taking the valid set of System-GMM estimators, there are several important robust 
results for compliant groups, particularly for the 2004-2007 period. For total employment 
rates, we estimate, -0.26 and -0.28 for short and long run elasticities. For youth we estimate 
higher figures; -0.68 and -0.94 for short and long run elasticities, suggesting this period has 
more minimum wage “bite” which is plausible. Furthermore, the finding that post-2004 
effects for the youth group are larger than for total employment, is line with the view that 
minimum wage policy has more impact on employment for young workers. Overall, despite 
some weak effects in the youth category, System-GMM estimators still offer support for 
our main conclusions in Section 5.3. 
5.5. Robustness checks: Gender and age cohorts 
This section offers another robustness check on the employment effect of minimum wages, 
discussing gender and age differences in turn. Gender differentiation is traditionally 
important, since the minimum wage covers more women. Age differences, for their part, 
are also worth further investigation to check employment effects by age, since only the 
youth category has been singled out so far. 
  Two points need to be noticed here. First, in this section, all specifications are the panel 
data regressions with municipal controls, without using IVs and System-GMM estimators. 
That is, the second specification in Section 5.3 is used (for example, the specification of 
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column (2) in Table 5.3), since the endogeneity problem appeared modest after controlling 
both municipal and time fixed effects, together with the municipal controls. Also, the 
System-GMM estimators were not robust for every regression. The other point is that since 
there was no obvious regional difference between the east and the whole country (taking all 
our sample provinces), only the effects for all the sample provinces are checked.  
Gender differences 
Females are always likely to be a vulnerable group in the labour market, whether in 
developed or developing countries. In China, Chi and Li (2008) point out that there is a 
“sticky floor” for women’s wages. Therefore, it may be expected that minimum wages will 
have stronger effects on female employment. Specifically, for the fully-compliant female 
worker group, we expect a larger negative effect than for males. 
  Table 5.8a displays the results for both the total sample and the fully-compliant group by 
gender over 1995-2007. For the total sample, females exhibit a larger negative response to 
minimum wages than males (comparing columns (1) and (3)), consistent with expectations. 
Also, once the compliance factor is added, females show an even larger negative response. 
The sum of the Kaitz effects is -0.686 for women, compared to an insignificant 0.0186 for 
men. 
  Table 5.8b shows the results for the post-2004 period after the policy was reinforced. The 
minimum wage displays stronger effects for women in this period. Corresponding to a 10% 
increase in the minimum wage, the female employment rate drops significantly by 1.55% in 
column (7), 8.7 percentage points higher than their counterparts for the whole period 
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1995-2007 in column (3) (taking only significant effects, instead of summing current and 
lagged effects). Female workers with full compliance see a decrease in employment rates of 
8.8% in column (8), 21 percentage points higher than their counterparts over the 1995-2007 
period in column (4). The stronger employment effects for females reinforce the conclusion 
that the minimum wage has significant effects on employment, and females face more 
disadvantages than males.  
Age differences 
Young adults and teenagers are an important target group for minimum wages. They should 
be most directly influenced by the minimum wage and bear disemployment effects, if there 
are any. The results in Section 5.4 have presented some evidence on whether young 
workers are more affected, and now a further investigation of all age cohorts is given. 
  Table 5.9a presents results for the full 1995-2007 period. We see that for the youth 
category the disemployment effects for both total and compliant sub-samples are stronger 
(columns (9) and (10)) than those for the prime age groups (age 30-49) (columns (11) and 
(12)). Interestingly, even more significant negative effects appear for the older workers. 
Especially for the fully-compliant older workers, the summed effect is larger than has been 
found in previous sections (normally between 0.3-0.6), being as high as -1.16 (column 14). 
Thus it appears that both old and young workers are disadvantaged relative to the prime-age 
group, as may be expected. 
  Moreover, it appears that after the minimum wage policy was reinforced in 2004, the 
negative effects become stronger. Results are given in Table 5.9b, and we see that the 
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summed effect for the compliant youth group (-0.81, column (16)) is clearly larger than that 
for the full 1995-2007 period (-0.43, column (10)), though admittedly still insignificant 
(while the total youth sample exhibits a significant positive effect, this is caused by a large 
increase in non-compliant youth employment - see above, Table 5.6c). As for the compliant 
older group, the negative effect is also much higher post 2004 (-1.45, column (20)). Again, 
though the significant effect for the total older sample disappears (column (19)), this 
appears to be caused by an increase in the non-compliant group, as happened for the youth 
group. In sum, the post-2004 effects are stronger for both disadvantaged groups. For the 
prime-age group (columns (17) and (18)), there is not much difference from the effects 
pre-2004, which is reasonable since the minimum wage should not influence this group 
much. 
Comparison with existing literature 
It is important to compare my results with the existing literature. For ease of reference, 
Table 5.10 summarises results from the three main studies. In fact, my results in section 5.3 
are comparable with these studies. My estimates in section 5.3 (about -0.1 for adults, and 
up to -0.5 for youth, and higher for compliant groups, Table 5.3a) are a little larger than 
Fang and Lin’s (2013) (-0.09 and -0.24) and Ni’s (2011) (-0.234). My IV estimates in 
section 5.3 are also larger than the non-IV estimates, which is also the finding in Fang and 
Lin (2013). As for long run analysis, where I find larger effects particularly post-2004 
(Table 5.7), there is no comparable work. Also no work has been done, apart from mine, on 
the distinction between compliant and non-compliant workers in China, or on the extra 
impact of post-2004 reforms. Nevertheless, as far as comparison is possible, it can be said 
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that my basic results on the disemployment effects of minimum wages in China are in line 
with existing research.  
As for gender and age analysis, my gender and age effects reported in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 
are basically more significant or larger than Fang and Lin’s (2013). As regards males, 
generally Fang and Lin’s results are insignificant, but my results tend to be significantly 
negative, though small, as shown in Table 5.8a. For females, the effects in Table 5.8a (-0.22 
to -0.68) are also larger than Fang and Lin’s (-0.07 to -0.21). As regards age differences , 
while my finding of a larger impact for youth than the prime age category in Table 5.9a 
parallels Fang and Lin’s, they have no finding of a large disemployment effect for the over 
50s. Some differences between our studies are to be expected if only because we have 
different data sources. .  
5.6. Conclusions 
This chapter looked at the employment effect of minimum wages across regions, periods, 
genders and age cohorts, considering the compliance issue as well. Generally, the minimum 
wage has a negative effect on China’s employment, which is stronger on full-compliance 
groups where the minimum wage has “bite”, and also appears to be stronger in the long-run. 
There is no obvious regional pattern for the east. As regards gender differences, women 
display disadvantages under rising minimum wages, with obvious larger negative effects in 
both total and full-compliance groups than men. As regards age differences, we find that 
older workers also experience disemployment, perhaps more than young workers. Thus, 
conventionally disadvantaged groups - women, young people (though this point is less clear 
in the dynamic System-GMM approach) and older workers - are all disemployed to some 
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extent by rising minimum wages. All the above conclusions become clearer after 2004 
when the minimum wage policy was reinforced. 
  A summary figure for the (negative) elasticity of employment with respect to the 
minimum wage is useful, but needs cautious interpretation since several factors are 
involved. Summaries are provided in Tables 5.5 and 5.7 (which contrasts short and 
long-run). From Table 5.5’s full model without IV, a round figure for the elasticity of 
employment for compliant workers is about -0.2 pre-2004 and -0.3 post-2004. The figure 
for compliant youth is higher, approximately -0.4 pre-2004 and -0.8 post-2004. However, it 
must be remembered that bringing in non-compliant workers, whose employment is 
encouraged by the minimum wage, reduces the overall negative effect. We thus see 
extensive crowding effects, with non-compliance providing a safety-valve. This impression 
is supported in Table 5.7 where allowing for possibly greater long-run adjustment still gives 
insignificant, though negative, disemployment effects for the total sample. The elasticity 
here is approximately -0.2, the resultant of significant negative effects for compliant 
workers counterbalanced by significant positive effects for the non-compliant. 
  Combined with the results in Chapter 4, the implication is that care is needed when 
raising minimum wages. The welfare implications for urban areas are not clear. Instituting 
the minimum wage does increase wages in the lower percentiles significantly. However, it 
may have a tendency generally to decrease employment - on net, taking account of 
additional employment of non-compliers counterbalanced by less employment of compliers. 
Certainly it reduces employment of the compliant group actually paid the minimum wage. 
The welfare of young people, women and elder people may be reduced, even though they 
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belong to vulnerable groups who need help most.  
  This said, the results in this chapter which appear to support the simple crowding model 
(section 5.2) are only an initial attempt to understand a complex labour market such as that 
found in China, which has a large non-compliant, informal sector. In fact, a recent study of 
the minimum wage in Indonesia (Magruder, 2013) not only divides the labour market into 
formal and informal sectors, as this thesis did, but also divides goods markets into tradable, 
non-tradable, industrialisable and non-industrialisable sectors. His conclusion is that only 
the tradeable, non-industrialisable sectors may experience disemployment13, and, moreover, 
that the panel fixed effects techniques are not as effective as spatial discontinuity methods 
in revealing positive employment effects. These results warn us to be careful when 
considering the minimum wage in a LDC. In summary, more studies are needed on the 
issue of minimum wages in China and other LDCs, though our results point to the need for 












13  Magruder's  "big  push" model  shows  that  the minimum wage will  have  different  effects  in  tradeable 
sectors (e.g. manufacturing, where the minimum wage should be negative), in non‐tradeable‐industrialisable 
sectors  (e.g.  retail  where  the  minimum  should  increase  the  formal  sector,  decrease  the  informal,  and 




applicable only  to  industries which were both untradable  (or at  least with high costs of  trade) and which 





      
Source: Adapted from Brown et al. (1982) 
 Figure 5.1: The minimum wage in a competitive market 
 
 
      
Source: Adapted from Brown et al. (1982) 
  Figure 5.2: the minimum wage in a monopsonistic market
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Source: adapted from Gramlich et al. (1976) and Boeri et al. (2011) 
Explanation: W0 is assumed to be the wage prevailing in both sectors prior to the 
introduction of the minimum, WM. The introduction of the minimum in the covered sector 
reduces employment in that sector to LC. Some of these unemployed workers will attempt to 
find jobs in the uncovered sector, pushing the supply curve there to S’U.  
 In the uncovered sector, wages in the simple competitive model go down to WU and 
employment increases to LU. However, a “lighthouse effect” whereby the setting of WM 
influences wages positively in the uncovered sector has also been found in some countries, in 
which case uncovered employment should decline as well. 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.5: Summary of MW Effects on the ln(EmpRate ) , Pre- and Post 2004
Total Total Total Young Young Young
1995-2003 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total sample -0.20 -0.06 0.15 0.14 -0.24 -0.50 
Compliant -0.28 -0.24 -0.14 0.01 -0.44 -0.77 
Non-
compliant
0.92 1.57 1.95 0.23 1.25 0.65 
2004-1007
Total sample 0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.35 0.84 0.28 
Compliant -0.30 -0.32 -0.19 -0.60 -0.81 -0.47 
Non-
compliant

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total sample Short Run -0.10*** 0.10
Long Run -0.15** 0.13
(0.0644) (0.3444)
Sargan Test 263.12*** 167.16 
Compliant Short Run -0.19*** -0.26
Long Run -0.25*** -0.42
(0.0588) (0.3328)
Sargan Test 264.23*** 181.34 
Non-compliant Short Run 1.34*** 0.76
Long Run 1.54*** 0.64
(0.3112) (0.4007)
Sargan Test 173.62 153.47*
Total sample Short Run -0.28*** 0.00
Long Run -0.41*** 0.00
(0.0876) (0.4417)
Sargan Test 221.72*** 191.38*
Compliant Short Run -0.30*** -0.36
Long Run -0.41*** -0.79
(0.0861) (0.6235)
Sargan Test 226.85*** 180.23
Non-compliant Short Run 0.91*** 0.84
Long Run 0.88** 0.87
(0.3636) (0.7240)
Sargan Test 161.52 133.13
Total sample Short Run -0.06*** 0.33
Long Run -0.09 0.49
(0.0695) (0.3903)
Sargan Test 131.65*** 113.73*
Compliant Short Run -0.08*** -0.36
Long Run -0.13* -0.27
(0.0777) (0.4879)
Sargan Test 114.07* 100.66
Non-compliant Short Run 0.91*** 0.33
Long Run 1.08** 0.23
(0.3815) (0.3685)
Sargan Test 86.99 99.11
Total sample Short Run -0.16 0.67
Long Run -0.21 1.13
(0.1663) (1.4274)
Sargan Test 86.85* 58.16
Compliant Short Run -0.26** -0.68*
Long Run -0.28** -0.94
(0.1347) (0.7521)
Sargan Test 82.10 74.01
Non-compliant Short Run 3.15*** 2.36**
Long Run 3.87*** 1.86*
(1.1430) (1.0493)
Sargan Test 67.45 47.59*
Table 5.7: Summary of MW Effects on the ln(EmpRate ) , Short Run vs. Long Run 
Elasticities, System-GMM Estimator
Notes: The first panel corresponds to Table 5.7a, the second corresponds to Table 5.7b,
the third is Table 5.7c, and the fourth is Table 5.7d. Each figure for the short-run is the
sum of the Kaitz ratio and its lag. Each figure for the long-run is calculated as:
(Kaitz+Kaitz lagged)/(1-employment lagged-employment lagged 2) in each regression.
The null hypothesis for the Sargan test is that overidentifying restrictions are valid. The









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































         Table 5.8a: MW Effects on the ln(EmpRate) by Gender, 1995-2007: Panel Estimates 








     
kaitz 0.0227 0.0606 -0.1564 -0.6652**
 (0.0445) (0.1990) (0.0890) (0.2605) 
kaitz lagged -0.0568*** -0.0420** -0.0687*** -0.0194 
 (0.0118) (0.0170) (0.0189) (0.0397) 
sum -0.0341 0.0186 -0.2251 -0.6846 
     
lnwage 0.0770 0.1388 -0.0974 -0.3293 
 (0.0487) (0.1588) (0.1190) (0.2078) 
education 0.2169*** 0.3429** 0.2675* 0.1434 
 (0.0636) (0.1227) (0.1362) (0.1538) 
female 0.6442** 0.6476** -0.3202 -1.2311*** 
 (0.2448) (0.2523) (0.3443) (0.3885) 
manufacture -0.0415 -0.0545 0.0122 0.0233 
 (0.0598) (0.0948) (0.2448) (0.3455) 
construction 0.3961 0.3398 -0.5637 -0.6469 
 (0.2501) (0.2447) (0.4668) (0.5517) 
service 0.1113 0.1928 0.1446 0.0075 
 (0.0850) (0.1561) (0.2406) (0.3027) 
soe -0.0878 -0.1819 0.0280 0.0724 
 (0.0763) (0.1225) (0.1482) (0.2247) 
enrolment -0.4176*** -0.4179*** -0.0580 0.0449 
 (0.1159) (0.0843) (0.2631) (0.3067) 
migrant -0.0510 0.0950 0.0813 -0.1057 
 (0.1258) (0.2421) (0.1027) (0.2939) 
constant -1.8400*** -2.8312* -0.5026 1.9787 
 (0.4903) (1.4597) (0.8832) (1.8329) 











Observations 676 676 676 676 
R-squared 0.4630 0.0604 0.4670 0.1983 
          Notes: Dependent variables are corresponding ln(EmpRate) in the first row. Kaitz ratios are 
defined as log (MW) - log (mean wages) for each municipality. Standard errors are in 
parentheses clustered by provinces. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
201
           Table 5.8b: MW Effects on the ln(EmpRate) by Gender, 2004-07: Panel Estimates 








     
kaitz 0.0185 0.2668 -0.1553*** -0.8799* 
 (0.0732) (0.3410) (0.0410) (0.4295) 
kaitz lagged -0.0157 0.2153 0.0313 0.1455 
 (0.0453) (0.1756) (0.0809) (0.0865) 
sum 0.0028 0.4821 -0.1240 -0.7344 
     
lnwage -0.0481 -0.0591 -0.3402*** -0.1873 
 (0.0494) (0.1898) (0.0876) (0.2890) 
education 0.1325 0.5615 0.3763*** -0.3985 
 (0.1543) (0.3402) (0.0935) (0.5226) 
female 0.6516 -0.1721 -0.4179 -1.2475 
 (0.4212) (0.9163) (0.3728) (0.8790) 
manufacture 0.0710 0.0566 0.7187* 1.5970** 
 (0.0966) (0.3324) (0.3787) (0.6015) 
construction 0.8882 1.2176* 0.2740 -0.2756 
 (0.4966) (0.5835) (1.0615) (1.0427) 
service 0.0192 0.0989 0.0736 -0.2253 
 (0.0466) (0.1806) (0.1100) (0.4173) 
soe -0.1505*** -0.3450 -0.1494** 0.2201 
 (0.0460) (0.2751) (0.0593) (0.2733) 
enrollment 0.0061 -0.1142 -0.0552 1.3848** 
 (0.3344) (0.4037) (0.4423) (0.5187) 
migrant 0.1813** 0.5626 0.4924*** -0.2600 
 (0.0709) (0.4806) (0.0908) (0.5650) 
constant -0.7328 -1.5214 1.0044 1.6937 
 (0.8506) (2.0285) (0.8834) (2.6131) 











Observations 322 322 322 322 
R-squared 0.2707 0.0374 0.2114 0.1106 
              Notes: See Table 5.8a.   
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Table 5.9a: MW Effects on the ln(EmpRate) by Age Category, 1995-2007: Panel Estimates 











       
kaitz 0.0595 -0.2941 0.0723 -0.3436 -0.3668** -1.0530** 
 (0.2421) (0.2355) (0.0411) (0.2389) (0.1376) (0.4215) 
kaitz lagged -0.1554* -0.1387* -0.0112 0.0349 -0.0147 -0.1040 
 (0.0836) (0.0709) (0.0065) (0.0385) (0.0340) (0.0606) 
sum -0.0959 -0.4328 0.0611 -0.3087 -0.3815 -1.1570 
       
lnwage -0.2290 -0.4192* 0.1093 -0.1330 -0.2063 -0.6550 
 (0.2253) (0.2334) (0.0626) (0.1639) (0.2009) (0.4059) 
education -0.1272 0.1087 0.1927* 0.0270 0.6929** 0.2178 
 (0.2895) (0.2104) (0.1071) (0.1381) (0.2944) (0.5052) 
female 0.9380 0.2636 -0.2149 -0.4914 0.9344 0.8432 
 (0.8403) (0.7249) (0.1923) (0.3814) (0.9704) (1.3485) 
manufacture -0.8826*** -0.5466** 0.0891 0.0450 -0.2771 -0.2823 
 (0.1651) (0.1867) (0.0769) (0.1211) (0.2971) (0.3957) 
construction 0.1948 0.2527 -0.0643 -0.4194 -0.4472 0.3581 
 (0.9148) (1.1357) (0.2531) (0.3661) (0.5385) (0.5997) 
service 0.0924 0.1098 0.0571 -0.1358 0.0638 -0.1121
 (0.1617) (0.1481) (0.0500) (0.2305) (0.1875) (0.3821) 
soe -0.5355** -0.5739* 0.0794 0.0858 -0.2169 -0.5008 
 (0.2226) (0.3224) (0.0880) (0.1513) (0.2154) (0.3437) 
enrollment 0.3876 0.2851 -0.1520 -0.0182 -0.9952 0.3483 
 (0.9829) (0.6239) (0.2155) (0.2797) (0.7020) (1.4013) 
migrant 0.0171 0.1039 -0.0729 -0.3600 -0.1329 -0.2866 
 (0.2541) (0.2502) (0.0896) (0.2689) (0.3203) (0.4307) 
constant 1.8047 2.3674 -1.5585** 1.0322 -1.8430 2.9851 
 (1.9410) (1.7297) (0.6388) (1.6224) (1.9982) (4.5221) 















Observations 664 656 701 701 697 697 
R-squared 0.3334 0.2921 0.4667 0.0857 0.1019 0.1043 
  Notes: Dependent variables are corresponding ln(EmpRate) in the first row. Kaitz ratios are defined as log 
(MW) - log (mean wages) for each municipality. Standard errors are in parentheses clustered by provinces. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table 5.9b: MW Effects on the ln(EmpRate) by Age Category, 2004-2007: Panel Estimates 











       
kaitz 0.5452*** -0.7449 0.0594 -0.5103 -0.3104 -1.5086* 
 (0.1576) (0.6524) (0.0429) (0.3608) (0.2109) (0.7548) 
kaitz lagged 0.2941 -0.0650 0.0111 0.2102 0.4764 0.0551 
 (0.3586) (0.5371) (0.0434) (0.1569) (0.3613) (0.6054) 
sum 0.8393 -0.8099 0.0705 -0.3001 0.1660 -1.4535 
       
lnwage 0.3875 2.3568* -0.0366 0.0029 -0.6387 -1.2384 
 (0.3001) (1.1044) (0.0348) (0.1943) (0.3981) (0.8982) 
education -0.9146 2.9064** 0.1050 -0.6012 0.0402 -1.1901 
 (1.3323) (1.1350) (0.0619) (0.5319) (0.3473) (1.6570) 
female 3.8181 -0.4681 -0.1073 -0.6185 0.1987 1.2675 
 (3.2021) (2.4018) (0.1732) (0.7802) (1.2574) (2.6844) 
manufacture 0.2695 -2.5060** 0.2543*** 1.0321 0.1448 -0.1243 
 (1.8786) (0.9186) (0.0487) (0.5855) (0.9481) (1.3345) 
construction -1.3907 -4.7487* -0.1161 -0.2748 2.8757** 4.1221 
 (2.7078) (2.4998) (0.2747) (0.3177) (1.2887) (2.6546) 
service -0.0731 -0.2842 0.0165 -0.2901 -0.3370 -0.5731
 (0.2384) (0.4559) (0.0293) (0.4289) (0.4378) (0.6409) 
soe -1.6420 1.1298 0.0368 0.2413 -0.0389 0.0071 
 (1.3164) (1.2292) (0.0401) (0.1935) (0.3127) (0.6902) 
enrollment 2.2216 -6.1841** 0.0661 1.3116* 1.8577 6.1417 
 (2.3972) (2.4951) (0.2395) (0.7177) (1.4160) (4.1376) 
migrant 0.2959 -0.1846 0.1494** -0.5860 -0.0083 -0.7088 
 (0.3635) (1.1161) (0.0647) (0.4672) (0.4531) (1.0385) 
constant -2.1640 -33.1726*** -0.2426 1.4918 4.2731 11.7717 
 (5.2243) (10.1183) (0.3534) (1.7243) (3.1036) (8.2411) 















Observations 320 320 322 322 319 319 
R-squared 0.2196 0.2528 0.2299 0.0746 0.0859 0.1062 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6. THE MINIMUM WAGE AND THE GENDER WAGE GAP 
6.1. Introduction 
Traditionally, empirical research has focused on decomposing the gender wage gap into two 
components: the composition and the unexplained effects. The composition effect is explained by 
the different characteristics between genders, such as education and experience, representing 
productive factors. The unexplained effect captures different returns, or prices, for the same 
endowment between genders. This unexplained effect is sometimes thought of as measuring 
“discrimination”; that is, lower pay to women who have the same measurable productivity level 
as men. However, it is better described as the “unexplained effect” because it might also include 
mis-measurement and omitted variable bias. The unexplained effect can also be called the 
structural effect since its source is due to distinctive gender wage structures. 
  The gender wage gap in China has continued to widen since the economic reform in the 1980s, 
when a market economy gradually replaces a planned economy (Table 6.2 below shows that the 
average gap rose from 21% in 1995 to 32% in 2007). This rising gender gap is caused by increases 
in both composition effects and discrimination/structural effects. As for the composition effect, 
productive factors become more and more important under competitive wage settings (Ge and 
Yang, 2012). This fact highlights the different endowments of males and females. As for the 
discrimination effect, before the reform, gender equality was maintained by state control on wage 
levels for state-owned and collective enterprises, which is one important factor in explaining the 
much smaller gender differentials when compared with developed countries in the same period. 
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After the reform, this artificial equality (in other words, “discrimination” in favour of women) was 
broken by the introduction of marketisation or decentralisation of wage setting (Ng, 2007). Firms 
and individuals have more autonomy to decide their respective demand and supply. One example is 
the dramatic drop in the female employment ratio in the 2000s. Overall, these developments mean 
that gender wage differentials have become an important topic for China.  
  This chapter further relates the gender gap to the minimum wage based on two considerations. 
First, during the process of this rising gender gap, females at the “sticky floor” (Chi and Li, 2008) 
are the most disadvantaged group compared with their counterparts at higher wage percentiles. 
Almost all relevant studies report this observation (Bishop et al., 2005; Ge, 2007; Chi and Li, 
2008; Chen and Duan, 2009; Ge and Zeng, 2011). Women with low skills compose another 
disadvantaged group (Gustafsson and Li, 2000; Zhang et al., 2008), who are inclined to be trapped 
at the wage floor as well. At the same time, as noted in Chapter 4, there are significant effects of the 
minimum wage on compression of wage distribution. Thus, the question whether or not minimum 
wages help women at the wage floor is an interesting one to investigate.  
  Government policies such as the minimum wage may influence the gender wage gap both 
through workforce “composition” (the skill composition of the female workforce is generally 
lower than that of the male’s and so more women may be affected) and wage “structure” effects 
(changing the returns to productive characteristics). In other words, since more females earn at the 
minimum wage level raising minimum wages, therefore, will affect more women relative to men, 
and reduce the wage gap via this workforce composition effect. As for the structural effect 
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(discrimination), if an increase in the minimum wage has more of an effect on women’s pay, as is 
likely since they work more for the small, low-paying firms, this too will narrow the gap. 
  This chapter applies the unconditional quantile regression method (Firpo et al., 2009)1 to 
decompose the gender wage gap, using our standard dataset (see Chapter 3 above), the 1995-2007 
China Urban Household Survey (UHS). It presents a moving picture over a ten-year period for the 
gender gap across the earnings distribution. The previous decomposition studies (e.g. Zhang et al., 
2008; Chi and Li, 2008) have not investigated minimum wage effects. Thus, this is the first study 
to examine the effect of the minimum wage on the gender wage gap in China using decomposition 
analysis.  
  This chapter finds that the gender wage gap in China has been rising, but at a slower pace since 
2000. The overall “discrimination” residual first increases then decreases after 2001. Since the 
gap is wider at the bottom deciles, the evidence points to a “sticky floor” for women. However, 
the situation for women at the wage floor has relatively improved in recent years, since the 
gender gap at the lower end of the wage distribution has shrunk while the gap in the middle and 
at the upper end widened after 2003. The strengthening of the minimum wage after 2004 appears 
responsible for a large part of this improvement at the lower deciles. In particular, for females at 
the bottom decile, the minimum wage is powerful, and works both through the composition effect 
(because more women are covered by the minimum wage), and the structure effect (since, at the 
lower deciles, the impact of the minimum wage on women’s pay is stronger than that for men). 
                                                              




  The remaining of the chapter is arranged as follows: section 6.2 gives descriptive statistics 
about the gender wage gap, combined with relevant information on the minimum wage. Section 
6.3 illustrates Firpo et al.’s (2009) unconditional quantile regression method. Section 6.4 shows 
the empirical results from annual data, and section 6.5 presents results of the robustness test using 
monthly data. Section 6.6 concludes the chapter.  
6.2. Descriptive statistics 
This section gives descriptive statistics of the sample data used in this chapter. The sample is 
similar to that in Chapter 4, and it contains full-time employees aged between 16 and 65 in 
non-farming jobs. The sample period is from 1995 to 2007, when the minimum wage covers the 
whole country. All independent variables are calculated at aggregated level of municipalities 
based on this trimmed sample. 
  Figure 6.1 shows the gender employment gap by age in 1996 and 2004 respectively. Notice 
that the sample in these two figures is different from that used later in the empirical sections. It 
comprises all people aged 16 and over including unemployed people, students and the retired; it 
also covers all industries including farming. Thus, a general picture of the employment activities 
in these two years is presented. The largest difference in employment between males and females 
appears in the 50 to 60 age range which becomes much smaller after the age of 60. This is 
understandable since in China the statutory retirement age for female workers is 55, compared to 
60 for males. However, one obvious difference between 1996 and 2004 is the advent of a 
prime-age employment gap. In 1996, the gap only shows after about age 40. In 2004, female 
employment rarely exceeds male employment across all ages; furthermore, the employment gap 
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appears at as early as around age 28, which is a common childbearing age in China. Thus, it 
would be interesting to investigate further whether this reduction in the employment of women 
from 1996 to 2004 leads to any improvement in the wages of female employees. 
  Table 6.1 presents statistics on individual characteristics by gender in 1996 and 2004, as well 
as means for the whole sample period. It is based on the same sample adopted in the empirical 
sections. Following Alaniz et al. (2011), the percentage of workers earning within 120% of the 
minimum wage is also shown to reduce the impact of measurement errors. In the table, it can be 
seen that females within 120% of the minimum wage form a higher proportion of the workforce 
than is the case for males, indicating more females are directly influenced by minimum wages 
than males. Moreover, the proportion is higher in 2004, which may be caused by stricter 
enforcement of the law. On average, the percentage of females at or close to the minimum wage 
is about 10 percentage points higher than that of males (19.52% versus 9.04%). As for other 
characteristics, female workers appear to have less working experience and education. At the 
same time, more females are in service occupations, but more males are manual workers. Both 
occupations are inclined to be affected by minimum wages, and so further decomposition is 
needed to analyse the effect by gender. 
  In summary, Table 6.1 illustrates that minimum wages may affect more female than male 
workers, indicating that the minimum wage is likely to lower the gender wage gap at the lower 
end of the wage distribution. Notice that statistics in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1 are very similar to 
those in Chi and Li (2008). Chi and Li (2008) do not analyse the minimum wage effect, but they 
use the same UHS data as this chapter. Thus, the similarity of their wage distribution results is 
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reassuring for the analysis below. 
6.3. Methodology 
This section discusses the two methodologies used in this chapter. One is the traditional Oaxaca 
(1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition, and the other is the unconditional quantile regression 
decomposition from Firpo et al. (2009, FFL hereafter). These two methods share the same idea in 
that both of them use labour market characteristics as the explained part, and returns to these 
characteristics as the unexplained part, i.e. discrimination. The only difference is that the method 
from Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposes at the mean, while the FFL method permits 
decomposition at the quantiles. The Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) composition, therefore, is 
discussed first, and can be seen as a benchmark; then the FFL method is discussed. Finally, a 
conclusion will be drawn. 
  In the method from Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), the wage differentials between the two 
groups are decomposed into two parts. Suppose that there are two wage equations for men and 
women: 
                             lnWf = αf + βf·Xf 
                             lnWm = αm + βm·Xm, 
where superscripts m and f indicate males and females, and α is the constant, β denotes the 
coefficients. These equations can be estimated using normal OLS. Under the Oaxaca (1973) and 
Blinder (1973) decomposition, the difference between the average wages of these two groups is 
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decomposed into two parts as below: 
              lnWm - ln Wf = βm·(Xm - Xf) + [(αm -αf) + Xf·(βm -βf)]. 
One part is βm·(Xm - Xf); that is, the gender wage differential attributable to differences in average 
male/female productive characteristics given the same wage structure (the coefficients for these 
characteristics) - in this case following the male wage structure (the coefficients estimated from 
the male wage equation). This part, which is based on the gender differences in productive factors, 
is known as the composition effect. The other part is [(αm -αf) + Xf·(βm -βf)], that is, the gender 
wage differentials arising from the wage structure (differences in coefficients of the two 
estimated wage equations) holding productive characteristics constant (in this case using the 
average female characteristics as a reference). Since the wage differential associated with this 
part is due to wage structures (the pay-offs for different productive characteristics male and 
female receive from the market) this part is often called the structural effect and considered to be 
caused by discrimination. Notice under OLS regressions, all estimators are at their averages, and 
hence both effects are the average effects over the gender group. There are several extensions of 
the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition, and the most basic and original version is 
adopted in this chapter as a basis for comparison with the FFL method. 
  The advantage of the FFL method is to decompose the group gap over the wage distribution, 
instead of at the mean only (FFL, 2009). One may argue that the quantile regression method 
developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978) can be used to get estimators. However, their quantile 
regressions express the influence of X on the conditional statistics of Y, while FFL’s model is on 
unconditional statistics, which is more reasonable. For example, it is preferable to know the 
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response of female wages to a given increase in minimum wages in the population (unconditional 
effects), rather than the response just for a sample with specific covariates (conditional effects). It 
is true that normally regression coefficients can be interpreted as unconditional effects, because in 
linear regression models the conditional mean E(Y | X) = Xβ leads to E(Y) = E(X)β, so that the 
unconditional response of Y can be acquired by averaging it over X (Chi and Li, 2008). However, 
this property does not hold for non-linear models, such as quantile regression models. Thus, one 
of the contributions of the FFL method is to permit this study to obtain the unconditional 
response of Y. The estimated coefficients and decomposition results are, therefore, more general. 
  The key to obtaining the unconditional effect of explained variables is the application of the 
Recentred Influence Function (RIF hereafter) in the FFL method. The RIF is based on the 
influence function, which is used as a measure of robustness of a general function form to outlier 
data in empirical applications (FFL, 2009). It describes “the influence of an individual 
observation on a distributional statistic of interest such as a quantile” (Chi and Li, 2008). The 
recentred version of the influence function, i.e. RIF, provides a linear approximation to a 
non-linear function of the distribution, through collecting the leading term of a von Mises 
expansion (FFL, 2009). This RIF regression contains the same conditional property as the OLS 
regression, so that the results can be interpreted in the same way as in traditional decompositions 
such as the method from Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973).  
  There are two steps in the FFL method. The first step is to decompose the gender wage gap 
across distributions into two effects: composition effects and structural effects. A counterfactual 
female earning distribution has to be constructed based on what women would earn if they had 
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the same returns to market characteristics as men. Then the difference between the male 
distribution and this counterfactual must be attributable to women’s different characteristics (the 
composition effect), and the difference between the counterfactual and women’s actual 
distribution represents the unexplained gap (the structural effect). In particular, suppose v (W) is a 
quantile of the wage distribution W, then the gender wage differentials at quantile τ can be 
expressed as below: 
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]m f m c c fv W v W v W v W v W v W     , 
where superscripts m and f denote males and females respectively. c indicates the counterfactual 
wages of women, showing how much females would earn if women had the same returns to 
characteristics as men. Thus, the underlying idea is the same as in the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
(1973) decomposition. Notice that FFL do not set the specific form of the wage distribution, and 
the re-weighting factor can be obtained by a logit/probit model, or other models with suitable 
properties suggested by FFL (2009). As noted above, the re-weighting factor is obtained by 
computing the quantile treatment effect estimators using Firpo’s STATA command rifreg. 
  The second step of the FFL method is to further decompose the raw gender wage gap into the 
effects of each covariate at quantile τ. With the help of RIF regressions, the linear approximation 
of the wage distribution at each quantile of interest is obtained. Specifically, for each year: 
ˆˆ( ; )m m mRIF W q X   
ˆˆ( ; )f f fRIF W q X   
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ˆˆ( ; )c c cRIF W q X  , 
where RIF represents the RIF regressions. ̂ denotes the estimate of the unconditional quantile 
partial effect, which can be interpreted in the same way for an OLS regression. Based on the 
results above, the decomposition for each covariate is finally achieved below, ignoring 
approximation errors resulting from the RIF linearity (Chi and Li, 2008): 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( )]m f m m f c f c fq W q W X X X          . 
  As with the method from Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), this equation decomposes the 
gender wage gap at quantile τ into two components. The first part is the composition effect, 
explained by different gender characteristics. The second part is the structural effect, explained by 
different gender returns to characteristics. In what follows, both the FFL method and the method 
of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) will be used to decompose gender wage differentials with 
special attention paid to the impact of the minimum wage on the decomposition.  
6.4. Empirical results  
This section starts by presenting the kernel density distributions for both genders in 1996 and 
2004, to give a basic idea of the distributional differences between men and women. It is this 
distributional gap that is decomposed into composition and structural effects across years. Finally, 
with the help of RIF regressions, these two effects are further decomposed into the separate 
effects of each covariate. 
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  Figure 6.2 show the kernel density distributions for both genders in 1996 and 20042. Clear 
differences are observed. For 1996, the wage gap is slightly larger at the lower end of the wage 
distribution, which is consistent with Bishop et al. (2005), Ng (2007), Chi and Li (2008) and Ge 
and Zeng (2011). However, for 2004 the wage gap widens relatively at the middle, but shrinks 
relatively at the lower end of the distribution. This observation is consistent with Chen and Duan 
(2009). Figure 6.3 contrasts 1996 and 2004, and we see how the overall gender wage gap across 
the distribution has widened from around 20% in 1996 to 35% in 2004. At the same time, we can 
see that dashed trend line for 2004 is less steep than in 1996, indicating that the relative position 
of women at the lower end improved over the period, suggesting the influence of factors such as 
the minimum wage.  
  The results of the first step of the FFL method, as well as those of the Oaxaca (1973) and 
Blinder (1973) decomposition are shown in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.4. Only selected quantiles are 
presented in order to save space. First, taking the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) 
decomposition results, while the gender wage gap increases from 1995 to 2007, the increases 
appear to be mainly caused by the sharp rise of the composition effect (denoted by the hollow 
circle line) after 2001. The structural effect started to fall after 2001. In other words, it appears 
that the share of the structural (discrimination) effect in the total wage gap has been declining in 
recent years despite the rise of the overall gap.  
  Second, looking further at the decomposition results for selected quantiles using the FFL 
                                                              
2  Our sample period is 1995‐2007. However, in 1995 some sample cities did not have their minimum wages yet, so 





method, there is an obvious difference between the gender gap at the 10th percentile and other 
percentiles. Specifically, beginning from 2002, the gender gap decreases dramatically at the 10th 
percentile, while the gaps at the 30th percentile or above exhibit a sharp rise first and then flatten 
out. This observation suggests that the increase in the gaps at the middle and upper end of the 
distribution are responsible for the overall rise of the gender gap. There has been an improvement 
for women at the bottom end of the earnings distribution, suggesting the possible influence of the 
minimum wage on gender gap noted in Chapter 4. 
  Third, composition effects increase at all percentiles from around 2002 and 2003, while 
structural effects, i.e. discrimination, decrease around the same period. Overall, though the 
gender wage differentials at the lower end of the distribution are the largest among all quantile 
gaps to start with, they shrink in relative term to gaps at other percentiles in recent years, 
suggesting an improvement in the situation of women at the “sticky floor”. 
  Finally the decomposition results from each covariate are obtained with the help of RIF 
regressions. First, results from the RIF regressions at selected quantiles are attached as 
appendices after this chapter (Appendices 6a and 6b3). As is our practice in this chapter, only 
results for 1996 and 2004 are shown in order to save space. Second, since the focus of this 
chapter is the minimum wage factor, Table 6.3 and Figure 6.5 only show the individual effect of 
minimum wages across (effects for all covariates are shown in Appendices 6a and 6b). 
Furthermore, based on Chapter 4’s finding that minimum wages have a spill-over effect up to the 
                                                              







50th percentiles, minimum wage effects are only shown up to the 50th percentile. 
  The results in Figure 6.5 and Table 6.3 indicate that the minimum wage indeed reduces the 
gender wage gap at the lower end of the wage distribution. For the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
(1973) decomposition, overall effects of minimum wages across the years appear only through 
structural effects, since composition effects are almost zero (Note how the FFL decomposition 
when calculated at the 50th percentile resembles the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) 
decomposition which is taken at the averages.). Notice, however, how this structural effect 
increases sharply for 2004-2007, when the minimum wage institution was reinforced.  
  Considering the quantile results from the FFL decomposition, both the structural and the 
composition effects impact the gender gap. Firstly, the total effect of the minimum wage at each 
quantile tend to increase in absolute size (become more negative) after 2004, showing that the 
minimum is becoming more effective in reducing the wage gap. Second, while the structure 
effect is responsible for most of the total across the quantiles, the pattern for the 10th percentile is 
quite different. That is, beginning from 2003, the composition effect exceeds the structure effect 
and can almost explain the total effect at each year. The 20th percentile has a similar trend, but not 
as clearly as the 10th. This observation suggests that after 2003, the minimum wage affects the 
gender gap at the bottom of the wage distribution because more women than men become 
covered by the minimum wage, which is reasonable (Table 6.1 also shows that women’s coverage 
rises from 15% to 25%, while men’s remains steady at about 10%). 
  In conclusion, the FFL decomposition reveals the significant effect of the minimum wage in 
decreasing the gender gap at the lower percentiles of the wage distribution. The overall gender 
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wage gap over the period 1995-2007 is increasing, but at a slower pace after 2002 than before. 
The increase before 2002 is largely explained by the different returns between genders, i.e. 
discrimination. However, beginning from 2002, the discrimination component drops or becomes 
stable, and more gender wage gaps can be explained by the different characteristics between 
genders than before (coverage by the minimum being a “characteristic”). This is especially true 
for the 10th percentile where, beginning from 2003, the effects of increased coverage of the 
minimum wage for the unskilled are seen.  
6.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the role of minimum wages is investigated in the gender wage gap of China using 
the UHS annual data for the period 1995-2007. The FFL decomposition method (Firpo et al., 
2009) is employed since it allows analysis of the entire wage distribution, not only the average. 
This is important as the minimum wage is more likely to affect the wage gaps at the lower deciles. 
The findings include that the gender wage gap keeps rising, but flattens out after 2000, indicating 
that a relatively stable wage structure has been established after the move to more competitive 
markets in the 1990s. Overall discrimination appears first to increase then decrease after 2001, 
which shows the role of marketisation in a transition economy. It has been said (e.g. Zhang et al., 
2008) that decentralisation and diversity in wage settings initially raise gender discrimination in 
the labour market. But gradually the profits of firms practicing discrimination will fall, which 
finally decreases discrimination in the market (in Figure 6.4 the composition effects are stable but 
with decreasing trends after 2002). This overall downward trend of the gender gap in China is 
consistent with Appleton et al. (2005), Zhang et al. (2008), and Chen and Duan (2009). 
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  As for the role of minimum wages, first, in the gender gap there is an obvious sticky floor, 
since the gender gap is greatest at the lower deciles. This observation is consistent with Chi and 
Li (2008) and Zhang et al. (2008). The difference of the findings of this study from Chi and Li’s 
(2008) is that in this study the situation of women at the wage floor has improved relatively in 
recent years, since the gender gap at the lower end of the wage distribution has shrunk while the 
gap in the middle and at the upper end has widened since 2003. This difference may be caused by 
different samples in the two studies.  
  In fact, the minimum wage appears to be responsible for a large part of the improved situation 
of women at lower wage percentiles. In particular, for females at the bottom decile, before 2004 
the minimum wage compressed the gender gap mainly through a structural effect (since, in the 
lower pay deciles, the pay of women was more affected by the minimum than that of men); after 
2004, it also works through a composition effect, since the minimum wage covers more 
women - one possible reason perhaps being stricter enforcement of the minimum wage. 
  The preliminary results in this chapter thus support those in Chapter 4, in that the minimum 
wage is shown to reduce the gender wage gap. In fact, my finding that the minimum wage 
reduces the gender pay gap has been overlooked in the leading studies of Chi and Li (2008) and 
Zhang et al. (2008). More research is needed to establish just how much wider the gap would be 
without the minimum wage, but the large size of the composition and structural effects associated 
with the minimum wage (see Appendix tables 6c and 6d) point to its importance. 
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Figure 6.3: raw gender wage differentials by quantile, 1996 & 2004.  
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Table 6.1: Labour Market Characteristics by Gender, 1995-2007
1996 2004 1995-2007
Male Female Male Female Male Female
MW*120% or below 8.77% 15.46% 10.54% 24.88% 9.04% 19.52%
Year of working experience 21.33 18.19 22.03 18.34 22.08 18.50
Education
College 26.87% 15.82% 35.13% 27.36% 32.74% 25.90%
High School 37.73% 44.75% 38.85% 45.36% 37.52% 44.06%
Junior high & below 35.40% 39.42% 26.02% 27.28% 29.74% 30.00%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Industry
Manufacturing 40.43% 39.15% 32.98% 26.90% 35.27% 29.88%
Construction 4.70% 3.73% 4.19% 1.47% 4.45% 2.20%
Transportation & communication 6.79% 4.53% 11.48% 4.92% 10.32% 5.25%
Wholesale, retail, food & hotel 12.60% 18.70% 9.64% 16.58% 10.09% 16.35%
Education, cultural, health care, 
sports, and social service
9.57% 14.39% 9.44% 14.35% 10.02% 14.97%
Science, research, technical service 2.97% 2.05% 4.12% 3.22% 3.31% 2.27%
Other personal and private service 4.98% 4.87% 7.67% 13.90% 6.49% 12.20%
Finance, insurance & real estate 2.56% 2.17% 5.49% 5.58% 4.38% 4.40%
Government 14.14% 8.75% 14.85% 13.06% 14.48% 10.66%
Others 1.27% 1.65% 0.15% 0.02% 1.18% 1.83%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Occupation
Professional & technical 21.51% 23.54% 18.93% 18.68% 19.16% 19.93%
Managerial 10.95% 3.58% 7.06% 2.10% 8.52% 2.65%
Clerical 22.47% 21.70% 31.36% 31.21% 27.58% 28.02%
Service 6.57% 16.19% 12.86% 26.19% 10.48% 23.54%
Manual 37.84% 33.95% 28.16% 20.15% 32.53% 23.95%
Others 0.66% 1.04% 1.63% 1.67% 1.73% 1.91%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Ownership
State-owned 81.88% 71.14% 64.47% 50.45% 60.20% 55.17%
Collective 10.51% 20.36% 7.14% 11.71% 5.65% 8.88%
Others 7.62% 8.51% 28.39% 37.84% 17.37% 19.56%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Region
East 69.91% 70.19% 83.15% 82.67% 75.77% 75.94%
Central - - 16.85% 17.33% 6.36% 6.11%
West 30.09% 29.81% - - 17.87% 17.94%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of observations 3636 3267 5995 4962 47865 40840
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Table 6.2: Decomposition of the Gender Earnings Gap at Selected Quantiles, 1995-2007
Oaxaca 10th 30th 50th 70th 90th
1995
Observed raw gap 0.215 0.362 0.211 0.188 0.182 0.195
Composition effect 0.029 0.035 0.059 0.075 0.048 0.031
Structure effect 0.186 0.327 0.152 0.113 0.134 0.165
1996
Observed raw gap 0.209 0.343 0.232 0.186 0.193 0.174
Composition effect 0.010 -0.003 0.058 0.056 0.045 0.021
Structure effect 0.199 0.346 0.174 0.130 0.148 0.152
1997
Observed raw gap 0.258 0.497 0.254 0.192 0.196 0.168
Composition effect 0.032 0.056 0.053 0.041 0.034 0.055
Structure effect 0.226 0.441 0.202 0.152 0.162 0.113
1998
Observed raw gap 0.197 0.367 0.234 0.172 0.162 0.122
Composition effect -0.011 0.023 0.049 0.041 0.025 0.019
Structure effect 0.208 0.344 0.185 0.130 0.136 0.103
1999
Observed raw gap 0.282 0.534 0.257 0.188 0.160 0.127
Composition effect 0.017 0.057 0.045 0.037 0.024 0.031
Structure effect 0.266 0.477 0.211 0.151 0.136 0.096
2000
Observed raw gap 0.308 0.523 0.309 0.211 0.159 0.124
Composition effect 0.026 0.015 0.034 0.036 0.037 0.040
Structure effect 0.283 0.508 0.275 0.175 0.122 0.084
2001
Observed raw gap 0.350 0.579 0.372 0.268 0.174 0.113
Composition effect 0.025 0.018 0.044 0.043 0.034 0.041
Structure effect 0.325 0.560 0.328 0.225 0.140 0.072
2002
Observed raw gap 0.286 0.323 0.357 0.293 0.241 0.206
Composition effect 0.062 0.073 0.079 0.058 0.047 0.027
Structure effect 0.224 0.250 0.278 0.236 0.195 0.180
2003
Observed raw gap 0.326 0.338 0.399 0.323 0.280 0.232
Composition effect 0.091 0.125 0.115 0.072 0.055 0.047
Structure effect 0.235 0.214 0.284 0.251 0.226 0.185
2004
Observed raw gap 0.368 0.394 0.394 0.356 0.357 0.349
Composition effect 0.107 0.108 0.111 0.091 0.105 0.110
Structure effect 0.262 0.287 0.283 0.266 0.252 0.239
2005
Observed raw gap 0.335 0.322 0.378 0.348 0.336 0.281
Composition effect 0.095 0.087 0.092 0.088 0.096 0.078
Structure effect 0.240 0.235 0.286 0.259 0.240 0.204
2006
Observed raw gap 0.328 0.346 0.331 0.333 0.341 0.282
Composition effect 0.088 0.065 0.088 0.093 0.096 0.088
Structure effect 0.239 0.280 0.244 0.240 0.245 0.193
2007
Observed raw gap 0.317 0.312 0.354 0.320 0.337 0.276
Composition effect 0.083 0.064 0.080 0.063 0.087 0.072
Structure effect 0.234 0.248 0.274 0.257 0.249 0.205
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Table 6.3: MW Effects in the Gender Earnings Gap at Selected Quantiles, 1995-2007
Oaxaca 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th
1995
MW total effect -1.811 -3.081 -3.165 -2.705 -1.599 -1.296
MW composition effect -0.001 -0.936 0.206 -0.285 0.154 0.069
MW structure effect -1.810 -2.145 -3.370 -2.419 -1.753 -1.365
1996
MW total effect -1.530 -7.080 -3.199 -2.145 -1.496 -0.956
MW composition effect -0.001 -2.116 -2.165 -1.023 -0.602 0.226
MW structure effect -1.529 -4.964 -1.034 -1.122 -0.894 -1.182
1997
MW total effect -3.121 -11.000 -5.063 -3.272 -2.207 -2.119
MW composition effect -0.001 0.921 0.224 0.024 -0.170 -1.115
MW structure effect -3.120 -11.922 -5.287 -3.296 -2.037 -1.004
1998
MW total effect -1.440 -10.152 -2.900 -0.806 -2.315 -0.636
MW composition effect -0.002 -2.903 -2.358 -1.745 -2.156 -1.754
MW structure effect -1.438 -7.249 -0.542 0.938 -0.159 1.118
1999
MW total effect -0.546 -10.520 -6.258 -2.732 -1.149 0.631
MW composition effect -0.004 -3.049 -2.327 -1.142 -2.203 -0.135
MW structure effect -0.542 -7.471 -3.931 -1.590 1.054 0.766
2000
MW total effect -1.244 -2.204 -4.789 -5.241 -2.070 0.298
MW composition effect -0.003 0.074 -1.151 -1.792 -1.006 -0.098
MW structure effect -1.241 -2.278 -3.638 -3.448 -1.064 0.396
2001
MW total effect -1.631 -2.661 -10.330 -7.519 -4.720 -2.096
MW composition effect -0.005 0.011 -0.971 0.572 -0.325 0.950
MW structure effect -1.626 -2.672 -9.359 -8.091 -4.395 -3.046
2002
MW total effect 0.704 -2.752 -1.109 -0.683 1.356 2.712
MW composition effect -0.002 -0.847 0.107 -1.060 -0.671 0.411
MW structure effect 0.706 -1.905 -1.216 0.376 2.027 2.302
2003
MW total effect -0.971 -1.589 -4.771 -3.138 -0.216 1.265
MW composition effect -0.001 -1.643 -3.312 -1.252 -0.292 0.603
MW structure effect -0.970 0.054 -1.459 -1.886 0.076 0.662
2004
MW total effect -3.675 -4.724 -6.051 -5.983 -5.744 -4.755
MW composition effect 0.000 -3.594 -1.258 -1.253 -0.885 -1.310
MW structure effect -3.675 -1.129 -4.793 -4.730 -4.859 -3.445
2005
MW total effect -2.878 -1.187 -4.691 -5.565 -5.764 -5.642
MW composition effect 0.000 -2.512 -3.099 -1.700 -1.649 -1.381
MW structure effect -2.878 1.325 -1.592 -3.865 -4.115 -4.261
2006
MW total effect -5.107 -6.117 -7.748 -7.483 -7.751 -6.693
MW composition effect 0.001 -4.535 -3.520 -1.865 -1.347 -0.956
MW structure effect -5.108 -1.581 -4.228 -5.618 -6.404 -5.737
2007
MW total effect -5.818 -9.288 -9.711 -9.945 -6.253 -6.276
MW composition effect 0.000 -7.360 -3.288 -0.505 -0.142 -0.762











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































       Appendix 6c: Decomposition of the Gender Wage Gap into Specific Variables at Selected Quantiles, 1996 
 The composition effect  The structure effect 
VARIABLES Oaxaca 10th 50th 70th  Oaxaca 10th 50th 70th 
         
minimum wage -0.001 -2.116 0.226 -0.900 -1.529 -4.964 -1.182 -0.767 
average wage -0.013 2.329 0.133 0.828 1.598 2.869 0.692 0.996 
compliance 0.002 -1.255 -0.252 -0.194 -1.163 -1.973 -0.328 -0.315 
college 0.020 0.003 0.005 0.012 0.013 0.009 0.018 0.005 
high school -0.008 -0.025 -0.020 -0.015 0.031 0.064 0.008 -0.004 
junior or below - - - - - - - -
soe 0.114 0.650 0.122 0.124 0.198 -0.474 -0.101 -0.142 
collective -0.079 0.073 0.028 0.036 0.062 -0.062 -0.019 -0.035 
other ownership - - - - - - - -
manufacturing - - - - - - - -
construction 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.012 0.001 0.010 
transportation 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.003 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
wholesales -0.002 0.001 -0.014 -0.004 0.010 0.008 0.010 -0.003 
education -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.009 -0.007 0.012 -0.013 0.001 
research 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.004 
personal service 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.020 0.000 0.004 
government 0.003 0.012 0.001 -0.006 0.011 0.036 -0.004 0.002 
finance 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 
other industry -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
professional -0.003 0.006 0.006 0.011 -0.024 -0.030 -0.033 -0.014 
manager 0.015 0.027 0.005 0.009 -0.011 -0.013 -0.009 -0.010 
clerical -0.000 -0.010 -0.001 0.010 -0.021 -0.001 -0.015 -0.026 
service 0.009 -0.009 0.001 0.005 -0.020 -0.014 -0.008 -0.002 
manual labor - - - - - - - -
other occupation -0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.009 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
east -0.000 0.020 -0.054 -0.024 -0.008 0.074 0.035 0.046 
central and west - - - - - - - -
experience 0.447 2.376 0.218 -0.310 -0.985 -1.005 -1.195 0.040 
expersq -0.500 -1.509 -0.144 0.095 0.862 1.112 0.727 0.091 
municipal control -0.000 0.023 -0.015 -0.029 -0.044 -0.117 -0.051 0.020 
constant - -0.615 -0.193 0.401 1.214 4.799 1.599 0.244 
  Notes: See Table 6a. 
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          Appendix 6d: Decomposition of the Gender Wage Gap into Specific Variables at Selected Quantiles, 2004 
 The composition effect  The structure effect 
VARIABLES Oaxaca 10th 50th 70th  Oaxaca 10th 50th 70th 
         
minimum wage 0.000 -3.594 -1.310 -0.560 -3.675 -1.129 -3.445 -2.588 
average wage -0.003 2.248 0.853 -0.385 3.745 0.236 4.373 5.436 
compliance 0.001 -1.377 -0.458 0.179 -1.516 -0.629 -1.672 -1.623 
college 0.027 0.023 0.014 0.023 -0.024 0.006 -0.037 -0.016 
high school -0.009 -0.012 -0.016 -0.011 -0.020 0.003 -0.030 0.004 
junior or below - - - - - - - -
soe 0.028 0.030 0.037 0.035 -0.057 0.040 -0.079 -0.086 
collective 0.003 -0.001 0.006 0.003 -0.011 -0.018 -0.008 -0.004 
other ownership - - - - - - - -
manufacturing - - - - - - - -
construction 0. 001 -0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 
transportation 0.012 0.011 0.016 0.011 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
wholesales 0.003 -0.003 0.005 0.004 -0.006 0.000 0.003 -0.014 
education -0.005 -0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.005 -0.008 -0.016 
research 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.009 0.000 0.001 
personal service 0.003 0.014 0.007 0.006 -0.002 -0.018 0.013 -0.001 
government 0.002 0.011 0.015 0.016 0.007 -0.019 0.004 0.001 
finance -0.000 -0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.012 
other industry 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
professional 0.001 0.014 -0.005 -0.008 -0.018 -0.026 -0.019 -0.017 
manager 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.017 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 
clerical 0.000 0.014 -0.007 -0.007 0.005 -0.002 -0.011 0.009 
service 0.017 0.027 0.018 0.015 -0.019 -0.018 -0.033 -0.022 
manual labor - - - - - - - -
other occupation 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.002 
east 0.001 -0.037 0.038 0.043 0.012 -0.016 0.035 0.019 
central and west - - - - - - - -
experience 0.235 0.958 -0.309 -0.117 0.079 -0.540 0.750 0.319 
expersq -0.229 -0.682 0.114 0.042 0.122 0.493 -0.256 -0.099 
municipal control 0.000 -0.024 0.003 0.003 -0.043 -0.017 0.011 -0.043 
constant - 2.477 1.040 0.784 1.690 1.943 0.681 -0.998 





This study has looked at China’s minimum wage system and has shed light on several related 
controversies, particularly its impacts on wages and employment. Chapter 3 considered the 
data used in this study; Chapter 4 looked at the wage effects of the minimum wage; Chapter 5 
investigated its employment effects; and Chapter 6 studied the gender wage gap and its 
relation to the minimum wage. 
  China’s minimum wage was first instituted in 1993 and it was revised and reinforced in 
2004. The minimum wage is defined as the minimum labour income that the employee earns 
in normal labouring hours (Minimum Wages Regulations, 2004), and is intended to apply to 
all employed people including disabled workers. As noted in Chapter 3, the minimum wage is 
set by the provincial governments and is agreed by the central government. Also, each 
province further sets several levels of minimum wages, and each municipality can choose a 
specific level according to its own economic conditions. Thus, there are more than 100 levels 
of minimum wage every year, providing greater variation in the minimum wage than in most 
other countries. Although China’s minimum wage system essentially follows international 
practice, as a developing country it has its own characteristics, with non-compliance being 
one of the most important. On average, non-compliance in this study’s data is around 7% (see 
Table 4.1), and is a factor that cannot be overlooked. Consequently, China’s minimum wage 




  This study investigates three questions. The first is the wage effects of the minimum wage 
(Chapter 4). Does the minimum wage help to reduce overall wage inequality in China, given 
its aim of helping the poor? If it does, what is the main channel for the minimum wage to 
work, i.e. are there wage effects specifically for unskilled workers, or for women? Do 
minimum wage effects spillover up the distribution, as in other countries? What about the 
informal sector and non-compliance? What about the “lighthouse effect”, given that 
approximately 7% of the workforce is not paid the minimum wage, yet may still be influenced 
by it?  
  The second question concerns the employment effects of the minimum wage (Chapter 5). 
Since wage effects and employment effects go side by side, it is natural to ask if there is a 
reduction in employment caused by China’s minimum wage. Does the minimum wage mainly 
affect vulnerable groups, such as youth, older labourers and women? How should the informal 
sector and non-compliance be considered? How does the long-run elasticity of the minimum 
wage compare with the short-run elasticity? How to consider the potential endogenous 
relationship between the minimum wage and employment? Are disemployment effects, if any, 
greater with the strengthening of the minimum wage system post-2004? 
  The last question relates to the gender wage gap and the minimum wage (Chapter 6). Since 
more women are covered by the minimum wage than men, what happens to the gender wage 
gap under the minimum wage system? Since females have disadvantages relative to males in 
productivity characteristics such as education and experience, is the gender wage gap mainly 
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caused by these differences (composition effects) or by the different returns to these 
characteristics (structure effects)? Are the composition and structure effects for unskilled 
workers at the bottom decile of the wage distribution similar to the effects further up? How 
much impact does the minimum wage have on these composition and structure effects? 
  Furthermore, since the minimum wage institution was reinforced in 2004, were its effects 
in the above three areas stronger after 2004? A set of individual panel data can be generated 
from the sample data to provide richer information. What different results can be obtained 
from this panel data when investigating wage effects of the minimum wage, as well as the 
gender wage gap? 
7.1. Summary of results 
This study is based on a unique municipal-level minimum wage dataset, as is discussed in 
Chapter 3. These data were collected personally from official publications. Such 
municipal-level data on the minimum wage provide more variation (see Fang and Lin, 2013) 
than the more usually used provincial-level data (e.g. Wang and Gunderson, 2012). The other 
dataset is a sub-sample from the Urban Household Survey (UHS), which contains annual data 
for workers in six provinces from 1990 to 2007, and monthly data for workers in eleven 
provinces from 2004 to 2007. The UHS is a long-standing nationally representative official 
survey, and hence is the best source of workforce data covering the past two decades. 
  Taking up first the questions of the wage effects of the minimum wage, the main conclusion 
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in Chapter 4 is that minimum wages have had a significant impact on wage inequality. The 
data for this topic are individual annual data for 1995-2007 (Individual monthly panel data are 
used for sensitivity tests). The empirical approach is based on Lee’s (1999) method and its 
extension (Bosch and Manacorda, 2010), which establishes a direct relation between effective 
minimum wages and wage percentiles.  
  The impact of the minimum wage on inequality certainly appears economically important. 
Our estimates imply that a 10% increase in the minimum wage raises the wage at the lowest 
10th percentile by up to 6% (Table 4.8). It also reduces the 10-60 wage gap by almost 10% in 
some specifications (see Tables 4.6 and 4.7), and has spillover effects spreading up to the 40th 
or 50th percentile of the wage distribution (Teuling’s (2000) model predicts this result, which 
is similar to Aeberhardt et al.’s (2012) results for France). Interestingly, the fact that the 
minimum wage raises wages of workers at the lowest 10th percentile suggests the existence of 
lighthouse effects pushing up wages even of workers not directly covered. All the above 
effects are stronger during 2004-2007 when the minimum wage system was reinforced, 
approximately doubling the pre-2004 wage effects (see Table 4.8).  
  Given the appreciable effects of minimum wages on the wage distribution, we would 
expect minimum wages to impact employment, and these employment effects form the 
subject matter of Chapter 5. Here our main conclusion is that minimum wages have lowered 
employment in formal (compliant) firms, an effect which is largely counterbalanced by 
employment increases in the non-compliant sector. The large, heterogeneous Chinese market 
239 
 
thus presents a more complicated picture than other countries (e.g. the US controversy, 
starting with Card and Kreuger (1994), and continuing with Dube (2011) and Neumark and 
Wascher (2013)).The data for this section is based on municipal level observations over 
1995-2007, summarised from individual annual data for this period. 
  Estimation of the elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage is of great 
policy importance, but estimates need cautious interpretation since several factors are 
involved, as shown in Chapter 5. A summary table of our range of estimates under different 
conditions is given in Table 7.1. Let us start with the first columns relating to the full sample 
with all ages taken together. The first row gives the short-run elasticity for the total sample 
(compliant and non-compliant together) over the full period 1995-2007, and we see a 
significant negative elasticity ranging from -0.10 to -0.07. Immediately below the 
corresponding long-run elasticities are given, ranging from -0.20 to -0.11, which is somewhat 
higher as expected. These are our basic results.  
 As can be seen, compliant workers exhibit higher negative elasticities, -0.34 to -0.19 in 
the short-run, and -0.28 in the long-run. However, these negative employment effects are 
counter-balanced to some extent by large positive elasticities for the non-compliant group. 
Since this group is quite small, the overall result is negative, as shown in our first entries. 
Thus, our elasticity estimate for the whole sample over the whole period is around -0.1 to -0.2. 
This figure is somewhat higher than Fang and Lin’s (2013) estimate (see Table 5.10), which is 
approximately -0.1, but it is not out of line with much of the international literature as 
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summarised by Neumark and Wascher (2008).  
  The second panel in the table takes the 2004-2007 period, after the minimum wage system 
was strengthened, and we expect larger effects to parallel the larger wage effects. However, 
the picture is not simple. We do see larger negative effects for the compliant group, with 
elasticities ranging from -0.32 to -0.19 in the short-run, and similar values in the long-run. At 
the same time, we also see large positive elasticities, even as high as 4.15 for the 
non-compliant group. The overall effect, for the total sample, is around zero in the short run, 
though with signs of a negative effect (ranging from -0.64 to -0.05). Thus it appears that the 
strengthened minimum wage system after 2004 did not reduce employment much, but rather 
caused a reduction of legal work, crowding workers into low-paying jobs, which of course 
was not the point of the law. Nevertheless, perhaps such crowding was a price worth paying to 
retain jobs. 
  Let us turn next to the findings for the youth group, which are more mixed. These results 
are presented in the second column of Table 7.1. We see that the short-run elasticity estimates 
over the full 1995-2007 period are significantly negative, ranging from -0.35 to -0.19, 
paralleling the negative effect for the full sample, but larger as may be expected. However, the 
long-run effect to not fall into the expected pattern, being smaller (-0.11 to 0.32). The 
elasticities for the compliant group tend to be negative, while those for non-compliant are 
positive, as we have already observed when all ages are taken together, but the picture is not 
as neat. Matters are somewhat clearer in the 2004-2007 panel, where we see that both short 
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and long-run elasticities for the compliant group are negative, however none are significant. 
Overall, we can say that a conclusion of a negative employment elasticity for the youth 
worker group does not yet have a firm foundation. This finding is at variance of course with 
the literature, which generally finds more marked effects (e.g. Neumark and Wascher, 2008) 
on youth employment. Clearly more research is required here. 
  As regards gender differences, women display disadvantages under rising minimum wages, 
with obvious larger negative effects in both total and full-compliance groups than men. As 
regards age differences, we find that older workers also experience disemployment, perhaps 
more than young workers. Thus, conventionally disadvantaged groups - women, young 
people and older workers - are all disemployed to some extent by rising minimum wages. 
  We take up our third set of questions, relating to the effects of the minimum wage on the 
gender wage gap, analysed in Chapter 6. Our main conclusion here is that the minimum wage 
system plays an important role in reducing the trend for the gender gap to widen. The findings 
here are the first for China, where no study of the gender gap has so far fully incorporated the 
minimum wage (Chi and Li (2008) and Zhang et al. (2008) overlook it). The data for this 
topic is individual annual data during 1995-2007. The gender gap decomposition is based on 
an unconditional quantile regression method (see FFL (2009), whose Stata command was 
used in this study).  
  We find that the gender wage gap in China has been rising, but at a slower pace since 2000 
(Figures 6.3 and 6.4) for women in the bottom percentiles – perhaps due to the minimum 
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wage. Certainly we find that the minimum wage raises pay of women in the bottom 10th 
percentile more than men (a structure effect). In addition, after 2003 more women than men 
become covered (a composition effect), which is reasonable (Table 6.1 shows that women’s 
coverage rises from 15% to 25%, while men’s remains steady at about 10%). More research is 
needed to establish just how much wider the gap would be without the minimum wage, but 
the large size of the composition and structural effects associated with the minimum wage 
point to its importance. 
  Overall, it seems that the welfare implications of higher minimum wages are not clear cut 
in China. We have found the minimum wage does significantly reduce both the wage 
distribution and the gender wage gap. However, there seems to be corresponding cost in that 
workers either lose their jobs – or might be crowded into non-compliant employment. Put 
simply, in the crowding model (see Boeri et al., 2011), as the supply of labour to informal 
sectors rises, wages fall. It should also be noted that our data do not cover rural migrants in 
informal sectors who are likely to be first to lose their jobs. Thus, our estimates of the 
(negative) employment elasticity of the minimum wage could be over-optimistic. More 
research is needed into this aspect. 
7.2. Research implications 
Since the welfare implications of the minimum wage are not clear cut, the adjustment of 
minimum wages should be undertaken with caution. The social costs of rising wages for these 
low-wage workers may include disemployment, even though it is true that our results for 
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groups generally considered to be most influenced by the minimum wage, such as the youth, 
older labourers and women, are mixed. In practice, non-compliance acts as a buffer since it 
cannot be eliminated without much more policing. Total disemployment effects (compliant 
and non-compliant sectors) will be smaller than they would be without non-compliance, 
which means a relatively smaller social cost.  
  Thus, more research into non-compliance is needed; in particular examining rural migrants 
in the informal sector. The wage changes and the labour mobility between formal and 
informal sectors caused by the minimum wage may lead to another research perspective. Only 
by combining the study of rural areas with the relevant studies for formal sectors or urban 
residents, can there be a complete picture of the minimum wage policy in China. My thesis 
here marks a beginning. 
  One additional recommendation is that the minimum wage and income (rather than 
earnings) inequality in China should be investigated further as income sources are much more 
complicated than wages. Income inequality also appears to have been rising more 
dramatically than wage inequality1. Moreover, people who receive the minimum wage 
sometimes are not those in the poorest households (see literature review from Brown, 1999, 









published in English has yet analysed income inequality and the minimum wage in China 
(there are several Chinese studies, e.g. Luo (2007c) concluding the minimum wage can reduce 
the income gap between rural and urban areas). These two topics are left for future study.  
  Finally, as noted above, our results for specific sub-groups, in particular youth and women 
are mixed. More research is needed into the youth sub-group, which formed only a part of this 
thesis’s more general study, which aimed to cover all age groups. The same can be said the 
minimum wage effects for women. Our study marks a beginning, in that the estimates suggest 
that the minimum wage reduces the gender wage gap substantially, but more work remains to 











Table 7.1 Employment-Rate Elasticities with respect to the Minimum Wage  
      All ages Young 
 Range Range 
1995-2007 
Total sample Short Run -0.10* to -0.07* -0.35* to -0.19* 
Long Run -0.20* to -0.11* -011  to 0.32* 
Compliant Short Run -0.34* to -0.19* -0.90* to 0.03* 
Long Run -0.28* to -0.28* -0.14  to -0.11 
Non-compliant Short Run 1.20* to 2.20* 0.36 to 1.56* 




 -0.68*  
      — 
 
Age 50-65 Total 
Compliant 
 -0.38* 
 -1.16*  
      — 
 
2004-2007 
Total sample Short Run -0.02  to 0.062 -0.24 to 0.84* 
Long Run -0.64* to -0.05 -0.84* to -0.71 
Compliant Short Run -0.32* to -0.19* -0.81 to -0.27 
Long Run -0.30* to -0.23* -0.75 to -0.40 
Non-compliant Short Run 3.2*  to 2.28* -0.27 to 2.40* 
Long Run 2.41* to 4.15* -1.02 to 0.96 
Female Total  -0.12* 
      — 
Compliant  -0.73* 
Age 50-65 Total   0.16 
      — 
Compliant  -1.45* 
 
Source: Chapter 5 
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